Allen, Martin A.
1. The Hitler/Hess Deception: British Intelligence's Best-kept Secret of the Second World War. London: HarperCollins, 2003.
According to a reviewer in Contemporary Review, Jun. 2003, "the author claims ... that [Rudolf] Hess was not deranged and that his flight [to Britain] was part of a secret offer" made to the British. "Nazi leaders were, the author claims, purposefully misled by British secret intelligence officers into believing" that Churchill could be replaced by a more pliant" person. "This 'British trickery' led to the German invasion of Russia.... Russian losses are, therefore, Britain's fault.... This is not the full story however earnest the writer is in telling it."
2. Himmler's Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich Himmler. New York: Carroll & Graf. 2006.
According to Peake, IJI&C 20.2 (Summer 2007), the author "alleges that the British government ordered and implemented the assassination of Himmler" in order to prevent his testimony at Nuremburg that "Britain had entered into peace negotiations with [him] without telling its allies." However, as the reviewer points out, the documents on which this conclusion is based have been determined to be forgeries. How these forgeries were placed in the British National Archives has not been determined.
Altenhöner, Florian. "SS-Intelligence, Covert Operations and the Slovak Declaration of Independence in March 1939." Journal of Intelligence History 8, no. 2 (Winter 2008-2009). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
1. "Axis Sigint Collaboration: A Limited Partnership." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 1-17. And in Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence in World War II, ed. David Alvarez, 1-17. London: Frank Cass, 1999.
2. "Diplomatic Solutions: German Foreign Office Cryptanalysis, 1919-1945." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 169-185.
This article follows the work of the Z Branch of the Foreign Ministry's Personnel Division. There are a substantial number of "may haves" in the part of the article discussing interwar activities. The unit's organization during World War II is detailed. "Cooperation between Pers Z and the separate cryptanalytic services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force did not exist."
3. "Wilhelm Fenner and the Development of the German Cipher Bureau, 1922-1939." Cryptologia 31, no. 2 (Apr. 2007): 152-163.
Fenner joined the Cipher Bureau in 1922 as head of the its cryptanalytic section; he was the "effective head" of the Bureau for most of the interwar years. This article surveys Fenner's efforts to build the Bureau, to make it a professional organization, and to fend off attacks on its responsibilities from the proliferating intelligence units under the Nazi regime. In the end, Germany's cryptanalytic capabilities were undercut by "duplication of effort, understaffing, inadequate technical resources, and uncoordinated operations."
Bartz, Karl. The Downfall of the German Secret Service. London: Kimber, 1956.
Wilcox: "Account of the failures and ultimate collapse of German spy and counterspy service."
Behrendt, Hans-Otto. Rommel's Intelligence in the Desert Campaign, 1941-1943. London: Kimber, 1985.
Sexton refers to this work as a "[l]avishly illustrated memoir of the role of intelligence in Rommel's operations." Behrendt describes "the organization, activities and personalities of Radio Intercept Company 621 and gives examples of the information gleaned from intercepts of British and American communications." According to Hunt, I&NS 2.2, the author served as intelligence officer to Rommel from April 1941 to May 1943. He has produced "a modest and enlightening account of his sevice which is as good an exposition of the practical side of intelligence work in the field as any I know from either side."
Behrens, Carl E. Effects on U-Boat Performance of Intelligence from Decryption of Allied Communications. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 1954.
Sexton describes this work as a study by the U.S. Navy "of the role of Sigint on German actions and deployments in the Battle of the Atlantic."
Bergmeier, Horst J.P., and Rainer E. Lotz. Hitler's Airwaves. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
Mitgang, NYT, 8 Sep., sees Hitler's Airwaves as a "well-documented book about Nazi Germany's propaganda broadcasts. The new study includes twisted song lyrics and radio talks from Berlin and Hamburg by American and British traitors." Also included is a description of "the organization of [Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda Joseph] Goebbels' broadcasting division and the role played by its foreign propaganda section." The writing is "clunky," but the authors are "diligent researchers."
Similarly, Peterson, History 26.3, finds this work to be "a detailed and fascinating study" that provides "a wonderful reference source for technical details and for names and dates of radio personalities" who broadcast over Nazi Germany's wartime English-language radio service.
Biddiscombe, Perry. WERWOLF!: The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement 1944-1946. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.
From publisher: "Near the end of the Second World War, a National Socialist resistance movement, known as the Werwolf, flickered briefly to life in Germany and its borderlands. Dedicated to delaying the advance of the Allies on both fronts, the Werwolf succeeded in scattered acts of sabotage and violence.... Werwolf violence failed to mobilize a spirit of national resistance. Biddiscombe argues that the group was poorly led, armed, and organized, and that it was doomed to failure given the war-weariness of the populace and the hesitancy of young Germans to sacrifice themselves on the funeral pyre of the regime."
Blandford, Edmund L. SS Intelligence: The Nazi Spy Organisation. Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 2000. SS Intelligence: The Nazi Secret Service. Edison, NJ: Castle, 2001.
From publisher: "The Nazi spy service was created by Reinhard Heydrich. Under his dedicated, methodical, and ruthless hand it grew into one of the most professional and dangerous espionage services in the world."
Bleicher, Hugo. Ed., Ian Colvin. Colonel Henri's Story: The War Memoirs of Hugo Bleicher, Former German Secret Agent. London: Kimber, 1954.
Constantinides comments that "Bleicher does not give a full story of the operations he does treat and leaves others obscure"; he does, however, provide "some valuable views of the counterintelligence war from the other side."
Boehm, Edward. Behind Enemy Lines: WWII Allied/Axis Propaganda. Secaucus, NJ: Wellfleet Press, 1989.
This extensively illustrated (coffee-table) book -- drawn from the author's personal collection -- covers only the European theater but provides examples of both Allied and Axis propaganda.
Boog, Horst. "German Air Intelligence in the Second World War." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 350-424.
The author's ultimate conclusion is that "[t]he underestimation of foreign air power, war potential, and morale and the overestimation of German air strength by German air intelligence before the war and in its early years contributed substantially to corroborate Hitler's false view that he could successfully wage a succession of victorious campaigns against individual opponents unpunished."
Braunschweig, Pierre Th. Tr., Karl Vorlathen and Frances Stirnemann-Lewis. Secret Channel to Berlin: The Masson-Schellenberg Connection and Swiss Intelligence in World War II. Havertown, PA: Casement, 2004.
Peake, Studies 49.2 (2005), finds that the author has thoroughly documented the complex details that make up this story. The work deals with "the controversial clandestine relationship between two World War II intelligence officers, SS Brigadier General Walter Schellenberg, head of the Nazi Reich Security Central Office (RHSA), and Colonel-Brigadier Roger Masson, head of Swiss military intelligence."
For Kruh, Cryptologia 29.3 (Jul. 2005), the author "tells the fascinating story of the most controversial Swiss intelligence operation" of World War II. "This is a superb book that fills in a large gap in our knowledge of a largely unknown aspect" of the war. Foot, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), comments that this "thoroughly scholarly work" is presented in an "effortlessly clear" translation. The "book, crammed with minutiae, gets more and more interesting as its main narrative goes on."
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