UNITED KINGDOM

World War II

Far East & Pacific Theaters

F - Z

Fitzgerald, Stephen K. MAGIC and ULTRA in the China-Burma-India Theater. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1992.

According to Surveillant 3.2/3, this book concerns the "operational use of MAGIC and ULTRA." The author "concludes that neither ULTRA nor MAGIC were able consistently to fathom Japanese intentions in Burma and that the ultimate importance of MAGIC and ULTRA was to confirm intelligence obtained from other sources." Kruh, Cryptologia 18.1, notes that this work "is well documented with 274 foornotes and a comprehensive bibliography which provides opportunities for further reading or research."

Ford, Douglas.

1. "British Intelligence on Japanese Army Morale During the Pacific War: Logical Analysis or Racial Stereotyping?" Journal of Military History 69, no. 2 (Apr. 2005): 439-474.

From abstract: "The British army's image of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) during the Pacific War (1941-45) was shaped by a logical analysis of the intelligence obtained through combat experience" and was not based on preconceived notions.

2. "'A Conquerable Yet Resilient Foe': British Perceptions of the Imperial Japanese Army's Tactics on the India-Burma Front, September 1942 to Summer 1944." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 65-90.

"[I]ntelligence played a vital role in enabling Fourteenth Army to employ its scarce resources effectively, by building a strategy whereby further setbacks could be avoided and wartime objectives attained in an economical manner."

3. "Planning for an Unpredictable War: British Intelligence Assessments and the War Against Japan, 1937-45." Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1 (2004): 136-167 .

From abstract: ""The intelligence pointing to the unpredictability of Japan's strategy and the disparity between the opposing forces in the Far East ... played a crucial role in shaping the evolution of a strategy that was within Britain's capacity to implement."

4. "Strategic Culture, Intelligence Assessment, and the Conduct of the Pacific War: The British-Indian and Imperial Japanese Armies in Comparison, 1941-1945." War in History 14, no. 1 (2007): 63-95.

Gilchrist, Andrew. Bangkok Top Secret: Being the Experiences of a British Officer in the Siam Country Section of Force 136. London: Hutchinson, 1970.

Hall, Suzanne. "The Politics of Prisoner of War Recovery: SOE and the Burma-Thailand Railway during World War II." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 51-80.

SOE's involvement in this effort "saved many of the prisoners from almost certain death."

Melinsky, Hugh. A Code-Breaker's Tale. Norfolk, UK: Larks Press, 1998.

Kruh, Cryptologia 25.1, notes that this is the "fascinating story" of a young man's wartime experiences from learning Japanese and codebreaking at the Inter-Services Special Intelligence School to service with MacArthur's Central Bureau in Wireless Units throughout the South West Pacific.

O'Brien, Terence. The Moonlight War: The Story of Clandestine Operations in Southeast Asia, 1944-45. London: Collins, 1987.

Erskine, IJI&C 4.1: O'Brien expresses his "anger at ISLD's [Inter-Services Liaison Department, the codename for the British Secret Service in India] inefficiency." The "principal enemy was ... weather and the fiendishly difficult terrain." O'Brien is a gifted writer" and his book is "full of detailed insights on British clandestine operations."

Reynolds, E. Bruce. Thailand's Secret War: OSS, SOE and the Free Thai Underground during World War II. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

For Sacquety, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), the author shows that once OSS and its Free Thai group "overcame various obstacles in their path, they proved very effective in Thailand, in contrast to the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its smaller group of Free Thai.... Initial attempts to operate from China proved disastrous for the fledgling OSS Free Thai group. Only by eventually basing the group with OSS Detachment 404 in Sri Lanka did Washington succeed in finding a location from which the Free Thai could successfully operate." With this work, "Reynolds proves that he is a dean among scholars of intelligence in the Far East during the Second World War. His exhaustive archival research and exploitation of untapped sources have produced a landmark work."

Ridderhof, H-War, H-Net Reviews [http://www.h-net.org], May 2008, says that this work "is well researched: a review of the sources indicates that Reynolds accessed both U.S. and British official sources, many western and Thai secondary sources, and has interviewed an impressive number of American, British and Thai participants. It is also a well-written book. Reynolds did an outstanding job in providing a clear narrative of what could be a very confusing story." Yu Shen, I&NS 20.3 (Sep 2005), also finds this to be "an excellent book" that "is well-researched." The author unfolds this "intricately complicated" story "with great sensitivity and objectivity."

Ride, Edwin. BAAG: Hong Kong Resistance, 1942-45. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Wilcox: "Allied intelligence network set up under Japanese rule."

Rooney, David. Mad Mike: A Life of Michael Calvert. London: Leo Cooper, 1997.

Foot, I&NS 13.4, notes that this is the biography of "a soldier ... who excelled at irregular warfare, and was one of the British Army's leading exponents of covert action against the Japanese in 1941-45." The author "writes clearly and understands his subject-matter well."

Scott, Norman. "Solving Japanese Naval Ciphers." Cryptologia 21, no. 2 (Apr. 1997): 149-157.

The author describes his experience and some operational procedures in solving Japanese ciphers at Bletchley Park and Anderson station, Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka).

Smith, Michael. The Emperor's Codes: The Role of Bletchley Park in Breaking Japan's Secret Ciphers. London: Bantam, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2002. [pb]

Jacobsen, intelforum, 17 Jun. 2001, says that "[t]his book grossly exaggerates the British and Dominion cryptologic successes against the Japanese navy during and preceding WWII. It is an Anglophilean attack against well established American successes.... Smith's failure to list page number citations makes it difficult or often impossible to verify his sources. He 'cherrypicks' many of his sources to support his more outrageous allegations when a thorough review of the same sources shows the opposite viewpoint."

According to Kruh, Cryptologia 25.1, this "excellent book" highlights the work of John Tiltman and Eric Nave in breaking Japanese codes. The author will "raise the ire of the U.S. Navy with his claim that the vast majority of Japanese codes and ciphers were broken ... by British and Australian cryptanalysts." Bath, NIPQ, Summer 2001, finds this to be "an interesting book ... [that] has something for everyone with an interest [i]n the subject or the times." After dismissing some of the more outrageous claims for this book, Mercado, I&NS 16.2, finds that "Smith offers in greater detail than ever before the story of British code breakers working against Japan."

Stripp, Alan. "Breaking Japanese Codes." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 4 (Oct. 1987): 135-150.

The author describes his work on Japanese codes at Bletchley Park and in New Delhi. He later worked on Farsi at Abbottabad, and passed briefly through Singapore. At the end of the article, Stripp illustrates "a typical Japanese code system."

Stripp, Alan. Codebreaker in the Far East. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. [pb] 2002.

Alan Stripp died on 18 February 2009 at the age of 84. See Telegraph (London), 20 Mar. 2009.

McGinnis, Cryptolog, Summer 1996, notes that this work includes the author's account of how he was recruited into the Comint business, learned the Japanese language, worked at Bletchley Park, and then worked at various sites in the Far East. "This is not the world's greatest book about Comint. A newcomer might find some of the anecdotal material interesting."

According to Sexton, the author "provides an overview of the ways in which ULTRA contributed to Allied operations in Burma and discusses the intricacies of breaking Japanese codes and ciphers." Kruh, Cryptologia 28.1, calls this "a fascinating first-hand account by a codebreaker and an important contribution to our understanding of British signals intelligence and training."

See also Allen, I&NS 5.3, for a lengthy look at some of the details in Stripp's book, as well as a brief reply from Stripp.

Trenowden, Ian. Operations Most Secret: SOE, The Malayan Theatre. London: Kimber, 1978.

Wilford, Timothy. "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth Intelligence before Pearl Harbor." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 131-164.

"Throughout 1941, British Intelligence pointed to a war with Japan in South-East Asia.... British Intelligence, according to some sources, also suspected that a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, an assessment shared with the United States."

Bath, NIPQ 19.3, notes Wilford's thesis that the Japanese fleet may have used low power, low-frequency ship-to-ship communications that allowed British DF stations to locate the ships advancing on Pearl Harbor. That information may have been passed to the U.S. authorities. The reviewer comments: "Much conjecture, little new, hard evidence."

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