WORLD WAR II

Europe

General

A - G

Bankier, David, ed. Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust: Collected Essays from the Colloquium at the City University of New York. New York: Enigma, 2006.

From publisher: "Includes a preface by David Bankier and an introductory essay by Gerhard L. Weinberg, along with the following international scholars of the Second World War and the Holocaust: David Alvarez, Shlomo Aronson, Peter R. Black, Richard Breitman, Hilary Earl, Tuvia Friling, Norman J.W. Goda, Robert Hanyok, Sébastien Laurent, Katrin Paehler, Stephen Tyas, and Piotr Wrobel."

Bennett, Ralph. "The 'Vienna Alternative,' 1944: Reality of Illusion." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 2 (Apr. 1988): 241-271.

Bentley, Stewart W. [CAPT/USA] "Intelligence During Operation Market-Garden." Military Intelligence 20, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun 1994): 15-18.

Bentley argues that the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, "[m]ore than any other factor,... contributed to the ... strategic failure of Market-Garden." He looks at the use of intelligence in planning the operation, and finds that Montgomery and/or his staff did not "agree with intelligence reports ... on the composition and disposition of armor units in the area of operations." Bentley also notes that "[i]ntelligence analysts had vastly underestimated the recuperative powers of the German logistic system."

Betts, T.J. "Operation Columba." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 2 (Spring 1961): A35-A41.

In 1944,G-2 began dropping pairs of pigeons into northwest France, Belgium, and Holland, with notes to use these homing fowl to send information back to Britain. The return was negligible, but the German reaction actually strengthened resistance in the affected areas. More than that, the Germans concluded that the area of the drops supported their conclusion that the Allied invasion would come near Calais. The author draws some thoughts about intelligence from the experience.

Bigelow, Michael E. "Big Business: Intelligence in Patton's Third Army." Military Intelligence 18, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1992): 31-36.

Bradley, Omar N.

1. Bradley: A Soldier's Story. New York: Rand McNally, 1951.

2. and Clay Blair. A General's Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.

Petersen notes that Bradley's memoirs contain "[m]any references to the use of Ultra." Sexton comments that Bradley "did not regard" Ultra "as the oracle of Delphi."

Breitman, Richard. Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998. London: Penguin, 2000. [pb]

According to Michael Smith, "Bletchley Park and the Holocaust," Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 262-274, this work "claims that British codebreakers knew Nazi police operating behind the German troops invading the Soviet Union were murdering thousands of Jews but that they and the British wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who read the messages, did nothing about it." Smith disagrees with Breitman's interpretation and declares that "both the Bletchley Park code breakers and Churchill are innocent of the charges laid against them."

Media stories based on Breitman's book include: James Bone and Michael Binyon, "Britain Accused of Hiding Facts on Holocaust," Times (London), 15 Oct. 1998; Dominic Donald, "Should Churchill Have Acted?" Times (London), 15 Oct. 1998; and Hugo Gordon, "MI6 'Concealed Extermination of Jews for a Year,'" Telegraph (London), 15 Oct. 1998.

Breuer, William B. Operation Dragoon: The Allied Invasion of the South of France. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987. 1996. [pb]

Showalter, Library Journal (via Amazon.com), finds that this work "focuses on the first day of the Allied invasion of southern France, and on the airborne and commando troops who spearheaded the attack. Breuer integrates the stories of veterans of these forces into a fast-paced narrative that reestablishes war as the province of confusion, particularly in the context of a nighttime air assault."

Brugioni, Dino. "Auschwitz and Birkenau: Why the World War II Photo Interpreters Failed to Identify the Extermination Complex." Military Intelligence 9, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1983): 50-55.

Bussey, Donald S. "ULTRA et la VIIe Armée Americane." Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et des Conflits Contemporains 34 (Jan. 1984): 59-64. "ULTRA and the U.S. Seventh Army." In American Commanders and the Use of Signal Intelligence, ed. Arthur L. Funk. Manhatten, KS: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian Publishing, Sunflower University Press, 1984.

Sexton identifies Bussey as having served as an Ultra liaison officer with the 7th Army.

Button, Robert E. "Ultra sur le Theatre Europeen." Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et des Conflits Contemporains 34 (Jan. 1984): 43-52. "ULTRA in the European Theater." In American Commanders and the Use of Signal Intelligence, ed. Arthur L. Funk. Manhatten, KS: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian Publishing, Sunflower University Press, 1984.

According to Sexton, "Button describes the role of ULTRA in the operations of the 6th Army Group and 7th U.S. Army in 1944-1945."

Campbell, Kenneth J. "General Eisenhower's J-2: Major General Kenneth Strong, British Army Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997): 81-83.

"General Strong's success as General Eisenhower's J-2 was the result of his long-term assignment to intelligence, his exceptional dedication to educating himself professionally, his loyalty to his commander, and his talents for working in an international joint command context."

Dippel, John V. H. "Jumping to the Right Conclusion: The State Department Warning on Operation 'Barbarossa.'" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 213-227.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday, 1943.

Farago, Ladislas. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: Dell, 1963.

Franco, Arnold Clement, as told to Paula Aselin Spellman. Code to Victory: Coming of Age in World War II. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1998.

White, IJI&C 12.2, notes that the author was "a cryptanalyst with the (Morse Code) Detachment A of 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile (G). This unit operated as an intercept and intelligence service working on German Luftwaffe voice and wireless telegraph (W/T) communications.... Code to Victory provides a much-appreciated look at the U.S. Army's intercept work in the European Theater."

Gardner, Warner W. "Les Renseignements Ultra au 6e Groupe d'Armées." Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et des Conflits Contemporains 34 (Jan. 1984): 53-59. "Report on ULTRA Intelligence at Sixth Army Group." In American Commanders and the Use of Signal Intelligence, ed. Arthur L. Funk. Manhatten, KS: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian Publishing, Sunflower University Press, 1984.

Sexton identifies Gardner as having served as an Ultra liaison officer with the 6th Army Group.

Glantz, Mary. "An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States-Soviet Relations, 1941-1943." Journal of Military History 72, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 141-177.

From abstract: U.S. Army Col. Philip Faymonville "played a significant and controversial role in United States-Soviet relations in the 1930s and 1940s. The first U.S. military attaché to the Soviet Union, Faymonville provided dispassionate, accurate assessments of the Red Army's military worth. Yet he earned the enduring hostility of his military and diplomatic colleagues. During World War II, Faymonville returned to Moscow as lend-lease expediter. He reported directly to the White House, and worked independently from the military attaché and the Embassy, solidifying his position as outsider and raising questions about the role of military officers in the conduct of diplomacy."

Goldston, Robert. Sinister Touches: The Secret War Against Hitler. New York: Dial, 1982. [Petersen]

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