Auty, Phyllis, and
Richard Clogg, eds. British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia
and Greece. London: Macmillan,1975. Auty, Phyllis, and
Richard Clogg, eds. British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia
and Greece. London: Macmillan,1975.
Constantinides: This work consists of the proceedings of a 1973 conference in London, with a majority of SOE participants. "Fascinating new material on British intelligence and resistance operations, capabilities, and relationships emerges from the proceedings."
Beavan, Stanley. Aegean
Masquerade: A Royal Air Force Odyssey. Studley, Warwickshire: Brewin
Books, 1994.
Surveillant 3.6 notes that Aegean Masquerade concerns "RAF wireless operations in the Mediterranean ... and RAF covert operations in Turkey and Greece. It is based on the author's first-hand experiences and RAF service."
Bennett, Ralph
1. Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy. New York: Morrow, 1989.
Sexton says that this "[c]omprehensive study" of the impact of Ultra on Allied strategy covers the campaigns in Greece, Crete, Iraq, Syria, the Western Desert, North Africa, Sicily and Italy. The work stands "as a model for historians."
To Ferris, I&NS 6.2, this "is the best ... book yet written" on Ultra's effect on any aspect of the war. Ultra is presented as "only one of many Allied sources of secret information."
2. "Intelligence and Strategy: Some Observations on the War in the Mediterranean, 1941-1945." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 444-464.
This is a concise presentation of the main findings of Bennett's Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy (see above).
Benton, Kenneth. "The ISOS Years: Madrid, 1941-3." Journal of Contemporary History 30 (1995): 366-370.
Benton joined British SIS in 1937 and served successively in Vienna, Riga (1938-1940), Hanslope Park, and Madrid, the focus of this brief memoir.
A note on terminology: The designator "ISOS" (Intelligence Series Oliver Strachey) was used for "all decrypts of Abwehr signals, however enciphered, to disguise the breaking of Abwehr Enigma." Erskine, I&NS 12.3/124, fn. 16.
Bristow, Desmond, and
Bill Bristow. A Game of Moles: The Deceptions of an MI6 Officer.
Boston & London: Little, Brown, 1993.
Surveillant 3.4/5 notes that this book presents the "part Bristow played within Section V -- the counterintelligence arm of MI6." He spent the "wartime years working for MI6 in Gibraltar and Algiers ... [and] retired in 1954.... [He] remains convinced that Roger Hollis of MI5 was a Soviet spy, that Guy Liddell was in the same category, and that David Footman (chief of MI6's political section for Central Europe) was working for the Russians, too."
For West, WIR 13.4, the author's account of his adventures in wartime Spain is "one entertaining anecdote after another." The book "dovetails with Philby's memoirs,... [as] the only detailed recollections in the public domain of Section V's activities.... [It] offers a fascinating insight into a rather obscure corner of the secret war."
Defty, I&NS 10.1, suggests that Bristow's critical stance toward his former employers may be "in no small part the result of his friendship with Peter Wright.... Bristow digresses rather often, apparently unable to contain his anger at 'how badly many worthy people have been treated by the powers that be....' [T]he charges he makes [against Hollis and Liddell] are largely a reiteration of those of his friend Peter Wright, and they are thankfully largely confined to one chapter." Most of the book "offers an engaging, occasionally revealing, and often diverting insight into some of more successful wartime deception operations conducted by SIS in the Mediterranean theatre."
Cochran, Alexander
S., Jr. "The Influence of 'Magic' Intelligence on Allied Strategy in
the Mediterranean." In New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers
Presented at the Fourth Naval History Symposium, United States Naval Academy,
25-26 October 1979, eds. Craig L. Symonds, et. al., 340-350. Annapolis,
MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1981.
Sexton notes that Ronald Lewin's commentary (included here) "cast[s] doubt on the soundness of Cochran's thesis" regarding the influence of Magic diplomatic intercepts on the Allied decision to invade Sicily and Italy.
Currer-Briggs, Noel.
"Some of Ultra's Poor Relations in Algeria, Tunisia, Sicily and Italy."
Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1987): 274-290.
The author worked on breaking "German double-Playfair military, SS and police hand-ciphers" at both Bletchley Park and in the Mediterranean theater of operations from the autumn of 1941 to the summer of 1944. The article is based on personal recollections; there are no footnotes.
[Sexton misspells the author's name as "Currier-Briggs" and misdescribes the article as involving "an American Sigint unit in the Mediterranean in 1942-1943."]
Denniston, Robin. Churchill's
Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the Foreign Offcie and Turkey 1942-44. London: Sutton, 1997. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. London: Sutton, 1999. [pb]
According to Kruh, Cryptologia 21.3, the author uncovered some previously unknown files of diplomatic intercepts that provide "a broader view of Churchill's role in British foreign policy and war planning." Included is new information on the Cicero spy affair.
Wylie, I&NS 15.3, finds that the author "presents a thoughful and well researched analysis of the role Sigint played in Churchill's attitude towards Turkey during the war.... Though at times repetitive and difficult to follow, Denniston provides a powerful and convincing case."
Dovey, H.O. "The
Intelligence War in Turkey." Intelligence and National Security
9, no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 59-87.
Erskine, Ralph. "Eavesdropping on 'Bodden': ISOS v. the Abwehr in the Straits of Gibralter." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1997): 110-129.
"This article describes British efforts during the Second World War to counter an Abwehr ship-reporting organization in the Straits of Gibralter, known as the 'Bodden' line, which employed advanced infra-red equipment for night observation purposes."
Fielding, Xan. Hide and Seek: The Story of a Wartime Agent. London: Secker & Warburg, 1954.
Constantinides: Fielding spent two years in Greece and parachuted into France in August 1944. He "reveals that the Cretan resistance organization EOK was encouraged and created by SOE and himself." He also "provides some rare looks at SOE personnel sent into occupied France during the war and at friction within SIS teams."
Goulter-Zervoudakis,
Christina. "The Politicization of Intelligence: The British Experience
in Greece, 1941-1944." Intelligence and National Security 13,
no. 1 (Spring 1998): 165-194.
From "Abstract": Because "a large portion of the intelligence effort had to be devoted to gathering political intelligence,... SOE operatives became embroiled in the internecine struggles between communist based and other resistance groups. Intelligence work was made even more difficult by inter- and intra-departmental rivalries, and tensions among the Allies involved in Greece."
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