UNITED KINGDOM

World War II

The British Services

Special Operations Executive

Mar - Me

Marks, Leo. Between Silk and Cyanide: The Story of S.O.E.'s Code War. London: HarperCollins, 1998. Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War, 1941-1945. New York: Free Press, 1998. Charleston, SC: History Press, 2007.

Rouse, Spectator, 31 Oct. 1998, calls this an "entertaining account" of the author's time as SOE's first and only cryptographer. Marks was unable to convince his superiors that the Dutch network was controlled by the Germans, until the Abwehr abruptly ended the operation in April 1944. For Spencer, IJI&C 13.1, "Between Silk and Cyanide beats John le Carre and Eric Ambler combined and happens to be true." Kruh, Cryptologia 24.1, points to the author's "narrative flair, vivid characterizations, and wry wit." This is "an excellent account of SOE covert operations and cryptology and [t]his exciting story has never [before] been told."

According to Erskine, IIHSG [International Intelligence History Association] Newsletter 6.2 (Winter 1998) [http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni- erlangen.de/reviews.htm], the author "gives a considerable amount of new information about Nordpol, the 'Funkspiel' operated by the Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst in the Netherlands, which led to the arrest and deaths of more than 50 agents, including some from MI6.... Marks has a gift for words. His splendid book is informative, intelligent and amusing and very moving. It is essential reading for students of the SOE or Nordpol, and can be thoroughly recommended to any one interested in the period."

Marriott, Edward. Claude and Madeleine: A True Story of War, Espionage and Passion. London: Picador, 2005.

Madeleine Victorine Bayard [Madeleine Barclay] and Claude André Michel Péri [Jack Langlais] served with SOE. They died when the specialty boat HMS Fidelity was sunk by U-boats in late December 1942-early January1943.

Marshall, Bruce. The White Rabbit. London: Evans, 1952. The White Rabbit: The Secret Agent the Gestapo Could Not Crack. London: Cassell, 2001.

Marshall, Robert. All the King's Men: The Truth behind SOE's Greatest Wartime Disaster. London: Collins, 1988.

Martin, David.

1. "Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder: Precursor to the Yugoslav Tragedy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1992): 417-431.

2. The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1990.

Surveillant 1.3 notes that Martin documents "what he calls an immense Allied blunder" (abandoning Mihailovic for Tito), using "secret British files that were only recent declassified." FA 70.2 (Mar.-Apr. 1991) cautions that "the crucial SOE records remain sealed," and reminds that "Martin is an advocate, not a neutral investigator"; as an advocate, "the facts he has been seeking are those that support his case."

Martin, Douglas. "Vera Atkins, 92, Spymaster for British, Dies." New York Times, 27 Jun. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Vera Atkins, who recruited, trained and watched over the legendary British secret agents who parachuted into France to sabotage the Nazis in World War II, died" on 24 June 2000. "She was principal assistant" to SOE Director Col. Maurice Buckmaster.

Masson, Madeleine. Christine: A Search for Christine Granville, GM, OBE, Croix de Guerre. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975. Christine: SOE Agent & Churchill's Favourite Spy. London: Virago, 2005.

McCue, Paul. Behind Enemy Lines with the SAS: The Story of Amedee Maingard, SOE Agent. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2007.

From publisher: "Amedee Maingard was a young Mauritian studying in London in 1939" who joined the SOE. "He parachuted into occupied France in 1943 to join the 'Stationer' circuit, initially as radio operator but soon was second-in-command in the circuit.... [H]e narrowly escaped the fate of his organiser who was[] captured by the Germans in May 1944. Undeterred, Maingard developed his own 'Shipwright' circuit in time to support the Forces Francaises de l'Interieure (FFI) and the arrival of fifty-five men of 1st SAS Regiment for the ill-fated Operation Bulbasket shortly after D-Day."

McLynn, Frank. Fitzroy Maclean. London: John Murray, 1992

According to Surveillant 2.6, this biography "contains little on [Maclean's] intelligence experiences." Clive, I&NS 9.1, refers to the book as an "authoritative biography." Maclean's "service in Yugoslavia with SOE ... is the centrepiece of the book." Maclean's "accomplishments will surely long outlive his critics."

Messenger, David A.

1. "'Against the Grain': Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1941-45." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 173-190.

In an intelligence-gathering role, "particularly as it related to economic intelligence, SOE in Spain did achieve some success and carved out a limited role for itself in assisting Britain to realize some of its aims in wartime Spain."

2. "Fighting for Relevance: Economic Intelligence and Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1943-1945." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 33-54.

In Spain, SOE was "forbidden from any involvement in direct action and sabotage.... [However,] SOE managed, over time, to find some small parts to play, most notably through intelligence gathering in connection with the Allied wolfram [tungsten] campaign.... [I]ntelligence gathering ... inevitably brought it into conflict with the Secret Intelligence Service, upon whose preserve it was trespassing."

Meszerics, Tamás. "Undermine, or Bring Them Over: SOE and OSS Plans for Hungary in 1943." Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 2. (Apr. 2008): 195-216.

"[T]his article reconstructs the planning process [of SOE and OSS for special operations in Hungary] between March 1943 and March 1944.... The restrained rivalry between the American and British organizations was .. clearly observable in the Hungarian case.... Possibly the most persuasive explanation lies in the organizational characteristics and history of the two agencies. OSS was given a comprehensive mandate for secret intelligence, special operations, counterintelligence, and morale operations. This was an advantage over SOE, which after 1942 had to focus on sabotage and subversion alone."

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