Harbron, John D. The
Longest Battle: The Royal Canadian Navy in the Atlantic, 1939-1945.
St. Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell, 1993. D770H34
Herz, Norman. Operation Alacrity: The Azores and the War in the Atlantic. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.
According to Bath, NIPQ 20.2, this work tells the story of the war in Atlantic in the context of the efforts to obtain Allied bases in the Azores. Although it is "not a book on intelligence,... [i]t is a well written account that documents a ...significant[] sidebar to the larger story of the U-boat war."
Howarth, Stephen, and Derek Law, eds. The Battle of the Atlantic. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. London: Greenhill. 1994.
Hughes,
Terry, and Costello, John. The Battle of the Atlantic. New York:
Dial Press, 1977.
Nautical Brass Bibliography, http://members.aol.com/nbrass/biblio.htm, views this as a "good account of this part of the War, although there are several errors regarding Enigma."
Kahn,
David. Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes,
1939-1943. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991. London: Souvenir Press, 1991. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1998.
Kruh, Cryptologia 23.2, notes that the Barnes & Noble edition of "this superb book ... contains a new preface by Kahn, who also used the opportunity to correct some minor errors found in the earlier edition."
For Surveillant 1.4, this is a "rare gem" of a book. It tells the "story of how the British, unable to break the German naval Enigma cipher machine because it was used in a much more complicated fashion than the Luftwaffe Enigma machine (which they were breaking), had to steal documents from some German weather ships operating north of Iceland, to aid in breaking the codes.... [W]ith these filched documents, [they] were able to break the German U-boat codes and divert their convoys so they wouldn't be sunk and, later, sink the U-boats because they now knew where they were located."
Miller, IJI&C 6.3, says that Kahn "presents another excellent work on intelligence and raises his standards even higher.... This remarkably fine book is the best to date on ULTRA." To Ringle, WPNWE, 17-23 Jun. 1991, the author's "impressive economy and dogged research" has produced "not only great history, but great midnight reading." Peake, AIJ 15.1/90, sees Seizing the Enigma as "a very readable and worthwhile book."
In the view of Milner, I&NS 9.1, the author presents a "fascinating study ... and a perfectly sound conclusion." He has an "impressive grasp of the practical problems of codebreaking and usage ... [and] understands the limits of special intelligence."
Kennedy, Michael. Guarding Neutral Ireland: The Coast Watching Service and Military Intelligence, 1939-1945. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008.
From publisher: "Using unique Irish military sources and newly available British and American material," this work tells the history of World War II "as it happened locally along the coast of Ireland and at national and international levels in Dublin, London, Berlin and Washington." The study details "the secret relationship between Irish military and diplomats and British Admiralty Intelligence, showing how coast watching service reports were passed on to the RAF and Royal Navy Britain in the hunt for German u-boats and aircraft in the Atlantic."
Kingsley, F.A., ed.
The Applications of Radar and Other Electronic Systems in the Royal Navy in World War II. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1995.
Knowles, Kenneth A.
"ULTRA and the Battle of the Atlantic: The American View." In
Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History: Papers from
the Third United States Naval Academy History Symposium, ed. Robert
V. Love, 444-449. New York: Garland, 1980.
Sexton identifies the author as the head of the Atlantic Section, Combat Intelligence, of the 10th Fleet (the U.S. Navy's equivalent of the British Admiralty's Submarine Tracking Room). Knowles argues that integrated with HF/DF, Ultra provided the "'edge of victory at sea' in the Atlantic. Highly recommended."
Kohnen, David. Commanders Winn and Knowles: Winning the U-Boat War with Intelligence, 1939-1943. Krakow, Poland: The Enigma Bulletin, No. 4, Special Issue, 1999. [pb]
According to information from Mark Friedman (http://www.mariner.org), Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve Commander Rodger Winn and U.S. Navy Commander Kenneth Knowles of the U.S. Navy's "F-21 Atlantic Section" were at the "strategic core" of the Allied naval effort in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Kruh, Cryptologia 24.1, says that "Kohnen has written an excellent account of British-American naval strategies, relations between their leaders, and he includes many cryptologic details and information about the codebreakers involved."
For Rohwer, JIH 1.1, "[w]e must be very grateful to David Kohnen for reminding us of the development of the American-British-Canadian SIGINT cooperation and especially for providing us with a vivid description of Rodger Winn and Kenneth Knowles."
Mallmann-Showell, Jak
P. Enigma U-Boats: Breaking the Code -- The True Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
From advertisement: The breaking of the Enigma code "was particularly important during the Battle of the Atlantic.... Without the decoded Enigma messages, the Allies' narrow victory would likely have turned to defeat. This ... analysis of Enigma's development and its role during U-boat operations includes details of Allied boardings from which Enigma machines could have been captured."
McLean, Douglas. "Confronting
Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Antisubmarine Warfare in the Last
Year of the Battle of the Atlantic." Naval War College Review
47 (Winter 1994): 87-104.
Milner, Marc. "The
Battle of the Atlantic." In Decisive Campaigns of the Second World
War, ed. John Gooch, 45-66. London: Frank Cass, 1990.
Sexton notes that this article includes a discussion of "the influence of communications intelligence on both German and Allied operations.... Highly recommended."
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