Callahan, Raymond. "No Real Surprise Here." Military History 8 (Oct. 1991): 74-79.
According to Sexton, the author discusses "four strategic surprises achieved by Axis forces...: the conquest of Norway, the thrust through the Ardennes, the invasion of Russia and the attack at Pearl Harbor. Each event is assessed in [a] context of extant intelligence and preconceptions."
Carlson, Elliot. "Missing Clues and Cracking Codes in the Pacific War." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137, no. 12 (Dec. 2011): 66-71.
The author suggests that Rochefort's 27 November 1941 briefing of Admiral Kimmel "might have unintentionally reinforced the Fleet commander's attachment to the conventional outlook at Pearl: Japan would strike -- on the other side of the Pacific."
Chapman, John W.M. "Pearl Harbor: The Anglo-Australian Dimension'" Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 3 (Jul. 1989): 451-460.
"[T]here seems to be no intrinsic reason on the British side, even less than on the Australian side, for there to be any cover-up surrounding the British role in Allied intelligence co-operation against Japan in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor."
Clausen, Henry C., and Bruce Lee. Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement. New York: Crown Publishing, 1992.
Clark comment: This book is a centerpiece in the long-standing dispute over "who lost Pearl Harbor?" Clausen was the independent investigator appointed by Secretary of War Stimson to investigate the root causes of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The book is essentially the conclusions drawn years after the fact from Clausen's highly classified report.
Kruh, Cryptolog 14.2, argues that the author "convincingly debunks Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories." He "names the individuals he blames for the disaster and ... lists these individuals in terms of their culpability based on a scale from zero to ten. Heading this list are the Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor." FILS 12.1 notes that Clausen's ranking of levels of guilt is performed "[p]erhaps with a little too much relish."
According to Robinson, Cryptolog 14.4, the "casual reader who lacks experience and understanding of the essential interaction that exists between intelligence information and operational activity, and some knowledge of the constraints imposed by security rules and procedures, will be misled." There is an "astonishing amount of bias, faulty judgment and an ignorance of the operational context of the times in which command decisions were being made.... The author, well stocked with preconceptions, repeatedly accuses Admiral Kimmel ... and others of lying when the problem is his own lack of knowledge of where these people are coming from."
To Beach, Proceedings 119.7 (Jul. 1993), this "book ... is a travesty ... [and] is flawed terribly." The "national leadership in Washington [Roosevelt, Marshall, Stark] ... failed utterly in its obligation to its armed forces." Pinaeu, Proceedings 119.7 (Jul. 1993), comments that Clausen's "investigative tactics were not above reproach." There are "several curiously uninformative footnotes ... and annoying bloopers abound." The author "slants evidence to cover Secretary [of War Henry] Stimson and General [George C.] Marshall on the basis of information that was stale in 1944." He also "echoes the fallacious At Dawn We Slept litany about U.S. unpreparedness."
Tolley, Proceedings 119.7 (Jul. 1993), believes that we should not "expect even a top trial lawyer to translate evidence into sound conclusions involving fields where he is largely ignorant and biased." Clausen's "understanding of general military affairs clearly was weak.... There are some good points to this book. A voluminous (157-page) appendix of background material is most informative and useful.... Also, the authors make it clear that the real villains in the Pearl Harbor debacle were an inadequate intelligence structure and lack of unified command -- plus a shortage of imagination and brillance on the part of all the principals."
Kaiser, I&NS 9.2, finds that Final Judgement "adds to our knowledge in several important respects." Clausen has produced a "highly readable book.... [M]uch of what he uncovered late in the war ... has been ignored.... Lawyers ... acquire the habit of working to prove a particular point.... Readers must therefore approach his account with caution." Neither Rusbridger and Nave nor Layton "have been able to prove that anyone had real information warning of a Pearl Harbor attack.... [T]he behavior of the Washington authorities suggests that they believed that they had given field commanders enough warning of impending hostilities, and for the most part, the record backs them up.... Th[e] evidence ... suggests that General Short simply did not regard an attack upon Hawaii as a serious possibility.... To the unbiased, reflective historian, five decades after the event, the Pearl Harbor attack exemplifies the difficult of anticipating surprise, the mistakes which individuals inevitably make, the ease with which governments fail to make use of available information, and the relative unimportance, in the long run, of winning the opening battle of a war."
Although not a review of Clausen's book, Michael Gannon, "Reopen the Kimmel Case," Proceedings 120.12 (Dec. 1994), 51-55, argues that the allegation that Admiral Kimmel "knew of and ignored advice regarding the direction and extent to which he should have ordered long-range air reconnaissance prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor is false -- and grounds to set it right exist."
Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press, 1990.
Wirtz, I&NS 6.3, says that the authors "move beyond the traditional analyses of military disaster by demonstrating how the performance of military organizations influences the outcome of battle.... [They] offer extraordinarily keen insights into some well-known events," including Pearl Harbor, the Chinese intervention in the Korean war, and the Yom Kippur war.
1. Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill -- The Shocking Truth Revealed: How Their Secret Deals and Strategic Blunders Caused Disasters at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. New York: Pocket Books, 1994. 1995. [pb]
Brinkley, WPNWE, 26 Dec. 1994-1 Jan. 1995, suggests that despite its "tabloid dust jacket," this is "a truly remarkable and original scholarly contribution ... [involving] painstaking archival research." This book "successfully rehabilitates the ... careers" of Pacific Fleet Commander Kimmel and U.S. Army Hawaiian Commander Short. But it is "bound to upset admirers of Gen. MacArthur." Costello also "questions the constitutionality of FDR's pre-war decisions."
To Bates, NIPQ 11.1, the "culprit" in this book is "MacArthur who, Costello contends, caused an even greater strategic defeat ... than Pearl Harbor." The book is "repetitious and poorly edited." Most of Costello's "facts and conclusions are accurate," but he "goes off the deep end" when he contends that 1945-1946 decrpyts of messages intercepted in 1941 contained information which "would have revealed the plan to attack Pearl Harbor." The book's secondary mission "is to force the exoneration" of Kimmel and Short.
Allen, Proceedings 121.4 (Apr. 1995), says "Costello discloses nothing sensational about the use and misuse of military intelligence. However, he does piece together a solid story about what happened, regardless of intelligence reports. Except for an occasional lurch into tabloid imagery..., Costello tells a bigger story than Pearl Harbor's day of infamy -- and tells it well." For Kruh, Cryptologia 19.3, Costello provides "strong and circumstantial evidence mixed with conjecture, speculation and 20-20 hindsight." The most controversial charges are delivered with "stinging rhetoric but not always solid evidence."
2. "MacArthur, Magic, Black Jumbos and the Dogs that Didn't Bark: New Intelligence on the Pearl Harbor Attack." In In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 197-250. Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994.
Curts, Bob. "Was Admiral Layton Too Hard on Himself? Some Thoughts on Warning and Surprise." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 3, no. 3 (1987): 4-5.
Dupuy, Trevor N. "Pearl Harbor: Who Blundered." American Heritage 13 (Feb. 1962): 65-80.
According to Sexton, this "somewhat polemical examination of the decisions and actions of key American political and military leaders ... attributes the Pearl Harbor disaster to a failure of leadership on General Marshall's part."
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