1. "The Forschungsamt: Nazi Germany's Most Secret Communications Intelligence Agency." Cryptologia 2, no. 1 (Jan. 1978): 12-19.
The Forschungsamt (Research Office) was the German organization that monitored telecommunications traffic in Germany. Sexton says that this is a "well-researched account."
2. "German Military Eavesdroppers." Cryptologia 1, no. 4 (Oct. 1977): 378-380.
3. Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II. New York: Macmillan, 1978. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1978.
According to Pforzheimer, Hitler's Spies is "based on personal interviews and on extensive research of documentary material. Its focus is on German Army and high command intelligence, with little on air and navy intelligence.... [It] is particularly weak on German counterintelligence." Constantinides says there is "no better summary of the overall dismal record of failures that German intelligence left." Nevertheless, there are "significant omissions as well as less significant ones.... [O]ne cannot use the adjective 'comprehensive' in describing the book."
Kessler, Leo [pseud., Charles Whiting]. Kommando: Hitler's Special Forces. London: Pen & Sword Paperback, 1997.
Horn, Parameters, Summer 1998, says that this book's "fast-moving, riveting text reads like fiction and yields a captivating glimpse of Hitler's Secret Service." One of the themes of Kessler's work is "the rivalry between the Abwehr and the parallel Secret Service apparatus of Himmler's SS organization. The struggle provides an interesting insight into the political intrigue of the period; it also portrays the depth of the anti-Hitler movement within the Abwehr." Kommando has "a glaring weakness: none of the exploits recorded in the book are substantiated.... Despite its riveting and detailed text, however, the lack of documentation and references limits its value."
Kilzer, Louis. Hitler's Traitor: Martin Bormann and the Defeat of the Reich. Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000.
West, IJI&C 14.3, dismisses completely the author's effort to connect Martin Bormann and the Rote Drei's mysterious sources codenamed Werther, Teddy, Anna, and Olga. The reviewer concludes that "this volume is an example of espionage mythology being exacerbated by an almost pervasive determination to circumvent any contrary evidence."
Kurowski, Franz. The Brandenburger Commandos: Germany's Elite Warrior Spies in World War II. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2005.
From publisher: "Before the German blitzkrieg stormed across Europe in 1939-40, a group of elite soldiers prepared the way by seizing bridges and other strategic targets ahead of the attack. In the following years,... the Brandenburgers operated behind enemy lines around the globe, from Russia and Yugoslavia to Egypt, Iraq, and India."
Kurzman, Dan. A Special Mission: Hitler's Secret Plot to Seize the Vatican and Kidnap Pope Pius XII. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2007.
Goulden, Washington Times, 23 Sep. 2007, notes that in 1943 German SS Gen. Karl Wolff "received a direct order from Adolf Hitler to seize the Vatican and kidnap Pope Pius XII.... Wolff managed to stall until the war staggered to an end."
Leverkuehn, Paul. German Military Intelligence. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954. New York: Praeger, 1954.
According to Pforzheimer, Leverkuehn is a former member of the Abwehr and, thus, provides an insider's look at Admiral Canaris. Constantinides points out that, while the author headed the Abwehr station in Istanbul from 1941 to 1944, he "has left out or missed" much, and "his loyalty to his old service and ... Canaris is undiminished." See also, Jähnicke, "Lawyer, Politician, Intelligence Officer: Paul Leverkuehn in Turkey, 1915-1916 and 1941-1944," JIH 2.2 (Winter 2002).
Lucas, James. Kommando: German Special Forces of World War Two. London: Cassell, 1985. Minneapolis, MN: Book Sales, Ic., 2003. [pb]
Library Journal (1999) (via Amazon.com): "Lucas provides an in-depth analysis of Germany's elite troops during the war. His research shows that while the kommandos played a significant role during the early part of the war infiltrating and setting up bases for the mass of troops that followed, they were mostly relegated to suicide missions once the tide began to turn against Germany."
Matthews, Peter. SIGINT: The Secret History of Signals Intelligence 1914-45. Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2013.
Peake, Studies 58.3 (Sep. 2014), finds that this book "tells some interesting stories about intercept units and operations, but it has two serious drawbacks. It is not documented"; and it "is poorly edited, and the narrative is often hard to follow." Nonetheless, it "offers an interesting account of German SIGINT operations not found elsewhere."
May, Ernest R. Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France. New York: Hill and Wang, 2000.
Adams, IJI&C 14.3, finds that the author "persuasively establish[es] the pivotal role played by intelligence in France's sudden and ignominious collapse in 1940." For May, Germany's massive panzer attack through the Ardennes forest is a "classic example of intelligence surprise." He points to "severe flaws in the methods used in Allied intelligence collection and analysis, and large gaps between this information and the key decisionmakers." On the other side, May sees a "close integration of intelligence with the German high command."
For Bath, NIPQ 18.1, May's "research is impressive, combining as it does material on German and French intelligence, rather than treating each separately as had been done previously. The result is a clear and authoritative study."
McKay, Craig Graham.
1. "German Intelligence and the Flight of Rudolf Hess." Journal of Intelligence History 7, no. 2 (Winter 2007-2008). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/7-2.html]
2. "The Krämer Case: A Study in Three Dimensions." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 2 (Apr. 1989): 268-294.
The author looks at the work of Karl-Heinz Krämer, of Abwehr Air Intelligence, in Stockholm from May 1941 to May 1945. The three dimensions used in surveying the activities of Krämer represent the German, British, and Swedish perspectives. McKay argues that Krämer "supplied various German central intelligence organs with a continuous flow of information."
Mendelsohn, John, ed. Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Military Deception During the World War II Era. 18 vols. New York: Garland, 1988.
This multivolume work consists of photo reproductions of documents from the National Archives.
Vol. 6: German Radio Intelligence and the Soldatsender.
According to Sexton, this volume "includes the War Diary of the Morale Operations Branch of the OSS in London, which describes OSS black propaganda operations aimed at German forces."
Vol. 14: A Man Called A.H. Intro., Robert Wolfe
From http://www.abebooks.com: This volume "includes documents on the investigation into Adolf Hitler's rumoured survival, reports from Hitler's doctors on his personality, interogations of persons in the Fuehrer Bunker and into the whereabouts of Hitler's and Eva Braun's remains, and a CIC report on the so-called 'Kaltenbrunner Report' of the SS investigation into the July Plot -- the attempted assassination of Hitler."
Vol. 17: The German View of Cover and Deception. Intro., John Mendelsohn.
Mowry, David P. German Cipher Machines of World War II. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2003.
Kruh, Cryptologia 28.2, says that "[t]his valuable booklet [32 pages] includes photographs of the various German cipher machines used in World War II."
Müller, Klaus-Jürgen "A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 301-326.
The author takes issue with the positive evaluation of Allied strategic deception operations by such writers as Ewen Montagu. "[V]ery often ... an exaggerated evaluation of the effects of deceptions operations is well founded.... Even where these strategems were 'bought' by those they were sold to, their effect at the strategic level was minimal in many cases. Deception at the tactical level, however, was very often successful."
David Hunt, "Remarks on 'A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations,'" Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988), 190-194, argues that "Müller is in error in supposing that Mincemeat ... did not work and had no effect on German strategy; and ... he has misunderstood the nature of the aims that the Allies were pursuing in the Mediterranean."
Mulligan, Timothy P. "The German Navy Evaluates Its Cryptographic Security, October 1941." Military Affairs 49 (Apr. 1985): 75-79.
According to Sexton, this article analyzes a "security review the Kriegsmarine conducted of its cipher systems"; the author concludes that "the Germans had a false sense of security concerning ENIGMA."
O'Donoghue, David. Hitler's Irish Voices: The Story of German Radio's Wartime Irish Service. Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1998.
From publisher: "From December 1939 to May 1945, German Radio broadcast Nazi propaganda to neutral Ireland." It was "a nightly bi-lingual service in Irish and English." The man behind the broadcasts was Dr. Adolf Mahr, former director of the Irish National Museum, who had "returned to Berlin at the start of war and spent the war years running the Irish desk at the German Foreign Office, as well as creating German Radio's Irish service, known as Irland-Redaktion." See also, Gerry Mullins, Dublin Nazi No. 1: The Life of Adolf Mahr (Dublin: Liberties Press, 2007).
O'Donoghue, David. "Neutral Ireland's Secret War." Sunday Business Post, 31 Dec. 2006. [From friend in Ireland]
With the outbreak of war, the 50-strong Nazi group that had existed in pre-war Ireland approached Eamon de Valera "to seek safe passage through Britain to reach home." He "was only too happy to oblige, getting Westminster's permission for their return home." They "sailed aboard the mail boat Cambria on September 11, 1939, and eventually made it across the channel. But their departure left a serious intelligence gap for the Nazis in neutral Ireland, one they would try to fill by dispatching no fewer than 12 agents here in the 1939-to-1943 period."
Olsson, Simon. "Beyond Diplomacy: German Military Intelligence in Sweden 1939-1945." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 338-351.
"At the outbreak of the war in 1939, the Abwehr was well prepared..., with a network of informants all over Sweden. The results during the war would, however, be mixed."
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