Barr, James. Setting the Desert On Fire: T. E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 19161918. London: Bloomsbury, 2006.
Peake, Studies 51.4 (2007), notes that the author "has taken a narrow approach, concentrating on Lawrence's role in the Arab Revolt. He describes Lawrence's development, application and impact of guerrilla warfare tactics, which had not been part of British military doctrine. He also emphasizes Lawrence's role in the political consequences of victory sorted out in London and Paris.... [U]nlike other accounts, Barr puts Lawrence's contribution in perspective by including the very significant role of other players, often overshadowed by the legend of Lawrence of Arabia."
For Goulden, Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), this is "a cold-eyed (and favorable...) appraisal," based on the author's "intrepid research."
Bidwell, Robin, ed. The Arab Bulletin: Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, 1916-1919. Oxford: Archive Editions reprint, 1986.
The Arab Bulletin was an intelligence summary that served as "the organ for circulating intelligence about developments in the Arab territories and the Arab Revolt." Yigal Sheffy, "British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1900-1918," I&NS 17.1 (Spring 2002): 43.
Capstick, Peter Hathaway. Warrior: The Legend of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen. New York: St.
Martin's, 1997.
Meinertzhagen served as a British intelligence officer in the Middle East and North Africa in World War I, engaging in both intelligence collection and deception operations. The reviewer for Publisher's Weekly, 22 Dec. 1997, clearly disapproves of the subject of this biography, a view that, perhaps, colors the conclusion that the book is "disappointing and disturbing" and "never rises above the level of men's-magazine analysis."
Cocker, Mark. Richard Meinertzhagen: Soldier, Scientist and Spy. London: Secker & Warburg, 1989.
Engle, Anita. The Nili Spies. London: Hogarth, 1959. Jerusalem: Phoenix Publications, 1989. Intro., Peter Calvocoressi. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
According to Constantinides, the Nili intelligence organization operated in Palestine in 1917. It was organized by Zionists Aaron and Sarah Aaronson, and provided assistance to the British with the hope of support for Jewish aspirations after the war. The organization's work is not the focus of this sympathetic book. There is more to be done in assessing Nili's contributions.
Commenting on the reprint of this book, Tauber, I&NS 7.3, says that there is too little emphasis on the group's intelligence activities, either what the group collected or how the information benefited the British. However, the main faults of the book are a general lack of footnotes and the fact that it is based on Nili documents without reference to British or Ottoman sources.
Garfield, Brian. The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a Colossal Fraud. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), the author discovered that many of the adventures described in Meinertzhagen's diaries "were fake or distorted -- including the Haversack Ruse. It was not, as he claimed, his idea, and he didn't drop the haversack. Nor was he wounded, and he was only a captain at the time.... Garfield's documentation is thorough and well corroborated.[footnote omitted] The charming, popular Meinertzhagen, roommate of Lawrence of Arabia in Paris, trusted friend of David Ben-Gurion, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, was a fraud."
Lawrence, T.E.
1. Seven Pillars of Wisdom. London: Jonathan Cape, 1935. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1935.
Clark comment: A literary masterpiece (at least, to some) and a "spy" story (irregular or guerrilla warfare) at the same time. What more can one ask for?
Constantinides reminds us that the "debate about the accuracy and even the truthfulness of Lawrence's account continues unresolved, and no significant new evidence has been uncovered on these crucial points of disagreement."
2. Ed., Malcolm Brown. Secret Dispatches from Arabia: And Other Writings by T.E. Lawreance. London: Golden Cockerel Press, 1939. [Reprint] London: Bellew, 1991.
Surveillant 4.2: This is a "collection of Lawrence's wartime reports during the Arab Revolt." It is "a good companion to Seven Pillars of Wisdom."
Lockman, J.N. Meinertzhagen's Diary Ruse: False Entries on T.E. Lawrence. Grand Rapids, MI: Cornerstone, 1995.
Sheffy, I&NS 17.1/fn. 22, calls this "[a] most critical, yet rather controversial, review" of Meinertzhagen's diaries.
Lord,
John. Duty, Honor, Empire: The Life and Times of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen. New York: Random House, 1970. London: Hutchinson, 1971
In the opinion of Constantinides, the author "could have developed Meinertzhagen's intelligence work more fully." That work was performed with the British in Africa and the Middle East before and during World War I. The biography's subject is best known for the "Meinertzhagen satchel ploy" employed in Allenby's Palestine campaign.
Meinertzhagen, Richard.
Sheffy, I&NS 17.1/39: "Traditional historiography, including three biographies, has lauded this officer, who headed General Edmund Allenby's EEF Field Intelligence and for a short time was his chief political officer, elevating him to an intelligence legend. [footnote omitted] Yet, in reality, his published as well as private diaries are far from being reliable. [footnote omitted]"
See Capstick, Warrior (1997); Cocker, Richard Meinertzhagen (1989); and Lord, Duty, Honour, Empire (1971). See also J.N. Lockman, Meinertzhagen's Diary Ruse: False Entries on T.E. Lawrence (Grand Rapids, MI: Cornerstone, 1995. Sheffy, I&NS 17.1/fn. 22, calls the latter "[a] most critical, yet rather controversial, review" of Meinertzhagen's diaries.
1. Army Diary. Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 1960.
2. Middle East Diary, 1917-1956. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1960.
Mohs, Polly A. Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War. New York: Routledge, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008), this is a "precedent-setting," "extensively documented," and "valuable contribution to the study of military intelligence."
Presland, John. Deedes Bey: A Study of Sir Wyndham Deedes, 1883-1923. London: Macmillan, 1942.
Sheffy, I&NS 17.1/39, comments that although Deedes served as head of Ib Branch in Allenby's EEF, this biography "only touches upon First World War intelligence."
Popplewell,
Richard J. "British Intelligence in Mesopotamia 1914-16." Intelligence
and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 139-172. "British Intelligence
in Mesopotamia 1914-16." In Intelligence and Military Operations,
ed. Michael I. Handel, 139-172. London: Cass, 1990.
Sheffy, Yigal. "British Intelligence and the Middle East, 1900-1918: How Much Do We Know?" Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 33-52.
Until World War I, "almost no institutionalized British intelligence agency functioned in the region on a permanent basis." The coming of the war "completely altered the picture." There are sufficient primary sources available to allow serious study within a broad context of the functioning of the British intelligence apparatus in the Middle East during the first two decades of the 20th century. However, "available evidence remains obscure and fragmentary with regard to the inner mechanism of the system."
Sheffy,
Yigal. British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
Campbell, AFIO WIN 12-99, 24 Mar. 1999, says that Sheffy "has done a thorough job in integrating intelligence into operations in this study of an often overlooked conflict.... This is a scholarly work on the development and utilization of military intelligence during World War I, appropriate for serious students of intelligence."
According to Kruh, Cryptologia 24.1, this "excellent" work "presents the development, operations and contribution of British Military Intelligence to the campaign against the Ottoman Empire on the Egyptian and Palestinian front..., placing it in regional context and historical perspective."
Sheffy, Yigal. "Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement: Allenby's Campaigns in Palestine." Intelligence and National Security
5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 173-236.
The author compares Allenby's use of deception prior to the Battle of Gaza (to hide from where the attack would come) and in the Megiddo Campaign (to hide the very existence of the coming offensive). What is distinctive, in Sheffy's opinion, is that Allenby "regarded the planning of the deception and its implementation as an integral and institutionalized part of the staff work in the combat procedure phase as well as during the conduct of operations."
Verrier,
Anthony. Agents of Empire: Anglo-Zionist Intelligence Operations, 1915-1919;
Brigadier Walter Gribbon, Aaron Aaronsohn and the NILI Ring. Washington,
DC: Brassey's, 1995.
According to Surveillant 4.2, Verrier uses Brig. Walter Gribbon's private papers and Aaron Aaronsohn's diaries to tell the story of a collaboration that "set in motion an intelligence operation which greatly helped General Allenby defeat the Turkish Army in the Levant, giving Britain its 'moment' in the Middle East and lay[ing] the foundations for a Zionist state."
Weldon, L.B. Hard Lying: Eastern Mediterranean, 1914-1919. London: Herbert Jenkins, 1925.
Sheffy, I&NS 17.1/39, notes that Weldon was an Ib officer in Egypt.
Winstone, H.V.F. Gertrude Bell. London: Barzan, 2004.
According to Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), the author tells the story of a "most remarkable upper-class, privileged, eccentric Victorian lady." She was "the first women officer in British military intelligence," serving in the Arab Bureau, headquartered in Cairo, during World War I. Bell "was subsequently transferred to Basra, where she remained until the British army took Baghdad."
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