Albright, Harry. Pearl Harbor: Japan's Fatal Blunder. New York: Hippocrene, 1988.
Petersen: "Former Army intelligence officer."
Anderson, Charles R. Day of Lightning, Years of Scorn: Walter C. Short and the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.
Bath, NIPQ 21.1 (Mar. 2005), notes that the author concludes "that much of the problem [with the surprise at Pearl Harbor] lay in the antiquated system of information-sharing and decision-making among the State, War, and Navy departments ... that precluded effective reaction to modern, rapidly developing international situations."
Azzole, Pete. "Afterthoughts: Rochefort on: A Successful Failure; Communications Intelligence and Pearl Harbor." Cryptolog 16, no. 6 (Fall Extra 1995): 12.
One in a series of articles by Azzole "based on Captain Rochefort's oral history interview in 1969 by Commander Etta-Belle Kitchen." Rochefort was "assigned in June 1941 as Officer in Charge, Combat Intelligence Unit, Pacific Ocean Areas, located in Pearl Harbor." Rochefort maintains that "up to and including 7 December , we were not reading the Japanese system."
Bachrach, Deborah. Pearl Harbor: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven, 1989.
Barker, Arthur J. Pearl Harbor. Battle Book No. 10, Ballantine Illustrated History of World War II Series. New York: Ballentine, 1971. 1977. [pb]
Barkin, Edward S., and L. Michael Meyer. "COMINT and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 4 (Winter 1988): 513-531.
The focus here is the work of "neo-revisionists" who emphasize the interception of Japanese Naval radio transmissions, rather than MAGIC, as warnings that were ignored -- or, rather, that Roosevelt deliberately failed to communicate to the commanders at Pearl Harbor. See Fishel and Tordello, "FDR's Mistake? Not Likely," IJI&C 5.3 (Fall 1991), 360-372, for a refutation.
Barnes, Harry Elmer. Pearl Harbor after a Quarter of a Century. New York: Arno, 1972.
"On Barnes and his conspiracy theories see Richard T. Ruetten, 'Harry Elmer Barnes and the Historical Blackout,' The Historian 33, no. 2 (Feb. 1971): 202-214." Zimmerman, I&NS 127.2/fn.8.
Bartlett, Bruce R. Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1978.
The title gives the thrust of this author's position.
Beach, Edward L. [CAPT/USN (Ret.)]
Beach (1918-2002) is perhaps best known as the author of the novel Run Silent, Run Deep.
1. Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
"Membership News," Proceedings 121.3 (Mar. 1995), calls Scapegoats an "impassioned but carefully reasoned plea for posthumous justice for the two military commanders blamed for the debacle at Pearl Harbor.... Beach argues that political and military expediency led to the[ir] firing." See also, Beach's letter, "Comment and Discussion," Proceedings 121.4 (Apr. 1995), 27-28.
Bates, NIPQ 11.3, comments that while Beach "presents no new evidence here ... [t]he case for rehabilitation is well presented.... There are two issues in the book which are overplayed.... First is the strong vilification of RADM Richmond Kelly Turner.... [T]o rehabilitate one actor does not require the posthumous declaration of dereliction by another.... The second is the speculation (pages 102 to 109) as to what might have happened had the Japanese attack not been so successful. While interesting, this does nothing for the case in favor of rehabilitation.... [Beach] does not subscribe to the revisionist theory ... that Roosevelt was fully aware of the Japanese armada approaching Pearl Harbor and purposely withheld that information ... so that the attack would take place and galvanize the nation in support of our entry into the war."
For Kruh, Cryptologia 19.4, "[w]hether or not you agree with Captain Beach, his examination of the juxtaposition of politics and war and his penetrating interpretation of events and the motivations of key personalities will fascinate everyone."
2. "Who's to Blame." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 117, no. 12 (Dec. 1991), 32-40.
Sexton finds this to be a "[t]endentious article" that includes "several erroneous assumptions relative to the content and character of MAGIC intercepts. Should be used with caution."
Beard, Charles. President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study of Appearances and Reality. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1948.
1. "The Dynamics of Surprise: The Defender's Perspective." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 113-144.
The author uses three cases studies -- Pearl Harbor (1941), the Chinese attack on India (1962), and the Yom Kippur War (1973) -- to illustrate his point that misunderstanding the enemy's intentions may not be the cause of a nation being "surprised" by an attack. Rather, he argues that a tendency to misunderstand -- to undervalue -- the enemy's capabilities seems to be more important in explaining why surprise was achieved.
2. "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attack." World Politics 28, no. 3 (Apr. 1976): 381- 395.
Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), finds that the author's "approach offers foresight." However, Ben-Zvi's use of only three case studies (Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor, and Yom Kippur) as the basis for his "conceptual framework" weakens the analysis.
Bisher, Jamie. "The Warning Shot." Honolulu Magazine 16, no. 1 (Dec. 2012): 55-57. [http://www.honolulumagazine.com]
From author: This "article describes the confiscation of a Japanese pocket novel by US Customs in Hawaii on December 7, 1933. The novel, written by a Japanese Naval Reserve officer..., described a future war with the US with Tom Clancy-like detail. The US Army intelligence officer recommended seizure of the book and Hawaii's Japanese-American community earnestly concurred, lest the incendiary fiction arouse ethnic antagonism. US military intelligence quickly translated it, recommending that the Army Chief of Staff take note of certain scenarios, and a copy of the translation was leaked to the Washington Herald, which published it in its entirety in several installments in early 1934. The article ... declares that the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor and United States interests throughout the Pacific was hardly any secret, as the 1933 bombshell confirmed. The surprise lay merely in the date and execution."
Bollinger, Marty. "Did a Soviet Merchant Ship Encounter the Pearl Harbor Strike Force?" Naval War College Review 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 93-110.
The author addresses the notion that "a Soviet merchant vessel detected and reported the Imperial Japanese Navy strike force en route to the Pearl Harbor attack." He concludes that there is "no evidence to support the view ... that the Japanese strike force heading for Hawaii encountered a Soviet merchant ship on 5 December 1941 (Hawaii time).... Likewise, no evidence places a Soviet merchant ship in the vicinity of the Japanese fleet in the period 13 December.... Therefore, it seems probable the Japanese did manage to maintain operational security during the tense voyage to Hawaii."
Borch, Fred L.
1. "Comparing Pearl Harbor and '9/11': Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?" Journal of Military History 67, no. 3 (Jul. 2003): 845-860.
Abstract: "Claims by some commentators that '9/11' was an intelligence failure like Pearl Harbor, that the United States was unprepared for '9/11' like she was for the Japanese attack on Hawaii, and that, like Pearl Harbor, the military was not ready to defend against al Qaeda's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are incorrect. On the contrary, an analysis of the two events reveals that they are more dissimilar than alike."
2. and Daniel Martinez. Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The Final Report Revealed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.
Bath, NIPQ 21.1 (Mar. 2005), notes that the report of the committee headed by Dr. Edwin Dorn "is the heart" of this book. For Marsman, DIJ 14.1 (2005), the authors provide "the context for properly interpreting the findings and intent of the Dorn Report.... A fairly easy read, the book clarifies comments, findings, and statements that were not (or could not) be made in 1995."
Brownlow, Donald G. The Accused: The Ordeal of Rear Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, U.S.N. New York: Vantage, 1968. [Petersen]
Budiansky, Stephen. "Too Late for Pearl Harbor." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 12 (Dec. 1999): 47-51.
"The monthly reports filed by OP-20-G confirm that at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, not a single JN-25 message from the previous 12 months had been read."
Burtness, Paul S., and Warren U. Ober.
1. The Puzzle of Pearl Harbor. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1962. [Petersen]
2. "Research Methodology: The Problem of the Pearl Harbor Intelligence Reports." Military Affairs 25 (Fall 1961): 132-146. [Petersen]
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