1. "Governmental Intelligence: Its Evolution and Role." Journal of Economic and Social Intelligence 2, no. 2 (1992): 91-113.
2. "The Development of National Intelligence." Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene 12, no. 3 (1993): 3-4.
Excerpts from above article. With the Cold War, "[c]landestine collection became established as a substantial peacetime activity," and there was a "a trend toward central intelligence organizations." The influence of intelligence "is still greatest when assessing force and threats of force."
Herman, Michael. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Freeman, I&NS 12.2, proclaims that this book "has an elegance and perspective that raises the study of intelligence to new levels.... The organization is methodical, the analysis meticulous, the range of sources extraordinary and the writing crisp and lucid.... It is one of the few weaknesses of the book that [Herman] has decided not to explore the relevance of his analysis for questions of democratic accountability."
In a highly laudatory review, Westerfield, IJI&C 10.3, states that "[n]o one who is serious about intelligence studies should fail to become familiar with this book." The emphasis of Herman's work is inclined "toward the analysis function and toward interface with policymakers." Additionally, his chapter on liaison is "excellent, extraordinarily frank."
Hoffman, History 26.1, says that the author "captures the essence of the intelligence mandate and argues for its enduring place" among the needs of governments. In the process, Herman makes the case against "market-driven collection," a faddish concept that "does not hold to the more tangential world of intelligence." This is "a learned text" that is "thoughful and well-conceived."
For Latawski, Rusi Journal, Apr. 1998, this is "a very thought-provoking and important work for understanding how an intelligence community works, when it fails and how it might work better.... Herman offers frank views on problems encountered in various components of the intelligence community." However, the "book is not an easy read."
According to Hess, IIHSG [International Intelligence History Association] Newsletter 7.1 (Summer 1999) and JIH 1.1, this "is a scholarly study and for those readers who want to know about the internal workings of intelligence it provides more fascination than many of the 'cloak and dagger' spy stories.... [This] thoroughly researched, well-structured, and very readable book is highly recommendable."
Hilsman, Roger. Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1966.
According to Pforzheimer, this "controversial academic study on the theory of intelligence is provocative, but not easy reading." Not all intelligence specialists agree with Hilsman's views. The book was written before Hilsman's stint as Director/INR. To Constantinides, "[s]ections of the book vary in quality and style"; the part that "describes the attitudes of various categories of individuals, from decision makers to academics and critics of intelligence" is probably the best.
Horowitz, Richard. "A Framework for Understanding Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 389-409.
The author finds that there are inherent problems "in the nature of trying to comprehend an opponent and foretell his actions." In addition, the "game theory model of 'prisoner's dilemma' illustrates how one's actions can be inexorably intertwined with another's, yet foreknowledge of the other's actions, though exceedingly important, is not necessarily helpful." The author concludes that intelligence is "a necessary element of decisionmaking," but is "limited by the realities of the human condition."
Hulnick, Arthur S. "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (Dec. 2006): 959-979.
The author argues that the venerable intelligence cycle "is really not a very good description of the ways in which the intelligence process works." In addition, it ignores both counterintelligence and covert action. Hulnick discusses some alternative models for looking at intelligence. He concludes, however, that it is likely that the intelligence cycle "will continue to be taught both inside government and elsewhere."
Hutchinson, Harold R. "Intelligence: Escape from Prisoner's Dilemma." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 327-334.
The "prisoner's dilemma" game theory model is a static, one-time situation. Many situations between nations might be seen more as a motion picture, rather than as a snapshot (my analogy, not the author's). When played as an iterative game, it is possible for a progressive stability of cooperation to emerge. Under such conditions, "intelligence is a means by which the players can establish and sustain a cooperative relationship.... Without intelligence, the optimal strategy choice of conditional cooperation is not possible."
Johnson, Loch K.
1. "Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence." Comparative Strategy 22 (Jan.-Mar. 2003): 1-28.
2. "Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 638-663.
The author explores "the key dimensions of intelligence" in an effort to clarify "what must be taken into account in answering the spy-side of the venerable question 'how much defense is enough.'"
Jones, R.V. Reflections on Intelligence. London: Heinemann, 1989. London: Mandarin, 1990. [pb]
Surveillant 1.1 comments that Jones "comes up with a doctrine for the guidance of intelligence officers called 'minimum trespass,' which parallels the military doctrine of 'minimum force.'" For Jervis, IJI&C 4.4, "[e]ven when R.V. Jones is not at his best, he is still good." However, this book "could have benefitted from more careful editing to eliminate repetition." Petersen notes that Jones "addresses ethical concerns raised by intelligence operations," while Foot, I&NS 5.3, calls the essays "splendidly incisive."
See also, R.V. Jones, "Some Lessons in Intelligence: Enduring Principles," Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 37-42. This is a speech Jones made at CIA Headquarters, 26 October 1993.
Kahn, David. "An Historical Theory of Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 79-92.
The author puts forward three "principles that a theory of intelligence should offer": (1) "Intelligence optimizes one's resources" (O'Brien Principle); (2) intelligence "is an auxiliary, not a primary, element in war"; (3) "intelligence is essential to the defense but not the offense."
Kent, Sherman. "The Need for an Intelligence Literature." Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1955): 1-11. Studies in Intelligence: 45th Anniversary Special Edition, Fall 2000, 1-11.
Since the beginning of World War II, "[i]ntelligence has become ... an exactly, highly skilled profession.... Intelligence today ... has developed a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques.... What it lacks is a literature.... What I am talking about is a literature dedicated to the analysis of our many-sided calling, and produced by its most knowledgeable devotees.... The literature I have in mind will, among other things, be an elevated debate." [emphasis in original]
Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966. [pb]
Constantinides notes that this book had "both a wide and a profound influence on the development of U.S. intelligence after World War II." Writing in 1985, Pforzheimer called this book "dated, but not obsolete." That judgment remains valid, as does the description of the work as "still a classic, foresighted early work ... on the theory and ideal operation of national intelligence production." The 1966 paperback edition includes a lengthy preface by Dr. Kent, drawing on his experience as Chairman of the Board of National Estimates.
For a contemporaneous and critical review of Kent's Strategic Intelligence, see Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," World Politics 1, no. 6 (Jul. 1949). Latter day insight on that debate is offered by Jack Davis, "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," Studies in Intelligence 35, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 37-50. See also, Donald P. Steury, ed., Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays (Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994).
Kent, Sherman. "Valediction." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 1 (Winter 1968): 1-11.
The founder of Studies in Intelligence shares his thoughts about leaving the journal's Board of Editors.
Krizan, Liza. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone. Occasional Paper No. 6. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1999.
Macartney identifies the author as a Department of Defense analyst who wrote this monograph "as part of her thesis while earning a masters degree in Strategic Intelligence at the College in 1996." This is "an excellent primer on intelligence -- but don't expect to find secrets, derring-do or skullduggery. It's mostly theoretical and practical, about knowledge and analysis -- an epistemology of intelligence if you will."
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