Bacon, Donald J. [MAJ/USAF] Second World War Deception: Lessons Learned for Todays Joint Planner. Wright Flyer Paper No.5. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1998.
According to Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), the author focuses on six World War II deception cases -- 3 British and 3 Soviet.
Beam, John C. "The Intelligence Background of Operation TORCH." Parameters 13 (Dec. 1983): 60-68. [Petersen]
Bendeck, Whitney T. A Force: The Origins of British Deception during the Second World War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Preess, 2013.
Peake, Studies 58.3 (Sep. 2014), concludes that Bendeck "covers the same topics as other authors have and adds little to their record." Nevertheless, this is "a concise but thorough treatment of an important topic."
Bjorge, Gary J. Deception Operations. Combat Studies Institute Historical Bibliography No. 5. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986.
Sexton calls this brief paper (12 pages) an "excellent bibliographic introduction to the literature on deception."
Bloom, Murray Teigh. "Uncle Sam: Bashful Counterfeiter." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 3 (1988): 345-358.
This article discusses a scheme raised by John Steinbeck and others to counterfeit German money. Donovan raised the same idea with regard to Italy. The idea also came from elsewhere in OSS regarding Japan. The author also discusses Reddick's operation.
Boog, Horst. "'Josephine' and the Northern Flank." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 1 (Jan. 1989): 137-160.
The author concludes that deception plan "Fortitude North, as far as it was carried through by British controlled agents, worked well until after the invasion.... [N]ot only did the British-controlled agent reports corroborate Hitler's preoccupation with Norway, but also the reports of Josephine. Although ... Josephine was not controlled, the information he [actually, Josephine was a source designation for the Swedish air and naval attachés in London] furnished must have been controlled information intentionally leaked to diplomats in London."
Boyce, Fredric. SOE's Ultimate Deception: Operation Periwig. Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2005. Charleston, SC: History Press; 2005.
From publisher: "[S]omeone had the idea of creating an entirely fictional German resistance movement and 'selling it' to the Nazi security authorities. From January until April 1945, SOE rained propaganda leaflets on the hapless population fleeing the ruins of their cities and the oncoming Allied ground forces; they broadcast messages to the 'resistance;' they planted the most scandalous lies about eminent Nazis; and at the end they even dropped four agents on fictitious missions."
Breuer, William B. The Secret War With Germany: Deception, Espionage and Dirty Tricks, 1939-1945. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989.
According to Sexton, this is a "[p]opular history of covert and special operations" in World War II. It is "based on secondary sources" and is "of limited value."
Brown, Anthony Cave. Bodyguard of Lies. London: W.H. Allen, 1975. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1975. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. New York: Bantam, 1976. [pb] New York: Morrow, 1991. [pb]
Clark comment: This book tells in an entertaining -- but sprawling and unfocused -- fashion the story of the Allied use of the take from ULTRA, the fruits of the success of British counterintelligence at the onset of war, and other "special means" to lay the basis for the "grand deception" that preceded the invasion of Normandy. As the quotes below indicate, few knowledgeable commentators are enthusiastic about the accuracy of Brown's work, especially where details are concerned. Many writers are particularly pained by the perpetuation of the "Churchill-let-Coventry-be-destroyed" myth.
Pforzheimer says that Bodyguard of Lies is so "replete with errors and erroneous embellishments" that it should be approached "only with great caution." Petersen calls it "[f]ar-reaching in scope and research, but unreliable." Hugh Trevor-Roper, NYRB, 19 Feb. 1976, opines that "while it can be enjoyed as narrative, as history it cannot be trusted."
Constantinides found it paradoxical that the author "produced a history of many Allied and especially British intelligence operations in the war ... that can be used as a reference on particular operations only if it is used as a starting point and further research is pursued on the matter elsewhere."
The utility of the lengthy review by Bowen, Studies 20.1 (Spring 1976), is tainted by his acceptance of Brown's Coventry story. He does go on, however, to note "the many evidences of inconsistency, controversy, and simple errors of fact" in the book. In general, the reviewer concludes that "[w]hat the author has done..., in a very accomplished manner, is to present the major elements of the story in both human and institutional terms"; it is a "spectacular if flawed work."
For a highly critical contemporaneous review, see Michael Howard, "The Ultra Variations," The Times Literary Supplement, 28 May 1976, 641-642.
Campbell, John P. "Operation Starkey 1943: 'A Piece of Harmless Playacting'? Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 92-113.
This article concerns a subsidiary operation, Starkey, of the larger Operation Cockade, designed to "conceal the actual state of Allied weakness in England" in 1943. Starkey was to simulate preparations for an Allied landing in strength on beaches between Boulogne and Le Touquet in early to mid-Sepember 1943.
Clarke, Dudley. Seven Assignments. London: Jonathan Cape, 1948.
Constantinides comments that Clarke has been seen by some as a "pioneer and genius in deception in World War II.... For those expecting to learn more of Clarke's deception work, this book will be a disappointment. It ends at the moment he assumes staff duties in the Middle East."
According to H.O. Dovey, "The Eighth Assignment, 1941-42," I&NS 11.4, pp. 672-695, Clarke continued his story in the form of a diary that is now available in the Public Record Office. Dovey reviews Clarke's presentation of "A" Force's work from Cairo for 1941-1942. Since the "A" Force Narrative War Diary continues until 18 June 1945, additional uses of Clarke's story can be expected.
Colby, Benjamin. 'Twas a Famous Victory: Deception and Propaganda in the War against Germany. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1974. [Petersen]
Colvin, Ian. The Unknown Courier. London: Kimber, 1953.
Constantinides: This account of Operation Mincemeat is "somewhat disjointed and at times elliptical.... The story of this operation was treated more authoritatively and completely by Montagu in The Man Who Never Was."
Coster, Donald Q. "We Were Expecting You at Dakar." Reader's Digest 49 (Aug. 1946): 103-107.
Petersen: "Allied deception plan for 1942 invasion of North Africa."
Cruickshank, Charles G. Deception in World War II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
According to Pforzheimer, this book presents an outline of Allied deception operations in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. It is "useful and well-written," but is "by no means the last word on the subject." Constantinides notes that some of the author's assessments of the success or failure and the contributions of the war's deception efforts "will be contested," because he "has not developed sufficient support or evidence."
Eldridge, Justin L.C. "The Blarney Stone and the Rhine: 23rd Headquarters, Special Troops and the Rhine River Crossing, March 1945." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 211-241.
The 23rd Headquarters, Special Troops, were organized in 1944 to conduct tactical deception operations in support of the Allied advance across Europe. Its efforts were largely "a series of unrelated and ineffective deception operations that contributed little to the supported combat operations." With regard to the Rhine crossing in March 1945, the author concludes that German military intelligence was in such disarray by this time that the extensive deception efforts of the 23rd were not even noticed by the Germans.
Telegraph (London). "[Obituary:] Eddie Chapman -- Safe-blower Who Became the Wartime Double Agent Zig-Zag and Outfoxed the Germans." 20 Dec. 1997. [http://www.telegraph. co.uk]
Chapman worked under the codename Zig-Zag as one of the Double Cross agents during World War II. He was in jail in St Helier for "trying to blow open a safe in Glasgow" when the Germans occupied the Channel Islands. The Nazis recruited him for a sabotage operation and sent him back to Britain, where "[h]e was immediately turned by the British." Chapman would later be played in the movie "Triple Cross" (1967) by Christopher Plummer. See also, Richard Goldstein, [Obituary:] "Eddie Chapman, 83, Safecracker and Spy," New York Times, 20 Dec. 1997; Booth, ZIGZAG (2007); and Owen, The Eddie Chapman Story (1954).
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