The
level of dispute that continues to surround the events of 7 December 1941
is amazing. Every few years, another book purporting to say something new
on the subject appears and enjoys relatively brisk sales. The
level of dispute that continues to surround the events of 7 December 1941
is amazing. Every few years, another book purporting to say something new
on the subject appears and enjoys relatively brisk sales.
For the most part, the basic facts about what happened on that day over 60 years ago are well established. However, many of the "how" & "why" questions continue to be debated, and most of the areas in dispute involve issues of intelligence. Essentially, the questions concern what was known and by whom and what was done or not done about it. There are at least two broad categories of contention.
The
first category is what we can call conspiracy theories. Pearl Harbor abounds
in such theories.
One
such theory says that President Roosevelt knew the Japanese attack was coming
and -- because of an overweening desire to see the United States in the
war -- did not warn the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii. Readers are
referred to the following articles to get both sides of this particular
dispute: Edward S. Barkin and L. Michael Meyer, "COMINT and Pearl Harbor:
FDR's Mistake," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
2, no. 4 (Winter 1988): 513-531; and Edwin C. Fishel and Louis W. Tordello,
"FDR's Mistake? Not Likely," International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 360-372.
For a discussion of another entry into the "FDR-knew" sweepstakes, see John C. Zimmerman, "Pearl Harbor Revisionism: Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit," Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 127-146, a "Review Essay" focused on Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor
(New York: Free Press, 1999).
A second conspiracy theory accuses British Prime Minister Winston Churchill of knowing that the Japanese fleet was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor but not warning Roosevelt. The reason suggested for Churchill's action was a belief that the America's joining with England was the only way that Hitler could be defeated. The central work in this category is probably James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt
into World War II (Old Tappan, NJ: Simon & Schuster, 1992). Rusbridger
was a prolific -- and often sensationalist -- author on intelligence matters.
Nave is regarded by some as the father of British codebreaking in the Far
East. Based largely on Nave's memory decades after the fact, the book contends
that both the British and the Dutch intercepted -- and read -- a radio signal
sent to the Japanese carrier force on 25 November 1941. That message is
supposed to have revealed the position and likely destination of the Japanese
fleet. The authors assert that Churchill received this message -- and deliberately
withheld it in order to ensure that the United States would be attacked
and thereby brought into the war.
The
assertions in the Rusbridger and Nave book were greeted with some enthusiasm
by the popular press, but were rejected almost universally by historians
and intelligence experts. In the main, the book is based on hearsay and
bits and pieces of information presented as evidence. The central argument
in the book violates all that is known about the history of British and
American cryptology. Briefly stated, the Japanese code that Rusbridger and
Nave claim the message was sent in had not by all credible evidence -- and
that evidence is voluminous -- been broken in 1941. In addition, the recently
released minutes of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) for 1941 do not
support the revisionist suggestion that Churchill had and withheld foreknowledge
of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. See Richard Aldrich, "British
and American Policy on Intelligence Archives: Never-Never Land and Wonderland?"
Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 18.
To
show that conspiracy theorists are committed to equal opportunity for friends
and nonfriends alike, a third theory gives Stalin knowledge of the Japanese
plans. Like Churchill, he is supposed to have so badly wanted the United
States in the war against Hitler that he withheld that information from
the Americans.
A
second category of dispute comes from within the U.S. military. This argument
began with the commanders of American Army and Navy forces in Hawaii. Both
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were relieved of their commands in the
wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Throughout the investigations that followed,
both men maintained that Washington had withheld vital information that
prevented them from being alert against a surprise attack. To this day --
and this is particularly true of Navy veterans -- the treatment of Kimmel
and Short remains a grievance that ever so often gives rise to calls to
restore them to a place of respect.
One
of the most vigorous defenses of Admiral Kimmel is contained in the bestseller
by Edwin T. Layton [RAdm/USN (Ret.)], with Roger Pineau [CAPT/USNR (Ret.)]
and John Costello, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway--Breaking
the Secrets (New York: Morrow, 1985). A more recent book with a clearly
enunciated agenda is Edward L. Beach, Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel
and Short at Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press,
1995).
On
the other side of this fence is a book that is highly credible -- you could
even say authoritative -- but still controversial. The book is Henry C.
Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement (New York: Crown
Publishing, 1992). Clausen was the independent investigator appointed by
Secretary of War Stimson to investigate the root causes of the Pearl Harbor
disaster. The book is essentially the conclusions drawn from Clausen's highly
classified report years after the fact; thus, the title "Final Judgement."
Clausen
concluded that the "proximate guilt for the disaster at Pearl Harbor
was an unworkable system of military intelligence, including the fact that
the Navy withheld from the Army vital intelligence information that called
for Army action." (p. 300) Clausen follows that conclusion by placing
the immediate guilt squarely on the shoulders of the two commanding officers
in Hawaii -- General Short and Admiral Kimmel. These conclusions have not
set well among certain naval officers of the period, and therein lies much
of the controversy surrounding the book.
The
points made in one review of Clausen's book seem to illuminate the controversy
particularly well: No one has "been able to prove that anyone had real
information warning of a Pearl Harbor attack.... [T]he behavior of the Washington
authorities suggests that they believed that they had given field commanders
enough warning of impending hostilities, and for the most part, the record
backs them up.... Th[e] evidence ... suggests that General Short simply
did not regard an attack upon Hawaii as a serious possibility.... To the
unbiased, reflective historian, five decades after the event, the Pearl
Harbor attack exemplifies the difficulty of anticipating surprise, the mistakes
which individuals inevitably make, the ease with which governments fail
to make use of available information, and the relative unimportance,
in the long run, of winning the opening battle of a war." David Kaiser,
"Review Article: Conspiracy or Cock-up? Pearl Harbor Revisited,"
Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 354-372.
In late 1995, the Department of Defense released what was meant to be (but will not be) the final word on the Kimmel-Short controversy: Memorandum
for the Deputy Secretary of Defense: "Advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel
and Major General Short" (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 1 Dec. 1995). The report, prepared
under the guidance of Edwin Dorn, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness, concluded that advancement of Kimmel and Short on the retired
list to their highest temporary grades of admiral and lieutenant general,
respectively, was not warranted.
The
findings of the Dorn study are summarized in five parts:
1. Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared.
2. To say that responsibility is broadly shared is not to absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short of accountability.
3. The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantially temperate and procedurally proper.
4. History has not been hostile to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
5. There is not a compelling basis for advancing either officer to higher grade. [See review by Thomas B. Buell [CDR/USN (Ret.)], U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 122, no. 4 (Apr. 1996): 98-100.]
The
debate was resumed in the U.S. Senate in May 1999, when an amendment to the defense spending bill brought a heated debate and a 52 to 47 vote "to exonerate [the] two American military commanders accused of dereliction of duty in the bombing of Pearl Harbor." Washington Post, "Senators Exonerate Pearl Harbor Chiefs," 26 May 1999.
Return to Pearl Harbor Table of
Contents