Allen, George W. “The Professionalization of Intelligence.” Studies in Intelligence 26, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 23-31. “The Professionalization of Intelligence.” In Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application, 2d ed., eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden, 33-40. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, 1995.
"Sherman Kent and others hailed the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency as symbolizing the maturing of intelligence as a profession. Yet, almost thirty-five years later, we find many of those engaged in the vocation of intelligence ignoring or neglecting the implications of its professionalization."
Berkowitz, Bruce. "Democracies and Their Spies." Hoover Digest 2003, no. 1 (Winter). [http://www.hooverdigest.org/031/berkowitz.html]
The author asks the question, "Are secret intelligence operations compatible with democracy?" He finds that: "Intelligence policies are not fundamentally different from other kinds of policies, and intelligence operations are not inherently different from other kinds of operations democracies carry out." In addition, "[t]he current oversight system for U.S. intelligence ... provide[s] an approach for reconciling democracy and secrecy and, thus, intelligence."
Berkowitz, Bruce D.,
and Allan E. Goodman. Strategic Intelligence for American National Security.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989. [pb] 3d ed., 1991.
Kozak, APSR 84.3, argues that Berkowitz and Goodman provide "a very systematic, thorough, authoritative survey that applies solid political science, policy science, and political theory to the important study of the gathering, processing, and utilizing of U.S. intelligence." Their work is "methodologically sophisticated and additive," and "raises some of the profound questions posed by intelligence activities in a free society.... A number of normative prescriptions for better practicing the 'craft of intelligence' ... seem right on target."
According to Cline, PSQ 104.4, this work "provides a competent description of the process of intelligence collection and analysis and presents a rapid overview of the issues that are still viewed as controversial." One criticism that can be made is that the authors did not address the interface between the intelligence process and the national policymakers. Cline, concludes, however, that the book "Is brief, readable, and crisply efficient in providing a good starting point of reference of the basic elements of the process of intelligence."
Surveillant 1.5 notes that Berkowitz and Goodman are "[c]ritical of many Washington sacred cows" and are seeking "to establish terms for a public debate on U.S. intelligence policy and planning in years ahead."
For Jervis, IJI&C 3.3, the book offers an "informative overview of American intelligence processes and problems." However, it "can be faulted for not fully addressing emerging trends," such as "the growing role of Congress ... as a consumer of intelligence."
Johnson, I&NS 5.3, sees the book as "the best primer available on the core mission of the intelligence community," but faults the authors for "underestimat[ing] the attractiveness and implications of covert action."
Lowenthal points out that the third edition "has an afterword reflecting on the challenges facing intelligence in the aftermath of the Cold War."
Bimfort, Martin T. "A Definition of Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 4 (Fall 1958): 75-78.
The author proposes the following: "Intelligence is the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and their agents which is needed by a government for its foreign policy and national security, the conduct of non-attributable activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy, and the protection of both process and product, as well as persons and organizations concerned with these, against unautorized disclosure."
Bozeman, Adda B. Strategic
Intelligence and Statecraft: Selected Essays. Washington, DC: Brassey's,
1992.
See C. Adamitis ["Addi"] Keim, "The Missing Link: Adda Bozeman on U.S. Strategic Intelligence," Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 37-44.
This is a collection of eight intellectual and intelligent essays: "International Order in a Multicultural World"; "War and the Clash of Ideas"; "Covert Action and Foreign Policy in World Politics"; "Traditions of Political Warfare and Low-Intensity Conflict in Totalitarian Russia and China: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change"; "Statecraft and Intelligence in the Non-Western World"; "Knowledge and Method in Comparative Intelligence Studies of Non-Western Societies"; "American Policy and the Illusion of Congruent Values"; and "Strategic Intelligence in Cold Wars of Ideas."
Allen, DIJ 1.2, comments that this is a "remarkable" and "fascinating book," while FILS 11.6 finds it "well worth reading." Surveillant 2.6 calls the book "illuminating.... Bozeman, a professor at Sarah Lawrence College, explains how strategic intelligence is the key to successful statecraft in foreign affairs."
Economist, 16 Jan. 1993, says Bozeman recognizes that "intelligence and the making of foreign policy have to be interwoven with each other.... This is no ordinary book of reprinted essays: it deserves to be closely studied, in all places where high policy is made."
According to a MI 20.2 reviewer, the "most profound assertion the author makes is that the West does not understand the value systems of other cultures.... This is a wonderful book for students of political science, political intelligence, and policy formation."
Warren, Intelligencer 14.2 (Winter/Spring 2005), says that this book "is worth reading by anyone who wants a different perspective on the relationship of Intelligence to American foreign policy."
Cline, Ray S. "Intelligence."
In Encyclopedia of the American Military, 1297-1338. New York: Scribner's,
1994.
Codevilla, Angelo.
Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century. New York: The
Free Press, 1992.
Clark comment: Codevilla returns us to many of the positions advocated by the Reagan Administration's "transition team" of late 1980-early 1981. That group's right-wing views did not carry the day then, and I fail to find the overall thrust of Codevilla's arguments any more persuasive now that the Soviet Union is no longer the center of attention of U.S. national security policy. Nevertheless, Informing Statecraft does go far in identifying many of the issues that will be discussed -- and some acted upon -- in the years to come. Whether you agree with Codevilla's criticisms and "solutions" is not the point; the book is still important in the discussion of what intelligence is and needs to be in the future.
Campbell, AIJ 14.2/3, says Codevilla "finds the Agency's performance over the years to be marred by serious mistakes, both analytic and operational." Allen, DIJ 1.2, views this "outstanding book [as] the next major installment ... in the formulation of a concept of strategic intelligence."
According to Rich, FILS 12.3, Informing Statecraft is "both a critique of American intelligence as it is today and an exhaustive guide to principles for intelligence policymakers in the future." Codevilla is "thoroughly up-to-date" in his sources, but is "unconvincing ... when he attempts to lay some blame" for the state of intelligence affairs "on 'the CIA's American Liberal culture.'"
In his review, Glynn, Commentary, Dec. 1992, concludes that "[t]he value of Codevilla's account is to connect the CIA's chronic failures ... with its corporate or bureaucratic culture.... Where the book is weaker is in regard to ... comprehensiveness[] and applicability to the future." Lowenthal also notes that Codevilla is "[s]tronger on criticisms than on possible solutions."
While basically pleased that American intelligence is being criticized, the NameBase reviewer seems unhappy with why those criticisms are being made: "Codevilla ... presents the conservative argument for major reform of the U.S. intelligence community. It's not because he has ethical objections to spying or covert action.... It's just that the taxpayers are not getting much more than incompetence and a self-serving bureaucracy for their $31 billion per year.... Over half of this budget figure is for expensive snooper satellites, many of which are focused so narrowly that they produce little that's useful."
The quality of a review in Economist, 6 Jun. 1992, is illustrated by the following example of complete ignorance of U.S. intelligence: "[I]t was only when John Walker's wife told the CIA that her husband was a spy that the agency realised that its naval codes had been read as clearly as if written in Russian." The CIA naval codes?
Wirtz, IJI&C 10.2, refers to Codevilla's "finely crafted and scholarly argument," but also finds Codevilla inconsistent in the manner in which he criticizes both American efforts at clandestine collection when they are discovered and American security when similar foreign activities are discovered. In addition, the author's "effort to interpret dozens of well-known incidents in U.S. intelligence folklore from an ultra-conservative perspective[] detracts from his presentation."
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