Aston, George G. [Sir] Secret Service. London: Faber & Faber, 1930. New York: Cosmopolitan, 1930.
According to Constantinides, this is "a collection of stories of secret service, partly derived from personal experience.... Credit must be given ... for [Aston's] recognition of the importance of security and counterintelligence and for his provision of many examples of their vital role in the success or failure of military operations."
Barton, George. Celebrated Spies and Famous Mysteries of the Great War. Boston: Page, 1919. [Petersen]
Beach, Jim. "Origins of the Special Intelligence Relationship? Anglo-American Intelligence Co-operation on the Western Front, 1917-18." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 2 (Apr. 2007): 229-249.
The author suggests that the World War I "interaction between the intelligence staffs of the British and American Expeditionary Forces was a significant precursor to the emergence of the later relationship."
Bigelow, Michael E. "The First Steps: Battalion S2s in World War I." Military Intelligence 18. no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1992): 26-31.
1. "Conjecture on the de Cramm Affairs." Intelligencer 16, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 55-57
This is a neat little piece of historical investigation, described by the author thusly: "Evidence suggests that Matilda de Cramm, intimate friend and French tutor of U.S. Ambassador to Russia David R. Francis during the Bolshevik Revolution, was a German or Austro-Hungarian agent, as was her estranged husband, Dr. Ludwig de Cramm."
2. "Hunt for Superweapons, Circa 1918." The Submarine Review, Jul. 2004.
Author's note: Discusses U.S. intelligence's hunt for German submarine bases in Latin America and the book by Charles Harris and Louis Sadler, The Archaeologist Was a Spy.
Blankenhorn, Heber [CAPT/MID/USA]. Adventures in Propaganda: Letters from an Intelligence Officer in France. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919.
Includes some interesting examples of propaganda materials.
Blum, Howard. Dark Invasion: 1915 -- Germany's Secret War and the Hunt for the First Terrorist Cell in America. New York: HarperCollins, 2014.
As Peake, Studies 58.3 (Sep 2014), notes, "the German agents in America before 1917 were engaged in old-fashioned sabotage, not terrorism." Nonetheless, this "is a good summary of America's initial attempts to deal with threats to the homeland." Goulden, Washington Times, 25 Mar. 2014, and Intelligencer 20.3 (Spring-Summer 2014), comments on the cursory nature of Blum's chapter notes but also finds the book an "engrossing examination of German intelligence efforts in the 'neutral' United States."
For DeGroot, Washington Post, 7 Feb. 2014, the author "breaks all the rules of historical writing, wantonly and repeatedly. Yet, partly for that reason, it's wonderfully gripping. Howard Blum is a storyteller, not a historian." Although Dark Invasion is "great fun," as history it "is seriously flawed. Inaccuracies abound."
Boghardt, Thomas. "Chasing Ghosts in Mexico: The Columbus Raid of 1916 and the Politicization of U.S. Intelligence During World War I." Army History (Fall 2013): 6-23.
Abstract by author. "In early 1917, the U.S. government learned of a secret German alliance proposal to Mexico that would come into effect if the United States joined the Allies. American interventionists claimed that the so-called Zimmermann Telegram ... represented the culmination of a series of German plots in Mexico, designed to challenge U.S. hegemony in the western hemisphere. This article shows, however, that from 1915 to 1917 American intelligence had carefully investigated and comprehensively refuted recurring rumors of German plots in Mexico. It argues that American interventionists, led by Secretary of State Robert Lansing, deliberately disregarded these findings and inaccurately portrayed the Zimmermann Telegram as corroboration of earlier rumors of German conspiracies in Mexico. Consequently, the erroneous notion of a German security threat to the western hemisphere became an important rationale for America's entry into World War I. Based on research in British, German, and U.S. archives, the article demonstrates the difficulty for intelligence collectors on the ground of overcoming political bias at the top government level, and the far-reaching consequences of tailoring intelligence to suit a political agenda."
Bruntz, George G. Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1938. London: Oxford University Press, 1938. New York: Arno Press, 1972.
From publisher: "Compiled from the vast World War I archives of the Hoover Library at Stanford, this volume is a systematic analysis of propaganda organization, content and effects in the 1917-18 period. Stress is on British and American effort and results. A nine-page bibliography is included."
Coulter, C.S. "Intelligence Service in the World War." Infantry Journal 20 (Apr. 1922): 376-383. [Petersen]
Cryptologia. Editors. "From the Archives: The Achievements of the Cipher Bureau (MI-8) during the First World War. Documents by Major Herbert O. Yardley Prepared Under the Direction of the Chief Signal Officer, 25 May 1945, SPSIS-1. Signal Security Agency. Washington, DC." 8, no. 1 (1984): 62-74. [Petersen]
Doerries, Reinhard R. Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count Bernstorff and German-American Relations, 1908-1917. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
Boghardt, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), 17/fn.1, refers to this as a "superb study."
Egerton, George. "Diplomacy, Scandal, and Military Intelligence: The Craufurd-Stuart Affair and Anglo-American Relations, 1918-20." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 4 (Oct. 1987): 110-134.
The author argues that this diplomatic incident played "a major role in the seminal events which transpired in Anglo-American relations and Washington politics in 1919." See also, Maechling, "Scandal in Wartime Washington: The Craufurd-Stuart Affair of 1918." IJI&C 4.3 (Fall 1990): 357-370.
[Egolf, Richard]. Radio Intelligence on the Mexican Border, World War I: A Personal View. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, [n.d.].
"The Radio Intelligence Service (R.I.S.) was created during World War I by the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Branch for the sole purpose of supporting strategic intelligence through radio intercept. This was the first unit of its kind and its success helped to lay the foundation for the use of radio intercept by the U.S. military. The R.I.S. served mainly on the U.S./Mexican border, monitoring the threat of a Mexican-German alliance. Mr. Richard Egolf was one of the young men recruited for the R.I.S. in 1918. He served in McAllen, Texas, with Radio Tractor Units 33 and 34. In 1976, Mr. EgoIf was interviewed by members of the NSA History Department about his experiences in this earliest of signals intelligence organizations."
Ellis, Mark. "'Closing Rank' and 'Seeking Honors': W.E.B. DuBois in World War I." Journal of American History (Jun. 1992): 96-124.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/1900-39.htm: "Close analysis of his 'accomodation' editorial & his candidacy for a commission" in the Military Intelligence Division (MID).
Finnegan, John P. "U.S. Army Counterintelligence in CONUS: The World War I Experience." Military Intelligence 14, No. 1 (Jan. 1988): 19-21.
Fox, John F., Jr. "Early Days of the Intelligence Community: Bureaucratic Wrangling over Counterintelligence, 191718." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005), 9-17.
"As the United States prepared to send troops to fight in France in 1917,... foreign agents had been acting largely with impunity on domestic soil for three years. Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo made what might appear to be a reasonable proposal: centralize all intelligence responsibility, especially counterintelligence, in a Bureau of Intelligence to be run by the Department of State or the Treasury Department.... [H]is proposal exacerbated a bureaucratic battle underway between the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice over how counterintelligence ... should be handled on the homefront. When the dust settled following the armistice of 1918, Justice's Bureau of Investigation -- the predecessor to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) -- came out on top as the agency in charge of domestic counterintelligence, a responsibility that has not been changed since that time."
Friedman, William F. "Use of Codes and Ciphers in the World War and Lessons to be Learned Therefrom." Signal Corps Bulletin, Jul.-Sep. 1938, 35-48. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/ usamhi/RefBibs/intell/ crypto.htm]
Gilbert, James L. "U.S. Army COMSEC in World War I." Military Intelligence 14, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): 22-25.
Gilbert, James L. World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2012.
Terrence Finnegan, Studies 57.1 (Mar. 2013), notes that "military" in the title refers only to Army intelligence, with no mention of the Navy's ONI. Nevertheless, the book "contains much that is new and intriguing." There is, however, "an insufficieny of source notes."
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