A - F

Ambrose, Stephen E.

1. D-Day: June 6, 1944 - The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

For Surveillant 4.1, Ambrose "makes very clear ... the critical role that intelligence and covert action played in insuring the success of D-Day." He covers intelligence collection, the Allies' massive deception effort, and the sabotage campaign waged by the Resistance with assistance from SOE and OSS.

2. "Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II." Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 1 (Jan. 1981): 153-166.

3. "Eisenhower, the Intelligence Community, and the D-Day Invasion." Wisconsin Magazine of History 64 (Summer 1981): 261-277. [Petersen]

4. "The Secrets of OVERLORD." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 1, no. 4 (Summer 1989): 70-75.

This article deals with the deception plan -- Operation Fortitude -- employed by the Allies in preparation for D-Day: "The problem was not just to fool the Germans about where the D Day landings would take place, but to persuade them that Normandy was merely a diversion."

Barbier, Mary Kathryn.

1. D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.

According to Kahn, Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), the author concludes that the Allied deception operation was "not as vital as often claimed." Springer, Army History 70 (Winter 2009), says this "work provides a ... thorough examination of intelligence and counterintelligence operations surrounding the Normandy invasion. She demonstrates the utility of the Fortitude campaigns without falling into the trap of presenting her topic as the sole, or even the primary, reason for the Allied victory. Rather, she presents a detailed explanation of how the campaign was carried out, linking it to an assessment of its effectiveness."

2. "Deception and the Planning of D-Day." In The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, ed. John Buckley, 170-84. London: Routledge, 2006.

3. "Planning, High Command, and Deception." Everyone's War 9 (2004): 29-34.

Beevor, Antony. D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. New York: Viking, 2009.

Fullenkamp, Parameters 40.1 (Spring 2010), notes that an "interesting aspect" of this work "is the reassessment of the efforts of the French Resistance, concluding that it deserves more credit than is generally accepted."

Bennett, Ralph. "Fortitude, Ultra and the 'Need to Know.'" Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 3 (Jul. 1989): 482-502.

Clark comment: Bennett argues that the linkage between the Fortitude deception plan and Ultra intelligence is perhaps less clear than it has been presented. Sexton says this article is "well worth reading."

Bickell, C. "Operation 'Fortitude South': An Analysis of Its Influence upon German Dispositions and Conduct of Operations in 1944." War & Society 18, no. 1 (2000): 91-122.

Boyes, Jon L. "C3I and D-Day." Signal 38 (Jun. 1984): 13-14. [Petersen]

Breuer, William B. Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception. Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood, 1993.

Ambrose, FA 72.3 (1993), provides a strongly negative review: "Operation Fortitude deserves a good book, but this is not it: the research is inadequate, the errors far too many, the breathless writing inappropriate to the subject."

According to Rich, WIR 13.4, "Breuer does not provide the detail of Anthony Cave Brown's classic Bodyguard of Lies..., but he has the advantage of nearly twenty more years of disclosures and provides a most useful bibliography." Kane,, praises Hoodwinking Hitler as a well-written piece of nonfiction that reads like an adventure novel. The reviewer recommends the book as "both informative and entertaining."

Brown, Anthony Cave. Bodyguard of Lies. London: W.H. Allen, 1975. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1975. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. New York: Bantam, 1976. [pb] New York: Morrow, 1991. [pb]

Clark comment: This book tells in an entertaining -- but sprawling and unfocused -- fashion the story of the Allied use of the take from ULTRA, the fruits of the success of British counterintelligence at the onset of war, and other "special means" to lay the basis for the "grand deception" that preceded the invasion of Normandy. As the quotes below indicate, few knowledgeable commentators are enthusiastic about the accuracy of Brown's work, especially where details are concerned. Many writers are particularly pained by the perpetuation of the "Churchill-let-Coventry-be-destroyed" myth.

Pforzheimer says that Bodyguard of Lies is so "replete with errors and erroneous embellishments" that it should be approached "only with great caution." Petersen calls it "[f]ar-reaching in scope and research, but unreliable." Hugh Trevor- Roper, NYRB, 19 Feb. 1976, opines that "while it can be enjoyed as narrative, as history it cannot be trusted."

Constantinides found it paradoxical that the author "produced a history of many Allied and especially British intelligence operations in the war ... that can be used as a reference on particular operations only if it is used as a starting point and further research is pursued on the matter elsewhere."

The utility of the lengthy review by Bowen, Studies 20.1 (Spring 1976), is tainted by his acceptance of Brown's Coventry story. He does go on, however, to note "the many evidences of inconsistency, controversy, and simple errors of fact" in the book. In general, the reviewer concludes that "[w]hat the author has done..., in a very accomplished manner, is to present the major elements of the story in both human and institutional terms"; it is a "spectacular if flawed work."

For a highly critical contemporaneous review, see Michael Howard, "The Ultra Variations," The Times Literary Supplement, 28 May 1976, 641-642.

Campbell, John P.

1. "D-Day 1943: The Limits of Strategic Deception." Canadian Journal of History 12 (1977): 207-237.

2. "Roger Hesketh and the de Guingand Letter." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 131-142.

A letter dated 25 January 1944 from Maj. Gen. "Freddie" de Guingand, Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, to Maj. Gen. C.A. West, of the Operations and Plans Division, SHAEF, "had a decisive and creative influence on the planning process" for Fortitude. But it was Roger Hesketh who "made 'Fortitude South' workable and then saved it."

Chandler, David G., and James Lawton Collins, Jr., eds. The D-Day Encyclopedia. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Surveillant 3.6 calls this an "impressive military history work" the scope of which is mostly "far afield" from intelligence. Sexton notes, however, that there are "informative entries discussing the importance of Signals Intelligence and ULTRA."

Cryptologia. Editors. "From the Archives. Subject: Codes and Ciphers for Combined Air-Amphibian Operations." 8, no. 2 (Apr. 1984): 181-186.

Petersen: "Coordinating cipher material for the Allied invasion of France."

Cubbage, T.L., II. "The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh's History of Strategic Deception." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 327-346.

The reference in the article's title is to an unpublished manuscript by Col. Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, "FORTITUDE: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe -- April, 1943 to May, 1945." The author calls this "the definitive history of how the deception Operation Fortitude South was accomplished."

Delmer, Denis Sefton. The Counterfeit Spy. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. London: Hutchinson, 1973.

According to Pforzheimer, this book on the deception program for the Normandy invasion is "not in a class with Masterman's Double-Cross System." Constantinides recommends reading this book after Montagu's Beyond Top Secret Ultra and Masterman's book.

Eldredge, Wentworth [MAJ/USAF (Ret.)]. "Biggest Hoax of the War: Operation FORTITUDE -- The Allied Deception Plan that Fooled the Germans about Normandy." Air Power History 37 (Fall 1990): 15-22. [Seymour]

Elliott, Geoffrey. Gentleman Spymaster: How Lt. Col. Tommy "Tar" Robertson Double-crossed the Nazis. London: Methuen, 2011.

Peake, Studies 56.3 (Sep. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.3 (Winter-Spring 2013), notes that Thomas Argyll "Tar" Robertson "was the original architect of the Double-Cross system." The author explains how Robertson used the ability to read German cable traffic to deceive the Germans. This book "provides unusual insights to both double agent operations and the life of one of the best at the task."

Evans, Michael. "Double Dealing Aided the Allies." Times (London), 17 Sep. 1999. []

The minutes of the XX Committee, "which masterminded the wartime double cross agents," were released by the Public Record Office on 16 September 1999. The minutes "reveal more details of the way the Germans were fooled," showing that the "greatest double cross agent of them all,... Juan Pujol Garcia, codenamed Garbo, played the crucial part in deceiving the Germans over Allied plans for the invasion of Normandy."

Ferris, John.

1. "'FORTITUDE' in Context: The Evolution of British Military Deception in Two World Wars, 1914-1945." In Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, eds. Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, 117-165. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

2. "Intelligence and OVERLORD: A Snapshot from 6 June 1944." In The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, ed. John Buckley, 185-200. London: Routledge, 2006.

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