VIETNAM

The Son Tay Raid (1970)

David, Heather. Operation Rescue -- the First Complete Account of the Daring Drop into North Vietnam to Rescue American Prisoners of War. New York: Pinnacle, 1971.

Gargus, John. The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007.

Keiser, Proceedings 134.3 (Mar. 2008), comments that the author "gives us a fascinating account of a top-secret operation that never got the credit it deserved."

Kamps, Charles Tustin. "The Son Tay Raid: A 35-Year Retrospective." Air & Space Power Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil]

Although no POWs were rescued "(the enemy had moved them to other facilities), the [Son Tay] raid serves as a model of a well-planned and -executed joint special operation." Indeed, Operation Kingpin was "[m]arked by outstanding organization, training, and unity of effort."

McRaven, William H. Special Operations -- Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.

Renken, MI 23.2, says that this is "an excellent book for special operators and the intelligence personnel who support them." McRaven, a former Navy Seal commander, "examines eight classic special operations in fascinating detail": the rescue of Mussolini (1943); the prisoner of war rescue at Cabanatuan (1945); Son Tay (1970); the Israeli rescue at Entebbe (1976); and raids on Fort Eban Emael (1940), Alexandria (1941), Saint Nazaire (1942), and the Tirpitz (1943). This is "good history, plus an analytical approach worth thinking about."

For Johnson, Parameters, Autumn 1997, the author's application of his framework for analysis makes Special Operations "a breath of fresh air and a genuine joy to read and study.... McRaven's theory of special operations states, 'special operations forces are able to achieve relative superiority over the enemy if they prepare a simple plan, which is carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, and purpose'.... Practitioners and students of special operations would do well to examine the utility of the author's analytical device as a possible planning tool. It appears to be more than adequate."

Rhee, Will. "Comparing U.S. Operations Kingpin (1970) and Eagle Claw (1980)." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 489-506.

"Kingpin" was the operational name for the raid on Son Tay; "Eagle Claw" was the operational name for the Iranian hostage rescue mission. This article engages in too much handwringing over what was done wrong without always supporting that something was wrong other than by identifying it as such.

Schemmer, Benjamin F. The Raid. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. New York: Avon, 1986. [pb] The Raid: The Son Tay Prison Rescue Mission. New York: Ballantine, 2002. [pb]

Southworth, Samuel A., ed. Great Raids in History: From Drake to Desert One. New York: Sarpedon Publishers, 1997.

Eggenberger, History 26.2, finds that "[o]n the whole,... the stories are well done and make for interesting reading." Included in the 19 raids discussed are Lawrence of Arabia, Otto Skorzeny, the Canadians at Dieppe, the Chindits in Burma, and the U.S. hostage-rescue raids on Son Tay and in Iran. Additionally, in a concluding chapter on the future of such raids, the Israeli raid at Entebbe is "well discussed."

Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University, 1993. E8404V36

FA 73.2 calls this a "commendable study of ... the Bay of Pigs, the Son Tay raid, the Mayaguez rescue and the Desert One fiasco.... Readers... may set aside the didactic concluding chapter and content themselves with four well-researched cases."

According to Immerman, AHR 100.1, "Vandenbroucke identifies common explanations for the outcomes [of his four cases]. These include faulty intelligence, poor interagency and interservice cooperation and coordination, a decision-making system plagued by flawed advice and wishful thinking, and micromanagement by both civilian and military leaders far removed from the theater of operations.... This is a suggestive study, but asking broader questions would have made it more compelling."

Hilsman, PSQ 109.4, refers to the author's "calm gathering of the facts" and "convincing analysis." The author "shows that only one of the four principal special operations in the last thirty years was justified." The "book contains only a few minor errors." For example, it was the Soviets, not Castro, who took the initiative in placing Soviet missiles in Cuba. "More serious is the author's overall conclusion that ... the United States should put more emphasis on espionage..., since technical intelligence ... cannot look inside buildings. But the fact is that ... espionage has been successful only in ferreting out technical and scientific secrets and almost never plans for offensives and the like."

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