WORLD WAR II

Germany

E - J

Eldridge, Justin L.C.

1. "Defense on the Rhine." Military Intelligence 21, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1995): 38-44, 52.

With regard to the Allied Rhine crossings in March 1945, "German intelligence fell far short of success and significantly hindered German efforts to halt Montgomery's assault.... German intelligence during the Rhine River crossing failed at the operational level of war."

2. "Delusions of Grandeur: Ethnocentrism and Wehrmacht Intelligence Analysis." Military Intelligence 18, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1992): 20-25.

3. "German Human Intelligence and the Conduct of 'Operation CITADEL.'" Military Intelligence 15, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1989): 23-25.

Erskine, Ralph.

1. "Enigma's Security: What the Germans Really Knew." In Action This Day: Bletchley Park from the Breaking of the Enigma Code to the Birth of the Modern Computer, eds. Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith, 370-385, 505-508. London and New York: Bantam, 2001.

2. "Naval Enigma: An Astonishing Blunder." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 468-473.

Message keys on the German naval Enigma cipher known as Süd, which was used in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, "were doubly enciphered until at least January 1944."

3. "Ultra Reveals a Late B-Dienst Success in the Atlantic." Cryptologia 34, no. 4 (Oct. 2010): 340-358.

Abstract: "This article describes a B-Dienst success in solving signals using a British code used by merchant ships (the Merchant Ships' Code (Mersigs II)) in late 1943, despite only having a depth of two; it also relates the history of the Mersigs II system."

Farago, Ladislas, ed. German Psychological Warfare. New York: Committee for National Morale, 1941. New York: Putnam's, 1942. New York: Arno Press, 1972.

The publisher of the 1972 edition states: "This is a greatly expanded version of the author's 1941 compilation, of bibliographic entries on the same topic -- this volume has more entries plus a lengthy essay on the theory, organization and practice of Nazi propaganda. There is coverage of both internal and foreign Propaganda, and details of political and military tactics and strategy."

Fernandez, Hugo Artucio. The Nazi Underground in South America. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942.

Woolbert, FA (Jul. 1942), comments that the author, "with much industry and courage, has been instrumental in exposing the subversive activities of the Axis south of Panama. In this book he has collected a mass of information about those activities in each of the South American republics, though he fails to provide adequate documentation. He is naturally best informed about [Uruguay] and its neighbor, Argentina."

Flicke, Wilhelm F. "The Lost Keys to El Alamein." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 4 (Fall 1959): 73-80.

This account is "[e]xcerpted from ... War Secrets in the Ether." It can "be presumed to exaggerate the importance to Rommel of the intercepted messages it cites; but that they were of some importance is attested in other sources." (p. 73/fn.1)

Flicke, Wilhelm F. War Secrets in the Ether. 2 vols. Vol. I (parts 1 & 2): to World War II; Vol. II (Part 3): World War II. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Books, 1977. Reprinted as 1 vol., 1994.

Denkler, Cryptolog 15.1, notes that "Flicke joined the German [signals intelligence] service at the beginning of World War I and remained through World War II.... Perhaps the most fascinating part[] is his description of the role of the service in counterintelligence operations in World War II."

According to McGinnis, Cryptolog 16.2, "Flicke gives a good account of German failures in the COMINT field during WWI, as well as their successes, such as the Battle of Tannenberg.... Flicke spent much of WWII dealing with agent and partisan communications networks operating within Germany or German occupied territories.... They did locate many of the agent transmitters.... There were so many of the transmitters, and enemy agents, that the flow of intelligence from within German territory to the Allied powers was not greatly interrupted. This is a landmark publication which deserves to be read by any serious student of COMINT.... The work has many defects, and is shallow reading in many parts, but the defects are frequently overshadowed by the author's remarks about how things should have been. He is clearly a proponent of centralized control of intelligence by a single body."

White, IJI&C 7.3, says that Flicke's "accounts of the radio intercept role in the famous engagements of both wars are fascinating." However, Pforzheimer finds some instances "where Flicke's memory is incorrect or his information is incomplete." As does Constantinides, who comments that "there are enough instances of error or incomplete information to warn that not everything Flicke says is automatically authoritative." Peake, AIJ 15.1/90, sees Flicke's work as "an informative overview," but adds that "the absence of sources and the availability of much more recent material greatly limits its utility."

Reviewing the one volume edition (1994), Surveillant 4.1 notes that "Flicke tells the story of German successes in reading the secret codes of both enemies and friends. Historians have long pondered how General Rommel knew in advance th[e] moves of the British army in North Africa. Flicke reveals the reason: the Germans had broken the U.S. secret code between Cairo and Washington."

Glünder, Georg. Tr., Paul Whitaker. "Wireless and 'Geheimschreiber' Operator in the War, 1941-1945." Cryptologia 26, no. 2 (Apr. 2002): 81-96.

This article represents some memories of the author who began service in the German Army in 1941 as a wireless operator and served through the war.

Hilton, Stanley E. Hitler's Secret War in South America 1939-1945: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999. [pb]

Sexton identifies this work as a "general history of German espionage activities and the role of Sigint in the breaking up of the Abwehr's networks." Commenting on the 1999 reissue, Fischer, I&NS 16.2, notes that Hilton's work, "based mainly on Brazilian sources," is today "a little long in the tooth." Nevertheless, the author "shows how the Germans whittled away the advantages they enjoyed in a key country, Brazil, as a result of rank amateurism and poor tradecraft." In addition, "readers who want to know more about how espionage operations are actually run will benefit from the voluminous ground-level detail."

Hoettl, Wilhelm. The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Political Espionage. New York: Praeger, 1954. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954. The Secret Front: Nazi Political Espionage 1938-1945. New York: Enigma, 2003. [pb]

Constantinides: "Though Hoettl speaks from first-hand knowledge..., the reader must still be on the lookout for sporadic unsound judgments." In addition, there are "[n]o sources, notes, or documentary supports." Nonetheless, Hoettl served with the Abwehr in Yugoslavia and Italy, and served as the Abwehr intermediary to the OSS "in peace feelers in the later stages of the war."

Hull, Mark M.

1. "The Irish Interlude: German Intelligence in Ireland, 1939-1943." Journal of Military History 66, no. 3 (Jul. 2002): 695-718.

From abstract: This article focuses on the efforts of the Abwehr and the SD "to use neutral Ireland as a base for wartime espionage directed against Great Britain. Though eleven agents were dispatched during a four-year period, a host of home-grown problems in the German system all but insured failure, and a brilliantly effective Irish army counterintelligence system mathematically eliminated any chance of German success. Because of the intelligence debacle in Ireland, German operations directed against England--including Operation Sea Lion--were hopelessly compromised."

2. Irish Secrets: German Espionage in Wartime Ireland, 1939-1945. Dublin/Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2003.

According to Kruh, Cryptologia 27.4, the author "graphically tells the little-known history of German military espionage activity in Ireland ... before and during" World War II. This is "a gripping account of the intelligence war and highlights the brilliant, creative success of Irish Military Intelligence in waging a counter-espionage campaign that effectively neutralized the German threat."

Erskine, I&NS 19.4 (Winter 2004), finds that the author "does not seem to be wholly comfortable with some of the fine detail of intelligence." Nevertheless, Hull "has researched his central subject painstakingly," and his work "will undoubtedly become the standard work on German intelligence in the Republic of Ireland."

3. "A Tale of German Espionage in Wartime Ireland." In Ireland in World War II: Diplomacy and Survival, eds. Dermot Keogh and Mervyn O'Driscoll, 81-92. Cork: Mercier Press, 2004.

4. "Werner Unland: The Abwehr's Man in Dublin." Irish Sword 21 (1999): 336-344.

Jablonski, David. "The Paradox of Duality: Adolf Hitler and the Concept of Military Surprise." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 3 (Jul. 1988): 55-117.

The author concludes that "[i]n the end, Blitzkrieg failed because Hitler failed as a strategist.... Although Blitzkrieg was initially closely meshed with Hitler's political goals, his very success led him beyond strategic aims that could be met by the limited opportunistic aggression of that doctrine."

Jackson, John. Hitler's Codebreakers: German Signals Intelligence in World War 2. Redditch, UK: BookTower Publishing, 2012.

Hamer, Cryptologia 37.4 (2013), finds that much of this book "is a verbatim compilation of the text from declassified NSA files," including the TICOM materials. The "author/editor's 'too-perfect verbatim' approach has resulted in the inclusion of inevitable errors that were included in the original TICOM coverage." The work does pull together in one place material available elsewhere.

Jähnicke, Burkhard. "Lawyer, Politician, Intelligence Officer: Paul Leverkuehn in Turkey, 1915-1916 and 1941-1944." Journal of Intelligence History 2, no 2 (Winter 2002). [http://www. intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

From abstract: "As a member of the secret Scheubner-Richter expedition in World War I, travelling to the Turkish-Persian frontier, and as spy chief in Istanbul from 1941 until 1944, Leverkuehn represents the history and development of German intelligence in Turkey....  His intelligence activities ended abruptly in February 1944, when his co-worker Erich Vermehren and his wife defected to the British." See also, Paul Leverkuehn, German Military Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954).

Johnson, David Alan. Germany's Spies and Saboteurs. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1998.

From publisher: This work is a compilation of "cloak-and-dagger tales describing the actions of the Abwehr,... charged with the task of gathering information for the Nazi war effort while disrupting the Allied homeworlds." Witmer, historynet.com, 12 Aug. 2001, finds that this work "attempts to show that the Germans had more competence in the spy business than previously believed, but author David Alan Johnson generally does not prove his case."

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