Halpern, Paul G.
1. "Jutland: A Battle in One Dimension." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 5 (Jun. 2006): 56-61.
This article includes (p. 58) references to intelligence mistakes on both sides of this battle.
2. A Naval History of World War One. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. London: UCL Press, 1994.
Lambert, I&NS 11.1, is extremely positive about Halpern's history: "This book will be the standard against which other projects of a similar ambition will be judged." Nevertheless, with regard to the treatment of naval intelligence, the work "adds little to our understanding of the subject" beyond placing intelligence into a broad context.
Heffernan, Michael J. "Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 21 (1996): 504-533.
1. "Counter-espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War." English Historical Review 101 (1986): 635-670.
2. "The Failure of British Counter-espionage Against Germany, 1907-1914." Historical Journal 28, no. 4 (1985): 835-862.
3. "The Failure of British Espionage Against Germany 1907-1914." Historical Journal 26, no. 2 (1983): 866-881.
4. "Internal Security in Wartime: The Rise and Fall of P.M.S.2, 1915-1917." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 395-415.
This article traces the brief organizational life of a British World War I counterintelligence unit, first called the Ministry of Munitions Labour Intelligence Division (MMLI) and renamed Parliamentary Military Secretary Department, No. 2 Section (P.M.S.2) in June 1916. See also Nicholas Hiley and Julian Putkowski, "A Postscript on P.M.S.2," Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 2 (Apr. 1988): 322-331.
5. "Spying for the Kaiser." History Today 38, no. 6 (1988): 37-43.
6. "The Strategic Origins of Room 40." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1987): 245-273.
The author argues that Sir Alfred Ewing was initially "employed to break into German strategic and diplomatic signals which could be intercepted on long-wave." Ewing only moved into work on the tactical signals of the German High Seas Fleet after "the German strategic wireless system lay in ruins" and the chance capture of German codebooks "offered a more profitable area of study on lower wavelengths."
In a Letter to the Editor, I&NS 3.2, David Kahn expresses doubt about Hiley's thesis: "I think it far more likely that the unit would work in a far more general and undiscriminating way on whatever its listening posts plucked from the ether." Hiley's response accepts that he "push[ed] the available evidence to the limits," but notes that older interpretations do not really work either.
1. "Entering the Lists: MI5's Great Spy Round-up of August 1914." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 46-76.
The author's conclusion: Didn't happen. "[T]he story of the August 1914 arrests ... was a complete fabrication," yet was allowed to become part of MI5's "foundation myth."
2. "Re-entering the Lists: MI5's Authorized History and the August 1914 Arrests." Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 4 (Aug. 2010): 415-452.
Hiley challenges the version of the August 1914 operation contained in Andrew's Authorized History of MI5 (Defend the Realm). He argues that the account in the Authorized History is "internally inconsistent," and that "Kell fabricated his most famous victory."
Hines, Jason. "Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland." Journal of Military History 72, no. 4 (Oct. 2008): 1117-1153
Abstract: "The role that Admiralty communications intelligence played in the Battle of Jutland has been given mixed reviews in histories of the battle. Historians acknowledge the superb performance of the Admiralty's cryptographic organization in efficiently decrypting German naval communications before and during the battle, yet the fact that communications intelligence did not reach Admiral Jellicoe in usable or recognizable form had led historians to judge this a failure. This article argues that contrary to the accepted history, the dissemination system performed as planned, since the Admiralty placed a higher premium on the security of the intelligence source over its operational use by the fleet at sea."
Hoehling, A.A. Edith Cavell. London: Cassell, 1958.
Cavell was the English-born matron at a Brussels hospital when the Germans pushed across Belgium at the opening of World War I. The rapid German advance trapped Allied soldiers behind the lines. Cavell cared for the sick and wounded and helped smuggle out the healthy ones. Captured by the Germans, she was shot as a spy in 1915.
Hopkirk, Peter. On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Great Game and the Great War. Grantham, UK: Grantham Book Services, 1992. Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire. New York: Kodanska/Globe, 1994.
According to Surveillant 4.1, the author "describes the attempt of Wilhelm II of Germany to harness the forces of militant Islam against Britain's imperial interests in central Asia during WWI.... Hopkirk weaves a romantic yet factual tale of intrigue.... The book covers, in detail, some of the shadowy episodes of the period." Popplewell, I&NS 10.2 (Apr. 1995), says that "Hopkirk's work "ignores the Bengali revolutionary movement almost as much as it ignores British intelligence. Though he claims that the work 'draws on the secret service documents' of the times, it is unclear what these documents are."
Hoy, Hugh C. 40 O.B.: Or, How the War Was Won. London: Hutchinson, 1932.
Constantinides: Much more is known today about Room 40's accomplishments than when this book was published. In its day, it was "an early disclosure of Admiral Hall's activities in British naval intelligence in World War I." Among matters covered are "the Zimmermann note, the case of Sir Roger Casement, the neutralizing of Trebitsch Lincoln, and the capture of Carl Lody."
James, William M. [Admiral Sir] The Eyes of the Navy: A Biographical Study of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall. London: Methuen, 1956. The Code Breakers of Room 40: The Story of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, Genius of British Counterintelligence. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956.
Pforzheimer notes that this is the biography of Britain's Director of Naval Intelligence in World War I by the officer in charge of communications intelligence part of that time. "It includes an interesting description of the exploitation of the Zimmermann telegram." Beesly's Room 40 is "perhaps a more useful study." Constantinides argues that although "James has written an important book on one of the outstanding figures of intelligence, not all has been revealed.... Friedman and Mendelsohn's research raises questions as to whether James's cryptanalytic account of the Zimmermann note is the full one."
Jones, R.V. "Alfred Ewing and Room 40." Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 34 (Jul. 1979): 65-90.
Judd, Alan. The Quest for C: Mansfield Cumming and the Founding of the Secret Service. London: HarperCollins, 1999.
Roberts, Spectator, 16 Oct. 1999, calls this biography of Sir Mansfield Cumming "a serious testament to the bravery and determination of the secret services" during World War I. The author "has had the inestimable advantages of support from his old employers [presumably SIS] and access to Cumming's secret diaries,... which he has diligently and on the whole successfully followed up." For Swain, I&NS 15.4, "Judd's is a general account, fluently written with journalistic flair and well worth reading; but it is not scholarly and footnotes are rare."
Kennedy, Gregory C. "Intelligence and the Blockade, 1914-17: A Study in Administration, Friction and Command." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): 699-721.
"Without the constant acquisition and provision of accurate and timely intelligence, commanders of the Blockade strategy ... would have been blind to ... key issues. Blockade intelligence saw the most sophisticated and wide-ranging intelligence assessment acitivities ever done to that date."
1. All's Fair: The Story of the British Secret Service Behind the German Lines. New York: Putnam's, 1934. [Chambers]
2. Secrets of the White Lady. New York: Putnam's, 1935. [Chambers]
3. Spreading the Spy Net: The Story of a British Spy Director. London: Jarrolds, 1938.
Constantinides: Landau headed the Military Division of the British secret service in Holland from 1916, running networks in France and Belgium. The "largest and considered the most successful" network was named the White Lady. These books are the memoirs of "a field intelligence officer." Some doubts have been raised about the accuracy of some of Landau's stories.
Larsen, Daniel. "British Intelligence and the 1916 Mediation Mission of Colonal Edward M. House." Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 5 (Oct. 2010): 682-704.
From abstract: "[T]his article reconstructs British intelligence's activities with respect to House's mission, examines the countermeasures that House employed as he attempted to protect the secrecy of his negotiations, delineates the role played by different British intelligence agencies and assesses their response to their findings."
Lasswell, Harold D. Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Knopf, 1927. London: Kegan Paul, 1938. New York: Peter Smith, 1938. [pb] Propaganda Technique in World War I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971. [pb]
Lerner at MIT Press: "This classic book on propaganda technique focuses on American, British, French, and German experience in World War I. The book sets forth a simple classification of various psychological materials used to produce certain specific results and proposes a general theory of strategy and tactics for the manipulation of these materials."
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