Anderson, Ralph V. "If I Remember." Cryptologia 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1982): 40-44.
The author served in the Navy Department code room.
Aplington, Henry, II. "Remembrance of Duty in ONI." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1989): 10-11.
Bath, Alan Harris. Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Seamon, Proceedings 125.3 (Mar. 1999), views this work as a "remarkably detailed history of Anglo-American cooperation in the arcane art of intelligence gathering and analysis." In telling the story, there is a "consistent undercurrent of conflict," in that "[n]either nation fully trusted the other's methods ... [nor] credited the other's conclusions." Yet, "they did learn to work together." To Maiolo, I&NS 16.3, the author's "prose style is very clear and his research thorough.... While the general tale of Anglo-American naval intelligence ... will be familiar to many, the value of this study is in the details."
For Bates, NIPQ 15.2 (1999), the author "does a good job explaining why intelligence cooperation in the Pacific was so poor in comparison with that developed in the Atlantic and Mediterranean." The reviewer concludes that "[t]his is a book you should read and it would make an excellent classroom text." Kruh, Cryptologia 23.2 (1999), applauds the author's effort "to put in perspective the total contribution of Allied Naval intelligence to victory in WW II." This is "an essential guide to the Anglo-American intelligence labyrinth ... and the role of codebreaking" in World War II.
Boyd, Carl. American Command of the Sea through Carriers, Codes, and the Silent Service: World War II and Beyond. Newport News, VA: The Mariner's Museum, 1995.
McGinnis, Cryptolog (Summer 1996), says this "is a small and short [80 pp] book intended primarily as a showpiece for The Mariner's Museum bookstore." Nevertheless, it gives a "short background of Comint, and then gives numerous illustrations about how Comint was used during WWII." According to Kruh, Cryptologia 20.2, this work "focuses on the role that signal intelligence played in increasing the effectiveness of submarines and aircraft carriers during the war.... This worthwhile book contains more than 75 illustrations."
Brooks, Tom [Thomas A.] [RADM/USN (Ret.)]
1. "Part One: Naval Intelligence and the Mafia in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 2 (Apr. 2007): 39-40.
In this first of a multipart series, Brooks writes on the relationship between the District Intelligence Office (DIO) of the Third Naval District in New York City and organized crime, particularly "Lucky" Luciano, in protecting the Port of New York.
2. "Part Two: Naval Intelligence and the Mafia in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2007): 17, 19.
Brooks writes about the four volunteers from DIO 3ND who participated in the Mediterranean landings from Sicily through the land campaign. "Their exploits would not have been possible without the contacts provided tham by the New York City Mafia and the local Mafia in Sicily."
3. "Part Three: Naval Intelligence and the Mafia in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Sep. 2007): 7, 11.
This part of the story "concerns Lucky Luciano and the controversy surrounding his pardon and deportation to Sicily after World War II."
Brugioni, Dino. "Naval Photo Intel in WWII." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114, no. 6 (Jun. 1987): 46-51.
Campbell, Rodney. The Luciano Project: The Secret Wartime Collaboration of the Mafia and the U.S. Navy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.
According to Pforzheimer, this book is "based on the official 1954 report of the New York State Commissioner of Investigation,... kept secret until 1976 when it was used as the basis of this accurate book." Constantinides says "Campbell does a fine piece of work in tracing events connected with this cooperative arrangement." However, he does not answer the question of what intelligence was actually produced. Bates, NIPQ 9.3, notes that Campbell "accuses ONI of a vicious campaign of denial and disinformation about the Luciano Project.... Nonetheless, the story is a good one, and convincing."
Christensen, Chris. "U.S. Navy Cryptologic Mathematicians during World War II." Cryptologia 35, no. 3 (Jul. 2011): 267-276.
This article "recognizes some of the mathematicians who served at the Washington, D.C. Naval Communications Annex during World War II."
Coon, Thomas F. "New York City and DIO-3ND in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 7-8.
The author offers a personal feel for the people and activities of the Third Naval District Naval Intelligence Office.
Dingman, Roger. Deciphering the Rising Sun: Navy and Marine Corps Codebreakers, Translators, and Interpreters in the Pacific War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.
Levine, Proceedings 136.2 (Feb. 2010), notes that the author "describes the development of the 'crash' program for training Navy and Marine Corps Japanese linguists immediately before and during World War II and their impact on postwar U.S.-Japanese relations." Levine, Cryptologia 34.2 (Apr. 2010), adds that this work "is truly a new and unique contribution to the literature of intelligence."
For Goulden, Washington Times (6 Sep. 2009) and Intelligencer 17.2 (Fall 2009), "Dingman demonstrates that an application of energy and talent could resolve our current linguist shortages." Aboul-Enein, NIPQ 26.1 (Jan. 2010), calls this "[a] timely and thought-provoking book on the history of a little studied aspect of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps intelligence." Mercado, Studies 54.2 (Jun. 2010), sees Dingman's history as "a moving and relevant one for today's readers."
Dorwart, Jeffrey M. Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983.
For Petersen, this is a "[c]ontroversial account emphasizing alleged questionable activities, some of which purportedly originated with President Roosevelt." Pforzheimer notes that Dorwart's "intelligence dilemma" is the Office of Naval Intelligence's dual "roles in both positive and counter-intelligence." His view is that "the latter interferes with the former which [he] feels is ONI's 'primary obligation.'" This "purported imbalance is well supported."
Ford, Christopher, and David Rosenberg. The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.
Mazzafro, NIPQ 21.2 (Jun. 2005), describes this work as an "easy to read, well-researched, and nicely-indexed slim volume." The authors "effectively use a chronological approach to let their research tell the Navy OPINTEL story through the recollections and commentary of those who lived and used it." For Kruh, Cryptologia 30.2 (Apr. 2006), this is a "path-breaking work" that goes "as close to the edge of classification as possible."
While he sees this work offering "many lessons both to the intelligence professional and to anyone doing research into intelligence matters," Guenther, NIPQ 21.3 (Sep. 2005), is disappointed by how much better the book could have been had it reflected Marine Corps participation. Reveron, DIJ 14.2 (2005), notes that the authors "had unprecedented access to naval intelligence archives and senior consumers and producers of Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL)." They have produced a book that "is a rich history of the origins of Navy OPINTEL, its transformation during the Cold War, and important lessons for the future."
Beyond a cautionary note ("the contention that the Navy's concept of all-source operational intelligence was in any sense pace setting is open to question"), Peake, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), accepts that "[l]ittle has been published on the topic of naval OPINTEL and this book fills that gap admirably. While it is replete with acronyms (over 130) and turgid Pentagonese, its basic message comes through loud and clear: Intelligence is the admiral's advantage."
Evans, Proceedings 132.3 (Mar. 2006), calls this work a "comprehensive and meticulously researched study." It "provides a remarkable insight into the chronicles of U.S. Navy" OPINTEL, and "the impact it had on the ultimate victory of the United States ... during the Cold War." See also Emil Levine [CAPT/USNR (Ret.)], "NFOIO's Place in the History of OPINTEL: A Commentary on 'The Admirals' Advantage,'" NIPQ 21.2 (Jun. 2005): 21-22; and John Prados' review in Journal of Military History 70.3 (Jul. 2006): 865-867, and NIPQ 22.4 (Sep. 2006): 34-35.
Furnas, Wendell J. [CAPT/USN (Ret.) "From JICPOA to Guam: Hitchhiking with the Marines." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 13, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 1-3.
Furnas was a Navy Japanese Language Officer who landed with Third Marine Division on Guam in June 1944. The mission was to interrogate prisoners and translate documents; collect high priority documents, equipment, and prisoners for immediate dispatch back to JICPOA and FRUPAK; and ship back other captured documents and equipment of longer-term interest.
Furst, Alan. "The Listeners of World War II." Intelligence Quarterly 3, no. 1 (1987): 1.
Bainbridge Island, WA, was a Naval Security Group listening post and training center for most of World War II and Korea.
Jacobsen, Philip H. [LTCDR/USN (Ret.)]
1. Eyewitness to History. Pensacola, FL: U.S. Navy Cryptologic Veterans Association, 2006.
According to Kruh, Cryptologia 31.2 (Apr. 2007), this book includes a number of Jacobsen's "interesting" and "outstanding" articles on various aspects of World War II. This "is an excellent book for anyone interested in the U.S. Navy's role" in the war.
2. "Station AL -- Guadalcanal: A Full Service WWII Cryptologic Unit." Cryptologia 31, no. 1 (Jan. 2007): 57-75.
The DF station on Guadalcanal went operational on 15 September 1942. On 5 November 1942, the personnel (including the author) arrived to establish a "small intercept, cryptanalysis, traffic analysis and reporting unit." The article has details about the work and life of the unit under dangerous and trying conditions.
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