1. Austria-Hungary
2. Belgium
3. Italy
4. Netherlands
5. Sweden
6. Vatican
7. General
Moritz, Verena, Hannes Leidinger, and Gerhard Jagschitz. Im Zentrum Der Macht: Die Vielen Gesichter des Geheimdienstchefs Maximilain Ronge. [In the Center of Power: The Many Faces of Secret Service Chief Maximilain Ronge] St. Pölten: Residenz Verlag, 2007.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), finds this work somewhat "disappointing" with regard to Ronge's work as intelligence chief during World War I.
Pethö, Albert. Agenten fur den Doppeladler: Österreich-Ungarns Geheimer Dienst im Weltkrieg. [Agents for the Double Eagle: Austria-Hungary's Secret Service in the World War] Graz: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 1998.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that the author begins his story in 1850. The work is heavily footnoted and "especially well illustrated."
Schindler, John R.
"A Hopeless Struggle: Austro-Hungarian Cryptology during World War
I." Cryptologia 24, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 339-350.
"Austria-Hungary's cryptologic effort was the most successful of WWI.... Habsburg cryptology played a major role in staving off defeat, keeping Austria-Hungary in the war to the end, and its leader, Max Ronge, was a noteworthy intelligence pioneer."
de Croÿ, Princess
Marie. War Memories. London: Macmillan, 1932.
These are the memoirs of a Belgian aristocrat who aided Allied soldiers in escaping from the Germans in World War I.
Maclaren, John, and
Nicholas Hiley. "Nearer the Truth: The Search for Alexander Szek."
Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 813-826.
The authors take on the long-running legend of the activities and fate of Alexander Szek, thought to have stolen German codes from Belgium which later helped in breaking the Zimmermann telegram. Their research and analysis essentially shoot down most elements of the previous story. Definitive? Probably not, but in most of its elements better based than its predecessor myths.
Alvarez, David. "Italian Diplomatic Cryptanalysis in World War I." Cryptologia 20, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 1-10. And in Selections from Cryptologia: History, People, and Technology, eds. Cipher A. Deavours, David Kahn, Louis Kruh, Greg Mellen, and Brian J. Winkel, 181-190. Boston, MA: Artech House, 1998.
From abstract: After its entry into World War I in May 1915, "Italy established a cryptanalytic unit to attack the military and diplomatic cryptosystems of other governments. This unit retrospectively solved an Austrian diplomatic system and currently read an American system, but it succeeded mainly against the codes and ciphers of minor powers."
Alvarez, David. "Left
in the Dust: Italian Signals Intelligence, 1915-1943." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001):
388-408.
The Italians began their cryptanalytic efforts in the fall of 1915, and by the last year of the war (1918) were enjoying some successes. In the interwar period, signals intelligence "contributed significantly to Rome's diplomacy and military operations" in the Ethiopian crisis. But "Rome's services failed to adapt to the new cryptologic world created" by World War II and "were left in the dust" of the services that participated in the "organizational and technological revolution" that began in the 1930s and was accelerated by the war.
Massignani, Alessandro. "The Regi Carabinieri: Counterintelligence in the Great War." Journal of Intelligence History 1, no. 2 (Winter 2001). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous. html]
From abstract: "The Royal Carabinieri ... were mobilized as Italy entered the Great War, deploying three battalions and two cavalry squadrons.... [T]he Carabinieri duties in wartime were counterintelligence and security (military police), as well as that of the defense of the State.... The Carabinieri branch had to cooperate with the counterintelligence section of the secret services, reporting espionage suspects and performing operations the services needed. The 'Italian secret war' during the First Wor1d War does not offer great moments of glory. However,... [t]he historical judgement is, that the out of the twelve operating intelligence services in Italy the Carabinieri 'was one of most serious and effective.'"
van Tuyll, Hubert P.
"The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the 'Enemy's' Intentions."
Journal of Military History 64, no. 3 (Jul. 2000): 711-738.
Pre-1914 Netherlands lacked a formal intelligence apparatus and had only a small diplomatic corps. Nevertheless, the country "did fairly well in gathering information and making military use of it. The Netherlands was the first country in Western Europe to mobilize ... and did this on the basis of closely held information received from inside Germany."
McKay, Craig G., and Bengt Beckman. Swedish Signal Intelligence 1900-1945. London: Frank Cass, 2002.
Hess, JIH 3.1, calls this "an important account about ... Sigint as it developed in a medium-sized, neutral country of Europe.... This definitive, exhaustive and illuminating account draws on the official archives notably from Sweden and provides new and surprising results.... The centrepiece of the study ... is the Sigint contribution to Sweden's neutrality in two world wars, particularly in the second.... [T]he book is well presented and thoroughly edited."
For Van Nederveen, Air & Space Power Journal 17.3, this "first authoritative account of Sweden’s SIGINT [is] both valuable and unique.... The authors are to be commended for their detailed, up-front explanation of SIGINT: how radio and telegraph coding was used between various countries and their diplomatic missions, what kinds of transmissions third parties could intercept, and the numerous tasks involved in decoding that data.... SIGINT books are rare, and this one is a must-read for intelligence professionals.... Historians interested in World War II may even have to reconsider some events of that war after reading this book."
Kruh, Cryptologia 27.2, calls this work "a definitive account of the evolution of Swedish signal intelligence between 1900 and 1945.... It is an interesting and surprisingly revealing source of European cryptology in the first half of the twentieth century." To Erskine, I&NS 18.3, the authors "have researched their subject thoroughly and know it well." The work "deals mainly with the collection and breaking of messages and the establishment and organisation of the various bodies which were responsible for Sigint. It contains comparatively little on analysing the resulting intelligence, or how it was used by policy makers."
Alvarez, David. "A
German Agent at the Vatican: The Gerlach Affair." Intelligence and
National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 345-356.
Monsignor Rudolf Gerlach was a Bavarian priest and "private chamberlain and confidant of Pope Benedict XV." He was also "a conduit for covert German subsidies" to anti-interventionist newspapers during the period before Italy entered World War I. It is also likely that he engaged in espionage activities while at the Vatican.
Alvarez, David. "Vatican
Communications Security, 1914-18." Intelligence and National Security
7, no. 4 (Oct. 1992): 443-453.
During World War I, the Vatican "depended upon the ordinary mails or, where possible, the diplomatic messengers of other states.... [P]apal cryptography during the war ... was a modest effort.... [T]here can be little doubt that throughout the war the Holy See was plagued by poor communications security."
Berndorff, H.R. Tr.,
B. Miall. Espionage. London: 1930.
Boucard, Robert.The
Secret Services of Europe. London: Stanley Paul, 1940.
Constantinides comments that "Boucard's allegations of German intelligence successes in Russia either have been refuted or have never been substantiated."
Finnegan, Terrence J. [COL/USAF (Ret.)] Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front -- World War I. Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2006.
Boghardt, Studies 51.4 (2007), is enthusiastic about this work: "Shooting the Front is a massive, expertly written and richly illustrated history of British, French and American aerial surveillance on the Western Front. The book's findings are based on meticulous archival research.... Finnegan's prose is precise and clear, and he provides the necessary historical context to make his work accessible to expert and layman alike."
Flicke, Wilhelm F. "The Early Development of Communications Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 1 (Winter 1959): 99-114.
The author traces the development of radio intercept and codebreaking in World War I. "There is a certain irony in the fact that at the very time when the Russians in the east were exposing themselves by clumsy use of radio so disasterously that the course of the Battle of Tannenberg wrecked their entire blitz campaign, the Germans in the west should be making the same mistake with the same result.... In the east, it was the Battle of Tannenberg; in the west it was the Battle of the Marne."
Gylden, Yves. The
Contributions of the Cryptographic Bureaus in the World War. Washington.
DC: GPO, 1935. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, n.d.
Constantinides: "Strictly speaking, Gylden has recounted the history of military cryptology, not the broader field the title implies. Much of what he writes is from the French, Austrian, and German experiences.... There is nothing on British accomplishments in military cryptology." Nevertheless, experts in the field give the book high marks.
Lasswell,
Harold D. Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Peter Smith, 1938. [Petersen]
Morgan, W.A. "Invasion
on the Ether: Radio Intelligence at the Battle of St. Mihiel, September
1918." Military Affairs 51, no. 2 (Apr. 1987): 57-61.
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