Leavitt, David. The Man Who Knew Too Much: Alan Turing and the Invention of the Computer. New York: Norton, 2006. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006. Leavitt, David. The Man Who Knew Too Much: Alan Turing and the Invention of the Computer. New York: Norton, 2006. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006.
Kruh, Cryptologia 30.3 (Jul.-Sep. 2006), finds that the author "portrays Turing in all his humanity, his eccentricities, his brillance, and his fatal candor while elegantly explaining his work and its implications." For Ferry, The Guardian, 29 Jul. 2006, the author presents Turing "as a lonely maverick, isolated by his fascination with machine intelligence and even more so by his homosexuality. For anyone daunted by Andrew Hodges's magisterial 1983 biography, on which he draws heavily, Leavitt provides a sympathetic novelist's take on a brilliant eccentric. But the supporting characters are curiously two-dimensional."
Lewin, Ronald.
1. "A Signals Intelligence War." Journal of Contemporary History 16 (Jul. 1981): 501-512. Also, in The Second World War: Essays in Military and Political History, ed. Walter Laqueur, 184-194. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1982.
Sexton sees this as an "insightful article in which the author endeavors to assess the impact of ULTRA."
2. ULTRA Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents. London: Hutchinson, 1978. New York: McGraw Hill, 1978. New York: Pocket Books, 1980. [pb]
Peake, AIJ 5.1/90, calls ULTRA Goes to War "a good relatively short overview of how ULTRA was used in the European theater."
According to Pforzheimer, "Lewin has had access to a considerable quantity of ... Ultra messages as well as to many Allied users as sources for his book. He makes a major contribution to World War II historiography in his study of the impact of the Ultra material on the major battles and campaigns of the war in the West."
Constantinides notes that the scope of the book "is largely British, and the areas are Europe, Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic Ocean." Worthy as it is of praise, this book is not perfect. Lewin's "version of the cryptanalytical breakthrough against Enigma, good as it is, has technical errors and cannot be regarded as definitive.... To say that the Purple machine was directly derived from the Enigma is not accurate."
Macksey, Kenneth. The Searchers: Radio Intercept in Two World Wars. London: Cassell, 2003. New ed. London: Cassell, 2004.
From publisher: This "history of radio intercepting answers the question of how enemy messages are detected in the first place. The focus is on the early war-shortening Y and Radio Intercept Services, and their brilliantly clever inventors and technologists who proved to be unsung heroes with headphones clamped to their ears."
Macksey, Kenneth. Without Enigma: The Ultra and Fellgiebel Riddles. Shepperton, Surrey, UK: Ian Allen, 2000.
According to Erskine, I&NS 17.2, this work combines "counter-factual history" (what would have happened without the take from Enigma) with a recounting of "the wartime career of General Erich Fellgiebel ... and his part in the 20 July 1944 assassination plot against Hitler." The author "gets too many aspects of ciphers and cipher machines wrong." Regrettably, this work "does not illuminate Ultra, and its twin themes do not blend well." Kruh, Cryptologia 26.4, comments that the author "provides a realistic and logical scenario of what might have been, along with insights on Hitler's generals and the failed assassination attempt. It is an excellent, imaginative book."
Mayer, Stefan. The Breaking of the German Ciphering Machine "Enigma" by the Cryptological Section in the 2nd Department of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff. New York: Pilsudski Institute, 1974.
Nautical Brass Bibliography points out that while this work is "[p]rimarily of historical significance," it "may have been the first to point out that Polish contributions to breaking Enigma were vastly understated by Bertrand and Winterbotham."
McDonald, Gilman [CDR/USNR (Ret.)]. "About ULTRA: Fact and Fiction," Intelligencer 14, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2005): 113-117 (with editorial additions, 117-120).
The author argues that the term ULTRA was simply a security classification or label applied to the U.S. Top Secret or, for the British, the step above Most Secret.
Michie, Donald. "Colossus and the Breaking of the Wartime 'Fish' Codes." Cryptologia 26, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 17-58.
From Abstract: The author "describes his three-year experience as a founder member of the 'Teastery' and "Newmanry' teams. Their combined use of innovative methods and machines led from the breaking of the German Lorenz military traffic to its large-scale daily decipherment."
Miller, A. Ray. The Cryptographic Mathematics of Enigma. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2001.
Milner-Barry, P.S.
"'Action This Day': The Letter from Bletchley Park Cryptanalysts to
the Prime Minister, 21 October 1941." Intelligence and National
Security 1, no. 2 (May1986): 272-276.
The author shares his memories of the circumstances surrounding a letter sent by himself, Welchman, Turing, and Alexander to Churchill in an effort to break some administrative bottlenecks in their work. It worked! Witness Churchill's response: "Action This Day." The article includes as an appendix the text of the letter.
Morris, Christopher. "Ultra's Poor Relations." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 1 (Jan. 1986): 111-122.
This article deals with work, in which the author participated, on Kriegsmarine hand ciphers at Hut 4 at Bletchley Park during World War II.
Murray, Williamson.
1. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945. Washington, DC: GPO, 1983.
Sexton notes that the author "illuminates the relationship of ULTRA to the strategic air offensive..., as well as discussing air operations in Normandy and the Mediterranean." The main themes of this book are summarized in Murray's "Ultra: Some Thoughts on Its Impact on the Second World War," Air University Review 35 (Jul.-Aug. 1984), 52-64.
2. "Ultra: Some Thoughts on Its Impact on the Second World War." Air University Review 35 (Jul.-Aug. 1984): 52-64. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/ RefBibs/intell/ww2/ultra.htm]
3. "World War II: Ultra -- The Misunderstood Allied Secret Weapon." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Spring 2002. [http://www.historynet.com/magazines/mhq/3033696.html]
"While historians and military analysts tell us that the Germans were extraordinarily proficient in the operational and tactical spheres, we should also recognize that the Germans were incredibly sloppy and careless in the fields of intelligence, communications, and logistics, and consistently (and ironically) held their opponents in contempt in those fields.... [T]he German defeat in World War II suggests that to underestimate the capabilities and intelligence of one's enemies is to suffer dangerous and damaging consequences to one's own forces."
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