WORLD WAR II

Europe

Deception Operations Generally

P - Z

Park, Edwards. "A Phantom Division Played a Role in Germany's Defeat." At: http://www.laynor.org/articles/parkart.htm [not found 11/5/04]. From The Smithsonian, Apr. 1985.

The focus here is the U.S. Army's 23rd Headquarters Special Troops. The 23rd's troops "specialized in impersonating other troops.... For 268 days in mid-1944 and early l945, the 23rd's 82 officers and 1,023 enlisted men pretended. at one time or another, to be the 5th Armored Division, the 4th Infantry Division, the 6th Armored Division, the 90th Infantry Division and many other Army outfits hard at work in the hedgerows and forests of northern Europe. With inflatable rubber guns and vehicles, with ever-changing shoulder patches, stencils to make phony signs, and with amplified recordings of heavy equipment in action, the 23rd played role after role."

This article was carried on the Laynor Foundation Museum site [http://www.laynor.org] dedicated to Harold A. Laynor (1922-1991), an American artist who served with the 603rd Camouflage Engineers, a unit of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, in World War II.

Phillips, William W. "The Ghost Army of World War II." 1996. At: http://www.laynor.org/articles/big-g01.htm [not found 11/5/04].

This article concerns the U.S. Army's 23rd Headquarters Special Troops or the "Ghost Army." The 23rd is "unique in the history of American warfare in that it was a battlefront battalion composed largely of artists, sculptors, architects, literary figures and others from the arts and humanities. Many of the new recruits were already famous; others would win celebrity stripes after the war. They included Olin Dows...; Bill Blass...; Elsworth Kelly...; George Diestel...; Art Kane...; and Harold A. Laynor."

This article was carried on the Laynor Foundation Museum site [http://www.laynor.org] dedicated to Harold A. Laynor (1922-1991), an American artist who served with the 603rd Camouflage Engineers, a unit of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, in World War II.

Popov, Dusko. Spy/Counterspy: The Autobiography of Dusko Popov. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974. Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1975. [pb]

Clark comment: Popov was agent "Tricycle" in the XX System. What his role was during a mission in the United States in 1941 remains controversial, especially in relation to the Pearl Harbor controversy.

Pforzheimer says that Popov's "autobiography makes pleasant and informative reading about the life of an unusual double agent." His comments about his relations with the FBI "should be read with some caution." To Constantinides, Popov offers "a rare first-hand account of double agent operations and deception of the XX Committee from the agent's vantage point."

The following comment is taken from a posting in the newsgroup alt.politics.org.cia, signed by Ernest Volkman:

"Popov's memoir, a mix of truth, half-truth, and outright falsehood (like many intelligence memoirs), should be approached with caution. Newly-declassified papers reveal the real story of Popov's 1941 mission.

"Briefly, Popov was dispatched by the Abwehr to the United States with a 'shopping list' of intelligence the Germans wanted, concealed in a microdot. J. Edgar Hoover took an instant dislike to Popov, a moral degenerate, and thus did not spend too much time analyzing the material contained in Popov's microdot. His animus also balked a plan by MI6 and MI5 to use Popov as a deception agent against the Abwehr in the United States.

"In any event, among the items the Abwehr mentioned in the microdot was a request that Popov collect intelligence about Pearl Harbor. Hoover did not wonder why the Germans would want information about Pearl Harbor. He did pass on the Popov material to both Army and Navy intelligence, but, regrettably, both those agencies also failed to demonstrate any curiosity about the German interest in Pearl Harbor -- a military base far removed from any possible German military interest. Obviously, the Germans were doing a favor for their Japanese allies; tragically, nobody in American intelligence asked the next obvious question: why were the Japanese interested in detailed intelligence about Pearl Harbor?

"It should be noted that throughout 1941, the FBI (which in those days had foreign intelligence responsibilities) and the military intelligence agencies were aware of extensive Japanese intelligence operations directed against Pearl Harbor. (Indeed, the FBI was running a covert wiretap on the Japanese consulate in Honolulu, recording much information on the activities of Japanese agents working under diplomatic cover). The Americans concluded that all the Japanese spying was routine; i.e., Tokyo long had demonstrated an acute interest in Pearl Harbor, headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, so there was nothing to be alarmed about. Unfortunately, American intelligence failed to properly interpret the clues that in late 1941 unmistakably indicated that the Japanese were collecting intelligence preparatory to an actual attack on the installation. This conclusion was just one of a series of blunders that permitted a Japanese striking force to sail near Pearl Harbor undetected and launch a surprise attack that caught the Americans totally unaware."

Pujol, Juan, with Nigel West. Garbo . London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985. Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent in World War II. New York: Random House, 1986.

According to Wheeler, IJI&C 2.1, this is a "valuable contribution to filling a gap in knowledge about the British MI-5 'Double-Cross System' of World War II.... Pujol, codenamed 'Garbo' by MI-5 and 'Arabel' by the Germans,... becomes the most successful double-agent in the vast Fortitude deception operation, 1943-1945."

Although he believes it to be a "valuable source," Sexton cautions that "Chapters 5, 7-10 by West are marred by egregious errors." Campbell, I&NS 2.2, is also critical of West's contribution, specifically of what he sees as extraneous detail and unnecessary mistakes.

Reit, Seymour. Masquerade: The Amazing Camouflage Deceptions of World War II. New York: Hawthorn, 1978. London: Hale, 1979.

Constantinides: The author discusses more forms of deception than just camouflage, but he "is best when writing of matters strictly defined as camouflage or concealment." Only a few of the incidents covered are new. The book is basically an introduction to the subject.

Sommer, Mark. "Getting the Message Through: Clandestine Mail and Postage Stamps." Military Intelligence 18, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1992): 35-38.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Mathtech. Office of Research and Development. Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore. Washington, DC: January 1981.

Constantinides: "This is a commendable piece of work, high in quality and presented in language devoid of any pretension or scholarly jargon." It does not pretend to be the final word on the subject; "it is, rather, a pathfinding work."

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Mathtech. Office of Research and Development. Thoughts on the Cost-Effectiveness of Deception and Related Tactics in the Air War, 1939-1945. Washington, DC: March 1979.

Constantinides: "The air war that is covered is really the RAF bomber offensive in Europe and in essence just night bombing.... The main conclusion and lesson, that wartime deception was cost-effective, is equally applicable to current military conflicts."

Wheatley, Dennis.

Wheatley was one of the earliest members of the London Controlling Section (LCS), the body that coordinated British deception activities during World War II. He has written two books that touch on his deception work, the more recent of which is much fuller in detail.

1. Stranger than Fiction. London: Hutchinson, 1959.

Constantinides notes that only a small section of this book deals with deception activities and then without specifics.

2. The Deception Planners: My Secret War. London: Hutchinson, 1980.

Constantinides says that this work is a "detailed first-hand account of the LCS and its personnel and work.... Wheatley contributes good character sketches of his colleagues in LCS and clarifies boundaries of responsibility ... between LCS and Dudley Clarke's A Force in the Mediterranean and the Middle East." Lacking from this work are mentions of the roles of Ultra and of the United States in deception operations.

White, John Baker. The Big Lie. New York: Crowell, 1955. London: Evans, 1955.

Despite the author's service with the Political Warfare Executive in World War II, Constantinides dismisses The Big Lie as "of no lasting value to the study of deception." Baker has inflated his experiences in deception (often confusing deception and activities that were purely psychological warfare), and his knowledge of the subject is "incomplete, faulty, or confused."

Wingate, Ronald. Not in the Limelight. London: Hutchinson, 1959.

Constantinides notes that the author was at one time deputy in London Controlling Section (LCS), the group that planned and coordinated British deception in World War II. Nevertheless, only one chapter in this book deals with the deceptions with which he as involved. "Much of what he relates has become better known, but ... the book is still a good, concentrated exposition on deception."

Young, Martin, and Robbie Stamp. Trojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second World War. London: Bodley Head, 1989. [Chambers]

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