VIETNAM

General

N - R

Nagl, John A. [LTCOL/USA] Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. [pb]

An advertisement for the 2005 paperback edition of this work notes that it includes "a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq."

According to Millen, Parameters 34.3, "this book compares ... the British approach to counterinsurgency in Malaya with the American approach in Vietnam.... Despite minor flaws, John Nagl’s book is a valuable asset for identifying key aspects of a successful counterinsurgency strategy."

Freedman, FA 83.6, says that "the point of Nagl's book is that the British managed to learn from early mistakes and adapt to the situation."

For Hoffman, Proceedings 132.3 (Mar. 2006), this work is "an extremely relevant text. Those interested in understanding the difficulties faced by Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, or who wnat to grasp the intricacies of the most likely form of conflict for the near future, will gain applicable lessons."

Nashel, Jonathan. Edward Lansdale's Cold War. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005.

Pellegrin, H-War, H-Net Reviews, Dec. 2006 [http://www.h-net.org], calls this work "a compelling analysis of the life, adventures, and legend" of Edward Lansdale. This "is not a biography in the traditional sense.... Rather, the author uses Lansdale's career to explain American activities during the Cold War and emphasizes those events where Lansdale had a significant effect on such activities."

Nicholson, Thom [COL/USA (Ret.)] 15 Months in SOG: A Warrior's Tour. New York: Presidio, 1999. [pb]

From Inside Flap: As commander of Company B, Command and Control North's Raider Company (Da Nang), the author "commanded four platoons,... in some of the war's most deadly missions, including ready-reaction missions for patrols in contact with the enemy, patrol extractions under fire, and top-secret expeditions 'over the fence' into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam." Nicholson "provides a rare glimpse into the workings of one of the military's most carefully concealed reconnaissance campaigns."

Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America's Albatross. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 1981. [pb]

Plaster, John L.

1. SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. New York: Onyx, 1998. [pb]

Bernstein, NYT, 21 Jan. 1997, calls this book by a three-tour veteran of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG) "comprehensive, informative and often exciting." Although the reviewer would like to have seen "some meditation on the worth of the overall program," he accepts that Plaster's "seems to be a reliable account of an important part" of the overall war in Vietnam.

To Crerar, AIJ 17.1/2, Plaster's account of Special Forces reconnaissance teams is a "[h]ighly readable anecdotal history."

Krott, at http://www.thehistorynet.com/reviews, is highly laudatory of SOG, terming it a "true insider's account" that reveals "much about this top-secret commando unit and its covert missions in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

For Green, Booklist, 1 & 15 Jan. 1997, Plaster's work is "[a]n indispensable addition for Vietnam and special-warfare collections."

2. Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

Seamon, Proceedings, Jul. 2004, briefly notes that the author "describes his experiences with this special operations force from 1969 to 1971."

Prados, John. The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War. New York: Wiley, 1998.

Odom, Washington Post, 7 Jan. 1999, finds that the book's "strengths ... are its descriptions of SOG [Studies and Observation Group] and Special Forces operations and its considerable treatment of the North Vietnamese side of the conflict....The book's major weakness is its treatment of strategic choices....

"On moral questions, where he passes out blame in large doses to U.S. leaders, the author leaves us uncertain as to whether the North Vietnamese leaders share any of the guilt. Keeping his opening promise, however, Prados does deliver the most comprehensive treatment yet of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and its place in the war."

According to Taylor, I&NS 15.4, "Prados devotes a good deal of attention to the intelligence-gathering efforts of the US forces.... [T]his book suffers from the lack of a bibliography and only the most cursory citations for direct quotations."

[Prados, John.] Fighting the War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 248. [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/index.htm]

"Previously secret U.S. Air Force official histories of the Vietnam war published [on 9 April 2008] by the National Security Archive ... include the Air Force's detailed official history of the war in northern Laos.... Also declassified were Air Force historical studies on specific years of the Vietnam War, documenting in great detail the Air Force's role in planning and implementing the air war in North and South Vietnam. Among other significant disclosures in these histories are:

"* Air Force interest in nuclear options during at least two flash points in the Southeast Asian conflict: Laos in 1959 and in 1968 during the battle of Khe Sanh.

"* CIA operational commitments for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion hampered the Agency's ability to carry out Kennedy administration policy in Laos.

"* CIA proprietary Air America directed search and rescue missions in Laos in addition to its role in combat operations.

"* The U.S. ambassador in Laos served as the field commander of the so-called 'secret war' there, a role that has been largely undocumented."

Prados, John. The Hidden History of the Vietnam War. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995.

Puchalla, Edward F. "Communist Defense Against Aerial Surveillance in Southeast Asia." Studies in Intelligence 14, no. 2 (Fall 1970): 31-78

"[T]he war in Southeast Asia has produced extensive and at times ingenious attempts at deception. Communist forces ... have relied heavily on deception to conceal their activity."

Rectanus, Earl F. ("Rex") [VADM/USN (Ret.)] "The Naval Intelligence Organization Vietnam (NAVINTFOV)." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2008): 10-12.

The "architect of the intelligence strategy to support Operation SEALORDS" reviews the changes in Naval Intelligence in Vietnam in 1968-1970.

Reske, Charles F.

1. MAC-V-SOG Command History Annex B: The Last Secret of the Vietnam War. 2 vols. Sharon Center, OH: Alpha Publications, 1990.

According to Surveillant 1.5, this is a "declassified top secret report on the Studies and Observations Group in 1971-72 of U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam.... The author, a former member of the U.S. Naval Security Group, summarizes and analyzes each chapter."

2. MAC-V-SOG Command History: Annexes A, N & M (1964- 1966): First Secrets of the Vietnam War. Sharon Center, OH: Alpha Publications, 1992.

Bates, NIPQ 9.2, identifies this as the "reproduction of [an] early command history, complete with classification markings and distribution code words. The author has placed his own clearly-marked additions and comments within the text wherever there is material missing through sanitization, or where he has pertinent data from other sources."

 

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