Schofield, Victoria. Wavell: Soldier and Statesman. London: Murray, 2006.
Foot, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), comments that while this biography covers Wavell's "role in developing the deception machine that played so large a part in British strategy from 1940 to 1945," it "hardly mentions Dudley Clarke" who "created the system of inflating the enemy's opinion of British strength."
Scotland, A.P. The London Cage. London: Evans Brothers, 1957.
Constantinides: "Scotland headed the British prisoner-of-war interrogation system in World War II," but says little here about either interrogating methods for acquiring intelligence from prisoners of war or about the use of such intelligence. Half of this book is on his experience as head of the War Crimes Investigative Unit.
Simpson, A.W. Brian. In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention without Trial in Wartime Britain. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994.
Rogers, Political Studies 44.4, sees this work as a "precise and carefully researched study of the use of the notorious Defence Regulation 18B." The author has produced an "excellent combination of academic detail and readability."
Stafford, David. Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets. Woodstock, NY: Overlook, 2000.
For Schwab, IJI&C 15.1, the author's "chief contributions are to illustrate the fascination of both leaders with intelligence, and to analyze how this secret dimension both strengthened and complicated their personal relationship.... He contends convincingly that, in spite of occasional disagreements and conflicting long-term objectives, Churchill and Roosevelt built a durable intelligence alliance." However, the work "is often more episodic and anecdotal than comprehensively analytical."
Stafford, David. "Secret Operations versus Secret Intelligence in World War II: The British Experience." In Men at War: Politics, Technology and Innovation in the Twentieth Century, eds. Timothy Travers and Christon Archer, 119-136. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1982. [Capet]
Stafford, David, ed. Flight from Reality: Rudolf Hess and His mission to Scotland, 1941. London: Pimlico, 2002.
Stirling, Tessa, Daria Nalecz, and Tadeusz Dubicki, eds. Fwd., Tony Blair. Intelligence Co-Operation between Poland and Great Britain during World War II: The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee. Vol. 1. Edgware, UK, and Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell, 2005.
From publisher: "The Anglo-Polish Historical Committee was established in 2000 with the full support of the Prime Ministers of both countries. The committee, made up of historians and official experts from both countries, was set up to identify and evaluate surviving historical records which would show the extent of the contribution made by Polish Intelligence to the Allied victory.... In order to assist the committee's work, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Chief Historian has been granted access to the archives of the British Intelligence Services. The Polish historians have concentrated their efforts on those documents publicly available in the archives of, for example, Britain, Poland and the United States of America."
DKR, AFIO WIN 34-05 (6 Sep. 2005), notes that this is the work of one British and two Polish historians, "with contributions from a variety of researchers. The result relates not only the story of the acquisition of Enigma but how the Poles smuggled to England in the middle of the war a copy of the German V-2 rocket and its top-secret fuel. [R]eaders ... will learn that Polish intelligence was active from Japan to every part of Europe, whether Nazi occupied or neutral."
According to Peake, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), "Foreign Office historian Gill Bennett is the major British contributor to this volume. In her summary of the Anglo-Polish wartime relationship, she describes both the difficulties and the successes resulting from the collaboration. She leaves no doubt that the Polish contribution was a positive one whose recognition was long overdue. This book is a major contribution to intelligence history."
Strong, Kenneth W. D. [Maj.-Gen. Sir]. Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer. London: Cassell, 1968. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969.
According to Pforzheimer, "General Strong ... served as G-2 for General Eisenhower during World War II" and held important positions in British military intelligence in the postwar years. This book relates (with great discretion) the general's "experiences during his intelligence career, his views of the role of intelligence in government, and important insights into the profession." There is no discussion of the use of Ultra material. Constantinides adds that this is "a mainly autobiographical work that looks at the nature and role of military intelligence rather than intelligence as a whole (except for the final chapter)."
In a biographical sketch, Kenneth Campbell, "General Eisenhower's J-2: Major General Kenneth Strong, British Army Intelligence," American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997), 81-83, finds several factors behind General Strong's success as Eisenhower's J-2: "his long-term assignment to intelligence, his exceptional dedication to educating himself professionally, his loyalty to his commander, and his talents for working in an international joint command context."
Taylor, Eric. Heroines of World War II. London: Robert Hale, 1995. [pb]
Surveillant 4.3: "Taylor shows the parts women, as nurses, spies, soldiers, WAAFS and WRENS, played in the Allied conflict."
Thomas, Edward. "Norway's Role in British Wartime Intelligence." In Britain and Norway in the Second World War, ed. Patrick Salmon, 121-128. London: HMSO, 1995.
Thurlow, Richard C.
1. "British Fascism and State Surveillance, 1934-45." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): 77-99.
"[T]he history of anti-fascist operations went full circle between 1934 and 1945 with the Home Office defending traditional policies of political liberty and surveillance of extremist groups at the beginning and end of the period. However, between those dates the limits of tolerance and the protection provided by the Habeas Corpus Acts were severely tested as a result of the changes in the perception of fascism."
2. "The Evolution of the Mythical British Fifth Column 1939-46." 20th Century British History 10, no. 4 (1999): 477-498.
3. "'A Very Clever Capitalist Class': British Communism and State Surveillance, 1939-45." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1997): 1-21.
The "practical application" of the emergency powers available to the British government was "minimal." The government "was careful not to proscribe" the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), "nor to evoke sympathy for it, by overt persecution." The CPGB's "failure to make more impact was due more ... to its own inadequacies" than the actions of the authorities.
Tombs, Isabelle. "Scrutinizing France: Collecting and Using Newspaper Intelligence during World War II." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 105-126.
In World War II, "some three-fifths of the economic intelligence obtained on Germany and German-occupied Europe came from press and other kinds of open sources.... [footnote omitted] [T]his article studies the important case of Open Source Intelligence applied to France and the mechanisms by which material was gathered, analyzed and diffused."
Wark, Wesley K. "British Intelligence and Operation Barbarossa, 1941: The Failure of F.O.E.S." In In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 499-512. Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994.
FOES was the British acronym for Future Operations Enemy Section, formed in December 1940 and reporting directly to the Chiefs of Staff. Its function was to seek to predict German strategy. It did not anticipate Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union.
Wheale, Adrian. Renegades: Hitler's Englishmen. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994.
Thurlow, I&NS 11.1: "Broadly speaking, the renegades were mainly involved with Nazi propaganda,... and with the attempted formation of ... the 'British Free Corps,' to fight against the Soviet Army on the eastern front." This book "gives the most illuminating account" of the latter effort thus far published. The author's work is also "useful" in discussing the motives behind treasonous behavior: "Wheale shows the complexity of the motives of those involved..., and provides a much more plausible assessment than Rebecca West's classic contemporary unsympathetic account of the weeds and misfits who dabbled in treason."
Wheeler, Douglas. "The Azores, Allied Secret Operations and World War II, 1939-1944." British Historical Society of Portugal Annual Report 32 (2005), 103-107.
1. "British Intelligence and the July Bomb Plot of 1944: A Reappraisal." War in History 13, no. 4 (Nov. 2006): 468-494.
2. "Churchill, British Intelligence, and the German Opposition Question." War in History 14, no. 1 (2007): 109-112.
Winter, P.R.J. "Libra Rising: Hitler, Astrology and British Intelligence, 1940-43." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 394-415.
The British used an astrologer from 1940 to 1943 in their efforts to figure out Hitler's strategic intentions. This reflected a mistaken belief that Hitler was into astrology, but had the support of the head of British naval intelligence, Admiral Godfrey.
1. Britain, Switzerland, and the Second World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Alvarez, I&NS 19.1, says that the author has produced "a comprehensive survey of Anglo-Swiss wartime relations.... The treatment of Swiss political and diplomatic personalities is especially illuminating." The chapter on British covert operations in Switzerland has "more detail on the cryptanalytic successes of Bletchley Park (which managed to crack several Swiss cyphers) and the covert operations" of SOE than on SIS' clandestine intelligence operations.
2. "'Keeping the Swiss Sweet': Intelligence as a Factor in British Policy towards Switzerland during the Second World War." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 442-467.
"Between the summer of 1940 and early 1943, Britain's intelligence community exercised a powerful, and at times crucial, influence over the evolution of British policy towards Switzerland.... Critical to the success of Britain's intelligence operations in Switzerland was the benevolence of the Federal political and security forces."
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