WORLD WAR II

Germany

C - D

Campbell, John P. "Some Pieces of the Ostro Puzzle." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 245-263.

Paul Fidrmuc (Ostro) was an Abwehr agent in Lisbon from the summer of 1940 until March 1945. The question is whether he really had the subagents in Britain and the Middle East that he claimed and whose information the Germans so highly prized, or whether he made it all up.

Campbell, Kenneth J.

1. "General Erich Fellgiebel: Master of Communications Intelligence." National Intelligence Journal 1, no. 1 (2009): 43-63.

Fellgiebel began his career in COMINT in World War I, and remained in that field through his execution in 1944 for being part of the effort to assassinate Hitler.

2. "Lt. Col. Ulrich Liss: A Highly Successful Analyst and Leader." American Intelligence Journal 26, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 86-92.

From 1937 to 1943, Liss headed the German General Staff's Fremde Heere West.

3. "Oskar Reile: A Highly Successful Spy, Who Failed." American Intelligence Journal 26, no. 2 (Winter 2008-2009): 75-79.

The author covers Reile's pre-World War II, wartime, and postwar careers with the Abwehr and BND.

4. "Walter Schellenberg: SD Chief." American Intelligence Journal 25, no. 2 (Winter 2007-2008): 88-94.

The author traces Schellenberg's rise in the Nazi intelligence hierarchy (including his organization of the capture of British intelligence personnel at Venlo in the Netherlands). He concludes that Schellenberg was certainly an opportunist by nature, but was also "smart and cunning."

Carter, Carolle J. The Shamrock and the Swastika: German Espionage in Ireland in World War II. Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books, 1977.

Constantinides finds that the "absence of access to Irish and British files" makes this book "less than comprehensive." Carter is at her best when discussing "the failures and incredible ineptitude of the German intelligence services."

Chapman, John W.M.

1. "Signals Intelligence Cooperation among the Secret Intelligence Services of the Axis States, 1940-41." Japan Forum (1991): 231-256.

2. "Tricycle Recycled: Collaboration among the Secret Intelligence Services of the Axis States, 1940-41." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 268-299.

This article is somehow passing strange. It includes some interesting Axis-states source materials that "throw light at least on the broader context of the intelligence collaboration, in which Popov [Tricycle] played a very minor role." This is true, but the focus here is on the "context," not on the Tricycle case per se.

Child, Clifton J. "In Defence of 'Tom' Delmer and Dr. Otto John: Notes for the Record." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 1 (Jan. 1989): 127-136.

Claasen, Adam. "The German Invasion of Norway, 1940: The Operational Intelligence Dimension." Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1 (2004): 114-135 .

From abstract: "This article ... investigates the pivotal role intelligence played in the planning, preparation, and carrying out of Weserübung.... Although primarily concerned with German intelligence gathering and utilisation, British efforts, including the potential impact of Ultra, are also considered."

Cooper, Mathew. The Nazi War Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944. New York: Stein & Day, 1979. The Phantom War: The German Struggle Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944. London: MacDonald & Jane's, 1979.

According to Constantinides, this book "deals with German security policy in the USSR and the partisan war there, primarily from the German point of view.... There is ... little on the intelligence war, though that little and the author's general comments about the subject are correct."

Cox, Sebastian. "A Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain, 1940." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 425-443.

Sexton points to this article as a "rare study of the problem of inaccurate or exaggerated enemy loss claims."

Cubbage, T.L., II. "The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 114-174.

The author notes that "[t]he Germans certainly expected the Grosslandung; and yet, the critical details of their expectations simply were wrong." His follow-on analysis addresses the "ten very common factors ... [that], alone and in combination, formed significant blocks to the ability of the Germans to perceive correctly the Allied intentions."

Cutler, Richard W. "Three Careers, Three Names: Hildegard Beetz, Talented Spy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 515-535.

The author was Beetz's "initial case officer" while working for U.S. counterintelligence after World War II. He traces Beetz's career as a spy from its beginning with the German SS's SD and her involvement with the Cianos during the war to her work with the Americans in the 1940s.

Day, Peter, and Andrew Alderson. "Top German's Spy Blunders Helped Britain to Win War." Telegraph (London), 23 Apr. 2000. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

Documents at the Public Record Office in London show that "Major Nikolaus Ritter realised as early as 1941,... that his spy network in Britain had been compromised but he never passed on his suspicions to his superiors.... Ritter's failure to report his suspicions paved the way for the success of Operation Double Cross."

See also, Benjamin Fischer, "A.k.a. 'Dr. Rantzau': The Enigma of Major Nikolaus Ritter," Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000): 8-11. [https://www.cia.gov/csi/bulletin/csi11.html#toc7 -- not found 4/5/13]: "[N]o one represented the Abwehr's ambiguous record of occasional success and repeated failure better than Maj. Nikolaus Ritter, whose operational alias was 'Dr. Rantzau.' Ritter, in fact, was intimately involved in one of the service's greatest successes and its two greatest disasters -- the compromise of all Abwehr agents in the United States and Britain."

Doerries, Reinhard R.

1. Hitler's Intelligence Chief: Walter Schellenberg -- The Man Who Kept Germany's Secrets. New York: Enigma, 2009.

Peake, Studies 54.3 (Sep. 2010) and Intelligencer 18.1 (Fall-Winter 2010), finds that Schellenberg's "controversial career is examined here by a skillful historian." The work is documented with "recently released documents from allied archives. The German records remain classified. Thus the final version of Walter Schellenberg's career is still to be written."

For Fischer, IJI&C 24.3 (Fall 2011). this is "a thoroughly researched and definitive biography." McKay, JIH 9.1 & 2 (Summer 2010), finds this an "important and readable" book. The author provides "a scholarly account[,] based on meticulous archival studies.... Although Doerries has many interesting things to say about espionage matters..., his main focus of interest ... is Schellenberg's contact work in Switzerland and Sweden." This is a "stimulating and thought-provoking study."

2. ed. Hitler’s Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003.

According to Erskine, JIH 3.2, much of this book "consists of a transcript of the final Allied interrogation report on Schellenberg. While the report is a fascinating document in itself, it greatly benefits from an admirable introduction by Professor Reinhard R. Doerries.... Doerries has clearly devoted a great deal of time and care to this book, and has done a fine job as editor. Hitler’s Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence is essential reading for everyone interested in Schellenberg, German intelligence in the Second World War, or the inner workings of the Third Reich."

See also, Schellenberg, The Labyrinth (1956).

Dugan, James, and Carroll Stewart. "Ploesti: German Defenses and Allied Intelligence." Airpower Historian 9 (Jan. 1962): 1-20. [Petersen]

Duggan, John. Herr Hempel at the German Legation in Dublin 1937-1945. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003.

From publisher: Dr Edward Hempel was German Minister in Dublin from 1937 to 1945. This book "throws new light on Third Reich diplomacy which lacked unity and was subject to inputs from a proliferation of competing ... agencies." It gives a "picture of the relationship between the Dublin Legation and Berlin and its effects on diplomatic intercourse between Germany and Ireland and consequently between Ireland and Britain."

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