Allen, Louis. "Burmese Puzzles: Two Deaths that Never Were." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 193-198.
This article concerns the reported deaths of two Japanese generals by Burmese guerrilla forces. The author believes the deaths never occurred.
Barrett, David Dean [COL/USA]. Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan. Berkeley, CA: Center for Chinese Studies, 1970.
The author was the first commander of the U.S. Army Observation Group (the Dixie Mission) in Yenan, China, in 1944. See also, Carter, Mission to Yenan (1997).
Briggs, Ralph T. "The Day VADM Yamagata Joined His Honorable Ancestors." Cryptolog 10, no. 5 (1989): 1-14. Naval History 3, no. 2 (1989): 29-35.
According to a letter signed by Emil Levine in NIPQ, Spring 1996, the shotdown of Yamagata's plane was accomplished on the basis of intelligence gathered by Fleet Radio Unit China.
Carter, Carolle J. Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists, 1944-1947. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1997.
Clark comment: This work concerns the American Observer Group (Dixie Mission) to the Chinese Communists, which arrived in Yenan in July 1944. Unsinger, IJI&C 12.2, notes that the author has "assembled a vast array of documents," but "she never really realizes [their] full potential." In particular, Carter relies too often on secondary sources.... [S]he just didn't do the job as well as it could have been done ... [and] contributes little to what has already been told." See also, Barrett, Dixie Mission (1970).
Fitzgerald, Stephen K. MAGIC and ULTRA in the China-Burma-India Theater. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1992.
According to Surveillant 3.2/3, this book concerns the "operational use of MAGIC and ULTRA." The author "concludes that neither ULTRA nor MAGIC were able consistently to fathom Japanese intentions in Burma and that the ultimate importance of MAGIC and ULTRA was to confirm intelligence obtained from other sources." Kruh, Cryptologia 18.1, notes that this work "is well documented with 274 foornotes and a comprehensive bibliography which provides opportunities for further reading or research."
Gayn, Mark, and John Caldwell. American Agent. New York: Holt, 1947.
Constantinides: Gayn "supplies the general background" to Caldwell's story of his Office of War Information (OWI) work in China in World War II. Although Gayn writes of Caldwell's involvement in intelligence activities, "Caldwell tells us nothing of these secret duties. What little he says of the intelligence world is from the viewpoint of an observer, or a coopted official at the very most, and he imparts nothing of significance to the intelligence historian."
Gladwin, Lee A. "The Diplomacy of Security: Behind the Negotiations of Article 18 of the Sino-American Cooperative Agreement." Cryptologia 29, no. 1 (Jan. 2005): 23-42.
The author surveys the establishment and operation of Naval Group China (NGC) and the difficulties brought about by the Chinese insistence on access to the American product.
Hogan, David W., Jr. "MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special Operations in the War against Japan." Parameters 25 (Spring 1995): 104-115.
"MacArthur and Stilwell were different men who took different approaches to special operations in their respective theaters. MacArthur's was based on a romantic vision ... of a people's war against brutal oppressors. The SWPA commander turned to special operations early, developed an extensive support organization, and closely supervised its work. Stilwell's approach was more cautious and pragmatic, judging special operations entrepreneurs by their results.... Yet, for all their differences, the two commanders shared some basic traits.... [W]hile both were basically orthodox soldiers who relied on the big battalions, both were ready to turn to special operations to aid conventional forces. Because of their support, special operations forces were able to make significant contributions to victory in the war against Japan."
Hogan, David W., Jr. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. CMH Publication 70-42. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1992
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 5. Special Operations in the China-Burma-India Theater
OSS Detachment 101
The Final Campaigns in Burma
The Office of Strategic Services in China
The Office of Strategic Services in Southeast Asia
Chapter 6. Conclusion
Hunter, Charles N. [COL/USA]
1. Galahad. San Antonio, TX: Naylor, 1963.
The author participated in the organization and training of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), which carried the codename Galahad and came to be known as Merrill's Marauders, after the unit's commanding officer, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Frank D. Merrill. Hunter served as Galahad's executive officer (second in command) and often as its commanding officer. He is scathing in his assessment of Gen Joseph Stilwell as commander of the war in Burma.
2. "Galahad: Intelligence Aspects." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 1 (Winter 1961): A1-A27.
This is a first-person account of "Galahad," a codename for sending "an unorthodox American force into Burma, [that] in practice came to designate the force itself." Hunter walks the reader through Galahad's major engagements in some detail, and with personal opinions clearly delineated. The author refers to "the failures in planning, coordination, and intelligence that characterized CBI Theater operations under General Joe Stllwell's erratic and nepotistical direction."
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