Ephron, Henry D. "An American Cryptanalyst in Australia." Cryptologia 9, no. 4 (Oct. 1985): 337-340.
The author worked at the Ascot Park, Brisbane, intercept site during World War II.
Elphick, Peter. The Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930-1945. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1997.
For Best, I&NS 13.2, this book is "interesting [but] contains some deep flaws." The author "has uncovered previously obscure episodes which shed light on the infighting and inefficiency which hampered the [British] intelligence effort in East Asia." Additionally, his "knowledge of the personalities and the degree of detail here is laudable." Nevertheless, Elphick "has only really skimmed the surface of the documentation held at the PRO," and "there are whole areas of intelligence activity which are largely ignored."
Unsinger, IJI&C 11.2, points out several themes in this work. The first theme concerns "the issue of Japan versus the future Allies in Asia in the pre-World War II years." The second theme focuses on the kind of intelligence, primarily signals intelligence, used by the British and Americans in running the war against Japan. And the third, lesser theme involves the struggle between the Comintern and all the intelligence services in Asia, both Japanese and Allied. For the reviewer, Far Eastern File is not a total success, providing "only a superficial look at the intelligence services' work in the region." Nevertheless, it gives the reader "a quick overview and some interpretation of events as they unfolded. It accomplished that well."
Ford, Douglas. "'Dismantling the 'Lesser Men' and 'Supermen' Myths: US Intelligence on the Imperial Japanese Army after the Fall of the Philippines, Winter 1942 to Spring 1943." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 4 (Aug. 2009): 542-573.
"The main effect of the intelligence obtained through the initial encounters with the IJA during 1942 and early 1943 was to introduce American military personnel to the challenges they were to face during their land campaigns in the Pacific theaters."
Herbig, Katherine L. "American Strategic Deception in the Pacific, 1942-44." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987), 260-300.
"[T]he Americans tried to deceive the Japanese about their every strategic move during the last two years of the war.... [Prior to that, deception] was at an operational level, linked to a specific campaign or impending clash with Japanese forces, and intended primarily to have local or short-term significance.... The deception supporting Midway was an excellent example of how a small-scale locally planned and implemented deception could materially contribute to a victory which, in this case, had great strategic significance.... After much wrangling, the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally agreed on a general policy for deception against the Japanese in September 1943.... [After that time,] strategic deception helped to reduce the cost in lives by directing and holding Japanese forces away from the Marianas and ... from Okinawa, when these important strongholds were invaded."
Hernandez, Al. Bahala na, Come What May: The Story of Mission ISRM (I Shall Return MacArthur), an Army-Navy Intelligence Mission in the Pacific, as Told to Dixon Earle. Berkeley, CA: Howell-North, 1961. [Petersen]
Hogan, David W., Jr. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. CMH Publication 70-42. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1992
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 4. Special Operations in the Pacific
Guerrillas in the Philippines
The Alamo Scouts
The 6th Ranger Battalion
The Liberation of the Philippines
Chapter 6. Conclusion
Holmes, Wilfred J.
1. Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979. Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1979. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.
Pforzheimer says that Double-Edged Secrets is an "accurate and very readable" account of "all-source intelligence production, analysis, and dissemination" in support of CINCPAC. Holmes' accounts of the intelligence background to the battle of Midway and the shoot-down of Admiral Yamamoto's plane are "[p]articularly valuable."
To Petersen, this is an "important memoir by a ranking naval intelligence officer in Hawaii." Constantinides sees Holmes as "an invaluable contributor to our knowledge of naval intelligence organization, personnel, operations, and problems in fighting the Pacific war." For Kruh, Cryptologia 30.2 (Apr. 2006), the author's "compassionate understanding of the business of intelligence gathering is unique. Here, he not only captures the mood of the period but also gives rare insight into the problems and personalities involved."
2. "Naval Intelligence in the War Against Japan, 1941 1945: The View from Pearl Harbor." In New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Naval History Symposium, United States Naval Academy, 25-26 October 1979, ed. Craig L. Symonds, 351-357. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981. [Petersen]
1. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. London and New York: Scribners/Simon and Schuster, 2004.
For DKR, AFIO WIN 18.4 (31 May 2004), the author "has compiled a massive account of the many operations conducted by the Allies to deceive the Axis" during World War II. "For scholars this work is a splendid compendium of information on the art of strategic deception. For the general public, it reads like a good spy thriller." Seamon, Proceedings 130.6 (Jun. 2004), notes that this work is a "comprehensive ... narrative of the complex series of misinformation operations ... that the Allies launched to deceive Axis intelligence services."
Hastings, Telegraph (London), 13 Dec. 2004, refers to this work as a "meticulous, encyclopaedic history of wartime deception." The author "has produced a masterly study." To Hughes-Wilson, Intelligencer 14.2 (Winter-Spring 2005) [reprinted from RUSI Journal, Dec. 2004], this "must be the definitive book on deception in WW2.... It is well written, beautifully researched and indexed, and with a wealth of details and references."
To Kahn, Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), this work is "a thrilling account of a fascinating subject"; and it "deserves that overworked but rarely merited adjective: definitive." Peake, Studies 54.3 (Sep. 2010) and Intelligencer 18.1 (Fall-Winter 2010), agrees: "The Deceivers provides a historical picture of deception that is truly unique. With descriptions of hundreds of operations and impressive detail concerning all the principals, all extensively documented, Holt's book stands as the definitive work on the subject."
2. "The Deceivers." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 7 (Autumn 1994): 48-57.
Sexton: "A brief overview of strategic deception in World War II with an emphasis on the Pas-de-Calais and Kurile Island campaigns."
Horner, D.M. "Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area in World War II." Australian Outlook: Journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs 32 (Dec. 1978): 310-327. [Petersen]
Howe, Russell Warren. The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose." Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1990.
Surveillant 1.1: Howe presents a "highly readable reconstruction of the life of Iva Toguri, the California-born Nisei." The book includes "detailed references to the actual trial transcripts."
Lewis, G.A., ed. Intercept Station "C" from Olongapo through the Evacuation of Corregidor, 1929-1942. Denver, CO: Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association, 1983.
This brings together personal recollections about U.S. naval Comint operations in the Philippines until Station "C" was closed down with the evacuation of Corregidor.
Lundstrom, John B. The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941-June 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
Sexton finds this work to be "well-documented," a "significant contribution," and "[e]ssential reading" on the subject of the influence of Sigint on U.S. naval operations in the early part of the war.
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