Aldrich, Richard J. "British Intelligence and the 'Barbarian' Enemy, 1941-1944." Everyone's War 15 (Spring-Summer 2007): 56-60. Aldrich, Richard J. "British Intelligence and the 'Barbarian' Enemy, 1941-1944." Everyone's War 15 (Spring-Summer 2007): 56-60.
Allen, Martin. Himmler's Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich Himmler. New York: Carroll & Graf. 2006.
According to Peake, IJI&C 20.2 (Summer 2007), the author "alleges that the British government ordered and implemented the assassination of Himmler" in order to prevent his testimony at Nuremburg that "Britain had entered into peace negotiations with [him] without telling its allies." However, as the reviewer points out, the documents on which this conclusion is based have been determined to be forgeries. How these forgeries were placed in the British National Archives has not been determined.
Andrew, Christopher.
"The Mobilization of British Intelligence in the Two World Wars."
In Mobilization for Total War: The Canadian, American and British Experience
1914-1918, 1939-1945, ed. N.F. Dreiszinger, 87-101. Waterloo, Ontario:
Wilfried Laurier University Press, 1981.
Sexton notes that this article "[e]mphasizes the recruitment of talented amateurs for wartime intelligence duties."
Annan, Noël. Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany. London: HarperCollins, 1995. New York: Norton, 1995.
For Surveillant 4.4/5, this is an "intimate portrait of British military, intelligence, and diplomatic operations from one who was closely involved in the work." Similarly, Powers, NYRB, 9 Jan. 1997, sees a "finely written memoir of [Annan's] own wartime intelligence work mainly concerned with the Germans."
Frazier, I&NS 11.3, comments that for the war years, the book represents "a valuable record of the inner workings of the system of control and use of intelligence by means of the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS)." The work is more limited with regard to the regeneration of postwar Germany. To Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), Changing Enemies is the "[p]erceptive memoirs of a British junior military intelligence analyst in WW II London." There is some suspicion, however, that the author "adjusted some of his memories to fit hindsight."
Bennett,
Ralph. "The 'Vienna Alternative', 1944: Reality or Illusion."
Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 2 (Apr. 1988): 251-271.
Bond, Brian. "Calm
Before the Storm: Britain and the Phoney War, 1939-1940." Journal
of the Royal United Services Institute 135 (Spring 1990): 61-67.
Sexton identifies this article as an "excellent review of British intelligence on the eve of the German offensive in the West in 1940."
Bowen, Elizabeth. "Notes on Eire": Espionage Reports to Winston Churchill, 1940-2. Aubane, Ireland: Aubane Historical Society, 1999.
Bowman, Martin W. The
Bedford Triangle: U.S. Undercover Operations from England in World War 2.
Chatham, Kent, UK: Patrick Stevens, 1988.
To Knouse, http://home.att.net, this book "has a number of glaring faults. For one thing, the chapters on Glenn Miller are entirely superfluous and speculative, not good history at all but more a bit of rumor-mongering than anything else."
Brewer, Susan A. To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Watt, I&NS 14.2, finds this a "clear, competent, workmanlike" book that is "based on thorough research used critically." He compares this work very favorably to Thomas E. Mahl, Desperate Deceptions (1998).
Brown, Kathryn. "Intelligence
and the Decision to Collect It: Churchill's Wartime American Diplomatic
Signals Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 10,
no. 3 (Jul. 1995): 449-467.
Churchill was receiving intercepts of U.S. diplomatic traffic in the second half of 1941. Britain had read State Department codes during World War I and continued to do so in the interwar period. The author concludes, using circumstantial evidence and logic, that it is probable that Churchill no longer received this material after Pearl Harbor. For the author, the question remains of why the British continued their intercept activity in the period immediately before Pearl Harbor. Ultimately, Brown concludes, the decision to do so should not come as a surprise.
Campbell, John P.
1. Dieppe Revisited: A Documentary Investigation. Cass Studies in Intelligence Series. London: Frank Cass, 1994.
Clark comment: The ill-fated Dieppe raid was codenamed Operation Jubilee. Greenhous, I&NS 9.4, says that Campbell "conclusively puts to rest the old canard[] that the Germans were ready for the raid as a result of information supplied by an agent.... [He] unpicks nearly all the legends of Dieppe and lays bare the underlying fabric."
2. "The 'Ultra' Revelations: The Dieppe Raid in a New Light as an Example of Now Inevitable Revisions in Second World War Historiography." Canadian Defence Quarterly 6 (Summer 1976): 36-42.
According to Sexton, the author contends that RAF claims of victory over the Luftwaffe during the Dieppe raid "should be reevaluated in light of ULTRA intercepts."
Claasen, Adam. "The German Invasion of Norway, 1940: The Operational Intelligence Dimension." Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1 (2004): 114-135 .
From abstract: "This article ... investigates the pivotal role intelligence played in the planning, preparation, and carrying out of Weserübung.... Although primarily concerned with German intelligence gathering and utilisation, British efforts, including the potential impact of Ultra, are also considered."
Costello, John. Ten
Days to Destiny: The Secret Story of the Hess Peace Initiative and British
Efforts to Strike a Deal with Hitler. New York: Morrow, 1991.
Surveillant 1.6: This book "shows just how close England came to making a peace deal with Hitler." Costello "exposes the cunning of Churchill's exploitation of American Embassy spy Tyler Kent both to silence his enemies and to blackmail President Roosevelt into helping England."
Cull, Nicholas John. Selling War: The British Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War II. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Rawnsley, I&NS 12.2, comments that the author reminds readers that "the sustained British propaganda" using "every conceivable method -- overt and covert --" had, by Pearl Harbor, "created a climate where the idea of involvement might flourish.... This is a populist history, a readable story elegantly written." For Kearney, Air & Space Power [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil], this is an "enlightening, informative, and important" work. The author "skillfully ... documents the information campaign that our ally waged from 1937 through 1941."
Deacon, Richard [Donald
McCormick]. Super Spy: The Man Who Infiltrated the Kremlin and the Gestapo.
UK: Futura, 1990. [pb]
Surveillant 1.1: This is the story of "William Otto Lucas, also known as William van Narvig.... He once told Deacon about meeting with Sidney Reilly.... Never accepted in the West, Narvig was suspected of being a double-agent by the FBI and not trusted by the British SIS. Most complete account to date."
de la Marck, David de Young. "De Gaulle, Colonel Passy and British Intelligence, 1940-42." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 21-40.
André Dewavrin (nom de guerre Colonel Passy) headed Free France's intelligence and subversion services, the Bureau central de renseignements et d'action (BCRA), but "was dependent on" British intelligence services, specifically SIS and SOE. De Gaulle's relationship with Dewavrin and with British intelligence "was defined by an obsessive need for political control, which only served to poison the otherwise good relations of the BCRA with SIS and SOE."
See, André Dewavrin, Souvenirs, 3 vols. (Monte Carlo: R. Solar, 1947-1951).
Denniston, Robin. "Diplomatic
Eavesdropping, 1922-44: A New Source Discovered." Intelligence and
National Security 10, no. 3 (Jul. 1995): 423-448.
"This study traces recent research into non-service -- that is diplomatic -- traffic, some of which was enciphered by systems which predated machine encipherment.... The new source disclosed is the diplomatic component of the files that came to Churchill from MI6 from late 1941 to VJ Day.... In 1943 up to a third of 'C's' daily delivery to Churchill consisted" of diplomatic intercepts. "A total of 17 countries were targeted."
Dubicki, Tadeusz, Daria Nalecz, and Tessa Stirling, eds. Intelligence Co-Operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee. Edgware, UK: Mitchell Vallentine, 2005.
See Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, "England's Poles in the Game," Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007): 98-100, for a review of some of the accomplishments of Polish intelligence during World War II.
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