WORLD WAR II

Europe

D-Day

G - Z

Gabel, Christopher R. "Books on Overlord: A Select Bibliography and Research Agenda on the Normandy Campaign, 1944." Military Affairs 48, no. 3 (Jul. 1984): 144-148.

Grabo, Cynthia M. "Deception in the Normandy Invasion." American Intelligence Journal 8 (Summer 1987): 20-24.

Haswell, Jock. The Intelligence and Deception of the D-Day Landings. London: Batsford, 1979. D-Day: Intelligence and Deception. New York: Times Books, 1979.

Constantinides comments negatively on this work, arguing that Haswell "contributes nothing of significance to our knowledge and understanding of deception in conjunction with the 1944 invasion of France.... He provides no references and is prone to repeat old or make new errors.... Look to other writings." Sexton, on the other hand, calls it a "[w]ell-researched popular survey."

Hesketh, Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. London: St Ermin's, 1999. New York: Overlook, 2000.

Cohen, FA 79.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2000), says that this "tale of espionage and counterespionage, meticulous planning and organization, and applied psychology used for the highest stakes ... is simply superb." The author, one of the top officials in the London Controlling Station, wrote the work immediately after the end of the war as Fortitude's official history.

Hoffman, Jon T. "Legacy and Lessons of Operation Overlord." Marine Corps Gazette 78 (Jun. 1994): 68-72. [Seymour]

James, M.E. Clifton. I Was Monty's Double. London & New York: Rider, 1954.

According to Constantinides, James' role was "only one small segment of the [Bodyguard] overall deception plan.... Nevertheless,... the fact that the scheme was a rare example of a human decoy operation in support of a strategic deception plan lend[s] the book special interest."

Koch, James R. "Operation FORTITUDE: The Backbone of Deception." Military Review 72 (Mar. 1992): 66-77.

Sexton: "Analytic history of the Normandy deception and its supporting radio deception plan."

Levine, Joshua. Operation Fortitude: The Story of the Spy Operation that Saved D-DAY. London: HarperCollins, 2011.

For Peake, Studies 56.2 (Jun. 2012), this "is a well-written summary of the principal and most successful deception operation of WW II and is a useful addition to the historical literature on intelligence."

Masterman, John Cecil. The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-1945. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1972. New York: Avon Books, 1972. [pb] New York: Ballantine, 1982. [pb]

Clark comment: Masterman was head of BI(a), the counterespionage arm of MI5, during World War II, and chaired the Twenty (XX) Committee that managed the German agents captured and turned beginning in 1940. Pforzheimer notes that the author "wrote this text as an official classified history"; as released, there has been sanitization. The book remains a "veritable classic treatise" on counterintelligence and deception. The lack of direct references to the Ultra material, which was used to check on the success of these operations, is a major void in the Masterman's presentation.

According to Constantinides, The Double-Cross System is "one of the great works of intelligence literature, an outstanding one in the area of deception, and perhaps the greatest work yet written on double agents." Sexton notes that this "slender volume ought to be essential reading for those seriously interested in intelligence and deception."

In a excellent article that is more than a book review, A.V. Knobelspiesse, "Masterman Revisited," Studies in Intelligence 18, no. 1 (Spring 1974): 25-40, proclaims that "Masterman's book ... merits the appellation 'seminal.'" The work presents "lean, impersonal, underplayed facts," and "combines brevity and conciseness with donnish elegance and challenge.... The codification of [counterintelligence] operational principles which accompanies Masterman's double agent case facts makes this the only book of its kind in public print.... The underlying thrust of the methodological theory and wisdom set out in this book ... apply to any time and to any adversary."

For the debates surrounding Masterman's release of his work and some of the follow-on controversies, see John C. Campbell, "A Retrospective on John Masterman's The Double-Cross System," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 320-353. See also, E.D.R. Harrison, "J.C. Masterman and the Security Service, 1940-72," Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 6 (Dec. 2009): 769-804.

Mendelsohn, John, ed. Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Military Deception During the World War II Era. 18 vols. New York: Garland, 1989.

This multivolume work consists of photo reproductions of documents from the National Archives.

Vol. 15: Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion. Intro., Harold C. Deutsch.

Vol. 16: From Normandy into the Reich. Intro., Edwin R. Coffee.

Perrault, Gilles [Pseud., Jacques Peyroles]. The Secrets of D-Day. London: Barker, 1965. New York: Little, Brown, 1965.

Constantinides finds this to be a work of "mixed quality." The author does "provide an overview of Allied deception and security efforts and operations" in preparation for D-Day. However, his lack of access to Allied records, the absence of knowledge of Ultra and of the work of the XX Committee, the presence of errors and gaps in the story, and the lack of documentation reduce the book's utility.

Public Record Office. Intro., Mark Seaman. Garbo, The Spy Who Saved D-Day. London: 2000.

According to Anderson, Intelligencer 11.2, most of this book, "with the exception of a first rate introduction by Mark Seaman,... is developed from a report by Garbo's MI5 case officer, Thomas Harris.... This is a great read for anyone interested in counterespionage and, in particular, the exploitation of double agents." See also, Juan Pujol, with Nigel West, Garbo (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985).

Pujol, Juan, with Nigel West. Garbo . London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985. Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent in World War II. New York: Random House, 1986.

According to Wheeler, IJI&C 2.1, this is a "valuable contribution to filling a gap in knowledge about the British MI-5 'Double-Cross System' of World War II.... Pujol, codenamed 'Garbo' by MI-5 and 'Arabel' by the Germans,... becomes the most successful double-agent in the vast Fortitude deception operation, 1943-1945." Although he believes it to be a "valuable source," Sexton cautions that "Chapters 5, 7-10 by West are marred by egregious errors." Campbell, I&NS 2.2, is also critical of West's contribution, specifically of what he sees as extraneous detail and unnecessary mistakes.

See also, Public Record Office, Intro., Mark Seaman, Garbo, The Spy Who Saved D-Day (London: 2000).

Ricklefs, Richard G. [MAJ] "FORTITUDE SOUTH: D-Day Deception." Military Intelligence 22, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1996): 48-50.

This article is a very basic and brief look at Fortitude South, the Allied deception operation designed to convince Hitler that the Allied landing would come in France at the Pas de Calais. A fictitious invasion force (the First U.S. Army Group) was "built up" in Kent, complete with commensurate radio activity.

Ringle, Ken. "The 'Boffins' of Bletchley Park." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 6-12 Jun. 1994, 37-38.

Despite its title, this article focuses more on the grand deception operation, Operation Bodyguard, than on the relationship between the deception activity and the codebreaking operation at Bletchley Park.

Sergueiev, Lily. Secret Service Rendered. London: Kimber, 1968.

According to Constantinides, Sergeyev was the XX agent codenamed Treasure, who was used in the pre-D-Day invasion deception. The reasons for Masterman's exasperation with Treasure show up in this book, which is more concerned with personal relationships than with the intelligence being passed by the Allies to mislead the Germans.

Smith, Timothy J. "Overlord/Bodyguard: Intelligence Failure through Adversary Deception." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 550-568.

Bodyguard "succeeded through a masterful combination of disciplines: counterintelligence and especially counterespionage, cryptology, aerial supremacy, and the art and craft of deception through double-agent operations and decoy forces and feints. To replicate so complete a triumph would be difficult."

Stafford, David. Ten Days to D-Day: Countdown to the Liberation of Europe. London: Little, Brown, 2003. London: Abacus, 2004. [pb]

From publisher: The author's "narrative, climaxing on the eve of D-Day, gives a day-by-day account" of the "human story behind this momentous event from both the Allied and Nazi perspectives. Stafford focuses on twelve very different human narratives -- ... an American paratrooper; a Canadian infantryman; a French Jew in hiding,... and SOE agents fighting to keep their identity secret."

Tooley, Peter J. Operation Quicksilver. Romford, UK: Ian Henry Publications, 1988.

Surveillant 2.1: Operation Quicksilver was "devised in 1943 and involved building dummy landing craft and mooring them in various rivers and harbors on the coast, giving the impression to enemy reconnaissance planes that there was a build-up of belligerent forces in those areas."

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