Aldrich, Richard J. "Soviet Intelligence, British Security and the End of the Red Orchestra: The Fate of Alexander Rado." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 196-218. Aldrich, Richard J. "Soviet Intelligence, British Security and the End of the Red Orchestra: The Fate of Alexander Rado." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 196-218.
From January to July 1945, Alexander Rado -- the GRU chief in Switzerland from 1940 to 1943 -- was in the hands of British Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in Cairo. Aldrich mines the available material for the conclusion that, contrary to popular legend, Rado neither tried to defect to the British nor did the British repatriation of Rado to the Soviets represent anything other than the routine treatment of him as a Displaced Person.
Additionally, the author suggests that the failure of the British to recognize who and what they had in their hands argues against the kind of relationship between British intelligence and Rado's network that some writers have put forward.
Arbogast, E.R. Contribution
of Intelligence to the Battles of Alam Halfa and El Alamein: August-November
1942, Final Report. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993.
Surveillant 3.4/5 comments that the "British victories ... were in large part due to the effective use of intelligence at the strategic and operational levels of war."
Atherton, Louise. SOE Operations in Africa and the Middle East: A Guide to Newly Released Records in the Public Record Office. London: PRO Publications, 1994.
Aldrich, I&NS 10.4: "This well-organized booklet is essential reading for anyone preparing to do extensive work on this subject."
Barkas, Geoffrey.
1. with Natalie Barkas. The Camouflage Story: From Aintree to Alamein. London: Cassell, 1952.
According to Constantinides, Barkas headed Britain's camouflage organization in the Middle East from January 1941. The work covers both defensive and offensive measures, but "the section of the book dealing with offensive deception ... is the most fascinating."
2. and John Hutton. "Camouflage of Airfields in the Middle East, 1941-42." R.A.F. Quarterly 5, no.2 (Apr. 1953), 112-120. "Camouflage of Middle East Airfields." Military Review 33, no.10 (Jan. 1954), 99-107.
According to Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), Hutton served as a camouflage officer under Barkas in World War II.
Chappell, F. R. Wellington
Wings: An RAF Intelligence Officer in the Western Desert. Somerton,
Somerset: Crecy Books, 1992.
Orange, I&NS 9.3: Did a Wellington night-bomber squadron in Egypt in 1942 "need a comparatively elderly [32] schoolteacher, entirely ignorant of aviation, as an 'intelligence' expert?... The answer emerges ... in this absorbing book as Chappell progresses ... to ... respected authority." The book was "first published by William Kimber in 1980 and re-appears in a slightly corrected edition.... [The] tone throughout is sensible and sensitive."
Clarke, Dudley. Seven
Assignments. London: Jonathan Cape, 1948.
Constantinides comments that Clarke has been seen by some as a "pioneer and genius in deception in World War II.... For those expecting to learn more of Clarke's deception work, this book will be a disappointment. It ends at the moment he assumes staff duties in the Middle East."
According to H.O. Dovey, I&NS 11.4/672-695, Clarke continued his story in the form of a diary that is now available in the Public Record Office. Dovey reviews Clarke's presentation of "A" Force's work from Cairo for 1941-1942. Since the "A" Force Narrative War Diary continues until 18 June 1945, additional uses of Clarke's story can be expected.
Cox, Sebastian. "'The
Difference between Black and White': Churchill, Imperial Politics, and Intelligence
before the 1941 Crusader Offensive." Intelligence and National Security
9, no. 3 (Jul. 1994): 405-447.
The author argues that Churchill orchestrated a "cooked" -- although in the end not inaccurate -- report on the relationship between German and allied air forces in the Middle East prior to the Crusader offensive. The reason for doing so was Commonwealth politics or, more specifically, concerns expressed by the Australian and New Zealand governments about a potential lack of allied air superiority in the theater, as had been the case in Greece and Crete.
Dovey, H.O. "Cheese."
Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 176-185.
Dovey writes here about "the Cairo-based trio of [British-controlled] double agents whose combined operations were known as 'Cheese.'" The author raises some questions about the story of Cheese as told by David Mure in his Practise to Deceive and Master of Deception.
Dovey,
H.O. "The False Going Map at Alam Halfa." Intelligence and
National Security 4, no. 1 (Jan. 1989): 165-168.
The author uses some documents at the Public Record Office to suggest that "the planting by the British Eighth Army of a false going map" did in fact mislead Rommel before the battle of Alam Halfa in August 1942.
Dovey, H.O.
1. "The Eighth Assignment, 1941-42." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 4 (Oct. 1996): 672-695.
2. "The Eighth Assignment, 1943-1945." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1997): 69-90.
Clark comment: The titles here refer to Dudley Clarke's Seven Assignments (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948).
Constantinides notes that Clarke ended his story "at the moment he assumes staff duties in the Middle East." According to Dovey, Clarke continued his story in the form of a diary that is now available in the Public Record Office (the "'A' Force Narrative War Diary"). Dovey reviews, in the first article, Clarke's presentation of "A" Force's work from Cairo for 1941-1942. He continues the story, including the February 1953 establishment of an "Advanced HQ" in Algiers in association with the Americans, in the second article.
Dovey, H.O. "Maunsell
and Mure." Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 1 (Jan.
1993): 60-77.
Raymond Maunsell headed British Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in World War II. David Mure was an "A" Force officer in Baghdad and Beirut.
Dovey, H.O. "The
Middle East Intelligence Centre." Intelligence and National Security
4, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 800-812.
Dovey traces the genesis of the Middle East Intelligence Centre (MEIC), which began operation in Cairo in August 1939; looks at some of the criticism the activity endured; and notes its virtual disbandment or melding into the newly established Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East (PICME) in the period May-July 1943.
Dovey, H.O. "Security
in Syria, 1941-45." Intelligence and National Security 6, no.
2 (Apr. 1991): 418-446.
The Allies invaded Syria in June 1941 to forestall a potential Vichy acquiescence in a German and Italian move into the area. After Beirut's capture on 15 July 1941, control of Syria passed into the hands of General de Gaulle's Free French. Between then and the end of the war, enemy espionage and sabotage in Syria was "contained, if never eliminated," and internal disturbances were kept to a minimum.
Everett, H.W. "The
Secret War in the Desert." British Army Review, Dec. 1978, 66-68.
Sexton: "An account of British interception of German tactical communications in the Western Desert."
Ferris, John. "The
British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-42."
Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 255-291.
Sexton notes that this is an overview of British difficulties in maintaining communications security in the Western Desert.
Ferris, John. "The
'Usual Source': Signals Intelligence and Planning for the Eighth Army 'Crusader'
Offensive, 1941." Intelligence and National Security 14, no.
1 (Spring 1999): 84-118.
The author seeks to "demonstrate that intelligence," especially signals intelligence, "was fundamental" to the "strategy of [Eighth] Army authorities in Cairo during ... their planning for 'Crusader.'" What was "really gained from intelligence was the ability to intervene before the enemy struck Tobruk, and the knowledge that the enemy could not fight a prolonged battle of attrition. These were significant gains."
Flicke, Wilhelm F. "The Lost Keys to El Alamein." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 4 (Fall 1959): 73-80.
This account is "[e]xcerpted from ... War Secrets in the Ether." It can "be presumed to exaggerate the importance to Rommel of the intercepted messages it cites; but that they were of some importance is attested in other sources." (p. 73/fn.1)
Funk, Arthur Layton. "The OSS in Algiers." In The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II, ed. George C. Chalou. Washington, DC: National Archives, 1992.
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