Gill, David W.J. "Research Note: Harry Pirie-Gordon: Historical Research, Journalism and Intelligence Gathering in the Eastern Mediterranean (1908-18)." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (Dec. 2006): 1045-1059. Gill, David W.J. "Research Note: Harry Pirie-Gordon: Historical Research, Journalism and Intelligence Gathering in the Eastern Mediterranean (1908-18)." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (Dec. 2006): 1045-1059.
"Pirie-Gordon was part of the [British] intelligence community in both world wars. He was certainly involved by the end of 1914 when he was working in Cairo." However, the exact timing of his "transition from academic studies and journalism to intelligence work remains unclear."
Gill, E.W.B. War, Wireless and Wangles. Oxford: 1934.
Noting that Gill worked in MI1e in the United Kingdom and the Middle East during World War I, Ferris, I&NS 3.4/46/fn.9, says that Gill's "account of any issue in which he was personally involved is accurate."
Grant, Robert M.
1. U-Boat Hunters: Codebreakers, Divers and the Defeat of the U-Boats, 1914-1918. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
Bath, NIPQ 20.3, finds that "there is a wealth of information on the cryptographic history of the First World War" in this book. The author "is recognized as a leading expert" on the U-boat war of 1914-1918, and this work "expands upon and updates previous works." For Kruh, Cryptologia 30.2 (Apr. 2006), this is a "groundbreaking book." An "incredible story emerges" from the author's "digging through the radio interception records, telegrams, and the records of the Admiralty Salvage Department."
2. U-Boat Intelligence, 1914-1918. London: Putnam, 1969. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1969.
Constantinides finds some "interesting anecdotes" in this work based largely on German records captured in 1945. However, such is not the overall pattern of the book. Primarily, the focus is on the author's statistical methodology; it is possible to wonder whether "the accumulated facts are properly put in perspective."
Halpern, Paul. "Jutland: A Battle in One Dimension." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 5 (Jun. 2006): 56-61.
This article includes (p. 58) references to intelligence mistakes on both sides of this battle.
Halpern,
Paul G. A Naval History of World War One. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. London: UCL Press, 1994.
Lambert, I&NS 11.1, is extremely positive about Halpern's history: "This book will be the standard against which other projects of a similar ambition will be judged." Nevertheless, with regard to the treatment of naval intelligence, the work "adds little to our understanding of the subject" beyond placing intelligence into a broad context.
Hiley,
Nicholas.
1. "The Failure of British Espionage Against Germany 1907-1914." Historical Journal 26, no. 2 (1983): 866-881.
2. "Internal Security in Wartime: The Rise and Fall of P.M.S.2, 1915-1917." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 395-415.
This article traces the brief organizational life of a British World War I counterintelligence unit, first called the Ministry of Munitions Labour Intelligence Division (MMLI) and renamed Parliamentary Military Secretary Department, No. 2 Section (P.M.S.2) in June 1916. See also Nicholas Hiley and Julian Putkowski, "A Postscript on P.M.S.2," Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 2 (Apr. 1988): 322-331.
3. "The Strategic Origins of Room 40." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1987): 245-273.
The author argues that Sir Alfred Ewing was initially "employed to break into German strategic and diplomatic signals which could be intercepted on long-wave." Ewing only moved into work on the tactical signals of the German High Seas Fleet after "the German strategic wireless system lay in ruins" and the chance capture of German codebooks "offered a more profitable area of study on lower wavelengths."
In a Letter to the Editor, I&NS 3.2, David Kahn expresses doubt about Hiley's thesis: "I think it far more likely that the unit would work in a far more general and undiscriminating way on whatever its listening posts plucked from the ether." Hiley's response accepts that he "push[ed] the available evidence to the limits," but notes that older interpretations do not really work either.
4. "Entering the Lists: MI5's Great Spy Round-up of August 1914." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 46-76.
The author's conclusion: Didn't happen. "[T]he story of the August 1914 arrests ... was a complete fabrication," yet was allowed to become part of MI5's "foundation myth."
Hines, Jason. "Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland." Journal of Military History 72, no. 4 (Oct. 2008): 1117-1153
Abstract: "The role that Admiralty communications intelligence played in the Battle of Jutland has been given mixed reviews in histories of the battle. Historians acknowledge the superb performance of the Admiralty's cryptographic organization in efficiently decrypting German naval communications before and during the battle, yet the fact that communications intelligence did not reach Admiral Jellicoe in usable or recognizable form had led historians to judge this a failure. This article argues that contrary to the accepted history, the dissemination system performed as planned, since the Admiralty placed a higher premium on the security of the intelligence source over its operational use by the fleet at sea."
Hoehling, A.A. Edith
Cavell. London: Cassell, 1958.
Cavell was the English-born matron at a Brussels hospital when the Germans pushed across Belgium at the opening of World War I. The rapid German advance trapped Allied soldiers behind the lines. Cavell cared for the sick and wounded and helped smuggle out the healthy ones. Captured by the Germans, she was shot as a spy in 1915.
Hopkirk,
Peter. On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Great Game and the Great War. Grantham, UK: Grantham Book Services, 1992. Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire. New York: Kodanska/Globe, 1994.
According to Surveillant 4.1, the author "describes the attempt of Wilhelm II of Germany to harness the forces of militant Islam against Britain's imperial interests in central Asia during WWI.... Hopkirk weaves a romantic yet factual tale of intrigue.... The book covers, in detail, some of the shadowy episodes of the period."
Hoy,
Hugh C. 40 O.B.: Or, How the War Was Won. London: Hutchinson, 1932.
Constantinides: Much more is known today about Room 40's accomplishments than when this book was published. In its day, it was "an early disclosure of Admiral Hall's activities in British naval intelligence in World War I." Among matters covered are "the Zimmermann note, the case of Sir Roger Casement, the neutralizing of Trebitsch Lincoln, and the capture of Carl Lody."
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