WORLD WAR II

Far East and Pacific Theaters

Japan

K - Z

Kato Masao. Rikugun Nakano Gakko no Zensho [Portrait of the Army Nakano School]. Tokyo: Tendensha, 1998.

Mercado, AIJ 21/1&2, notes that Japan's "school to train men in intelligence gathering and covert action" operated from 1938 to 1945. The author, a product of the school, "traces the institution's prewar roots, recounts its wartime exploits, and highlights the postwar activities of several prominent graduates."

Kimura, Hiseo, as told to Scott Berry. Japanese Agent in Tibet: My Ten Years of Travel in Disguise. London: Serindia Publications, 1990.

Surveillant 2.4: Kimura was a 1940s agent for the Japanese and British. After 1950, he "worked for the US Gov't, monitoring daily Mongolian broadcasts from Moscow, Ulan Bator and Peking." Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War (1999), 330/fn.38 refers to Kimura as having "spent the war on a hapless intelligence mission for the Japanese military in the Ando region of northeastern Tibet. He reached Lhasa only after the war ended." See also, Berry, Monks, Spies and a Soldier of Fortune: The Japanese in Tibet (1995).

Kotani, Ken. "Could the Japanese Read Allied Signal Traffic? Japanese Codebreaking and the Advance into French Indo-China, September 1940." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 304-320.

"[I]t is clear that Japan had negotiated with Indo-China on the basis of intelligence about US and British intentions obtained beforehand. Signal intelligence was one of the reasons Japanese troops could move into French Indo-China without fear of provoking serious Western reaction." However, "the Japanese Navy and Army solved only low grade British ciphers." In 1940, the Japanese Navy's "11th Section is comparable to the [British] GC&CS in their ability to read ciphers." This "situation gradually changed in 1941," with the increasing ability of U.S. and British codebreakers to read and process significant high-grade Japanese ciphers.

See Philip H. Jacobsen's letter, I&NS 21.2 (Apr. 2005): 318-319, for a critique of this article.

Kotani, Ken.

1. Nihongun no Interijensu: Naze Joho ga Ikasarenai no ka [Japanese Military Intelligence: Why Is Intelligence Not Used?] Tokyo: Kondansha, 2007.

2. Japanese Intelligence in World War II. Tr., Kotani Chiharu. Oxford: Osprey, 2009.

Mercado, Studies 54.1 (Mar. 2010), notes that this "translation" does not include the references in the author's earlier work to Tokyo's contemporary intelligence issues. Nonetheless, this work provides the reader with "a better appreciation for Japanese military intelligence, in particular for SIGINT." There are some "mistranslations of standard military intelligence terms and awkward English," but Western readers "should find value" here. The endnotes "warrant a close reading."

Although he finds the book "both frustrating and disappointing in several ways, Beard, I&NS 26.2&3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011), it is still "a useful addition to the literature. The translation, though awkward in places, is completely clear, and the footnoting is comprehensive."

Krebs, Gerhard. "Signal Intelligence in the Pacific War." Journal of Intelligence History 1, no. 2 (Winter 2001). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

From abstract: "While cryptologic activities were reduced in the years after World War I, they were intensified again in the late 1930s. The USA had reached good results in the period immediately before Pearl Harbor.... Japan since the early 1930s was [also] able to read the military and diplomatic ciphers of the United States as well as of Great Britain, though to a lesser degree than their enemies, and exchanged cryptographic information with the Axis partners, including captured code books."

Matthews, Tony. Shadows Dancing: Japanese Espionage Against the West, 1939-1945. London: Hale, 1993. New York: St. Martin's, 1994.

Surveillant 3.4/5 says that this is the "story of Japanese spy rings operating through Spanish embassies and consulates in the UK, U.S. and Australia during WWII. Matthews shows how Japan manipulated a neutral country's diplomatic missions abroad to wreck destruction on the Allies."

Meo, L.D. Japan's Radio War on Australia, 1941-1945. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1968. [Winkler]

Mercado, Stephen C. "An Insight into Japanese CI." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 4 (Winter 2002-2003): 628-632.

This is a review of the Japanese-language work by Azuma Teruji, Warakushi wa Yoshida Shigeru no supai datta (I Spied on Yoshida Shigeru), ed., Hosaka Masayasu (Tokyo: Kojunsha, 2000), but the review is as close as most of us will be able to get to the author's memoir of counterintelligence service in World War II.

Mercado, Stephen C. "The Japanese Army's Noborito Research Institute." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 286-299.

The Noborito Research Institute "conducted research and development in four main areas: intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), covert action, and propaganda.... The military officers who led Noborito were accomplished men who hired technical talent from Japan's top universities, drew on the expertise of academic experts, and tapped corporate resources to execute the institute's projects." After the war, "Noborito's veterans applied their skills in an organization designated the Government Printing Supplies Office (GPSO). Their reproductions supported the agent operations conducted before and during the Korean War." [Footnotes omitted]

Mercado, Stephen C. The Shadow Warriors of Nakano: A History of the Imperial Japanese Army's Elite Intelligence School. Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2002.

Jonkers, AFIO WIN 30-02, 29 Jul. 2002, notes that the Nakano School provided training in "intelligence collection, propaganda and irregular warfare." The author is "a former CIA analyst and Asia expert," whose work "sheds light on a special niche of intelligence activities in World War II and postwar Japanese affairs."

For Seamon, Proceedings 128.11 (Nov. 2002), the author "manages to keep his scholarly report moving through a sea of Japanese names that could well drown a non-Japanese-speaking reader." Peake, Studies 48.4 (2004), comments that "[i]n addition to being an interesting and impressive work, The Shadow Warriors of Nakano is the only scholarly account of this subject in English and thus a unique contribution to the intelligence literature."

Nish, I&NS 18.1, says that "[t]his is an intriguing book,... packed with interesting facts.... It is well-grounded in Japanese sources and research in the American archives.... Mercado provides a comprehensive survey of an important element in prewar Japan's Army intelligence network." To Bath, NIPQ 19.3, "[t]hat portion of Shadow Warriors dealing with the post-surrender period and the relationship between the American military government and the remaining Nakano graduates is of particular interest." The author traces the influence of the Nakano "old boys" well into the postwar years.

Prados, John. "Neglected Intelligence: The Japanese in the Solomans Campaign." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 8 (Aug. 2013): 66-71.

"Though the Imperial Navy developed the same intelligence techniques as its adversaries, its sense of the limited utility of such information inclined the Japanese against devoting an effort equivalent to that of the Allies, and their intelligence never evolved into the same kind of supple instrument wielded against them."

Reitman, Valerie. "Japan Broke U.S. Code Before Pearl Harbor, Researcher Finds." Los Angeles Times, 7 Dec. 1941. [http://www.latimes.com]

"[W]hile digging through the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Md., last summer," Toshihiro Minohara, a "young Japanese American professor [at Kobe University,] stumbled upon a document, declassified by the CIA about five years ago, that proved that Tokyo had succeeded in breaking the U.S. and British diplomatic codes. A few microfilmed documents, showing the Japanese translations of the telegrams, were attached.... Further research by a colleague in Japan confirmed the findings -- and may shed light on the mind-set that caused Japan's last holdouts for peace to opt for war just weeks before the attack, Minohara said this week."

Rogers, James T., and Graham Yost, eds. The Shadow War: Espionage and World War II. New York: Facts on File, 1991.

Surveillant 2.5 says that this book "[p]rovides clear compelling accounts of American, British, German, and Japanese espionage and counterespionage organizations, their missions, their successes and failures.... Carefully researched."

Watanabe Kenji, ed. Kokosei ga ou Rikugun Noborito Kenkyujo [High School Students Track the Army Noborito Research Institute]. Tokyo: Kyoiku Shiryo Shuppankai, 1991. [Mercado, Studies 46.4/fn. 2]

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