Jackson, Robert. The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars, 1948-1960. London: Routledge, 1991.
Komer, R.W. The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf]
This study "focuses on the structure and control -- and their effect on policy and performance -- of an actual counterinsurgency effort."
Ladwig, Walter C. "Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya." Military Review (May-Jun. 2007): 56-66.
"In the case of Malaya, maximum effectiveness was achieved when a single individual, Sir Gerald Templer, was empowered to coordinate all aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign. This model served the British well, and they replicated it in later counterinsurgency campaigns in Kenya and Cyprus."
Mackay, Donald. The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood. London-Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1997.
Miers, Richard. Shoot to Kill. London: Faber & Faber, 1959.
http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger: "Considered one of the best books written about the Malayan emergency. Story of a Welsh batallion commanded by the author against the Communist insurgency."
Miller, Harry. Jungle War in Malaya: The Campaign against Communism, 1948-1960. London: Littlehampton Book Services Ltd., 1972.
Mitchell, David Fontaine. "During the Communist Insurrection in Malaya, General Sir Harold Briggs Led One of the Greatest Counterinsurgency Successes of the 20th Century." Military Heritage (Apr. 2012): 16-21.
Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs was tasked in early 1950 with coordinating civil, military, and police operations in Malaya. He instituted a resettlement policy targeting "Malaya's missive rural and largely unassimilated Chinese squatter population." He "restructured and expanded the Special Branch, the intelligence arm of the police that was responsible for gathering and interpreting information." He also shifted from "large-scale conventional tactics to small patrols better suited for counterinsurgency operations." When Briggs's extended tour ended after 18 months, Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Ternpler was appointed high commissioner and director of operations. "Although Templer went on to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign that ultimately resulted in the defeat of the guerrilla resistance, the framework of the plan was initially established by Briggs."
Nagl, John A. [LTCOL/USA]
1. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. [pb]
An advertisement for the 2005 paperback edition of this work notes that it includes "a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq."
According to Millen, Parameters 34.3, "this book compares ... the British approach to counterinsurgency in Malaya with the American approach in Vietnam.... Despite minor flaws, John Nagl's book is a valuable asset for identifying key aspects of a successful counterinsurgency strategy." Freedman, FA 83.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2004), says that "the point of Nagl's book is that the British managed to learn from early mistakes and adapt to the situation."
For Hoffman, Proceedings 132.3 (Mar. 2006), this work is "an extremely relevant text. Those interested in understanding the difficulties faced by Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, or who want to grasp the intricacies of the most likely form of conflict for the near future, will gain applicable lessons."
2. "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War." World Affairs 161 (Spring 1999): 193-199.
O'Ballance, Edgar. Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960. London: Faber & Faber, 1966.
Purcell, Victor. Malaya: Communist or Free. London: Gollancz, 1954.
1. "Content, Credibility and Context: Propaganda, Government Surrender Policy and the Malayan Communist Terrorist Mass Surrenders of 1958." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 242-266.
"[T]he potency of government surrender policy in the form of the Merdeka [independence] amnesty was explicable because after 21 December 1957, the three crucial factors of government credibility, the attractive content, and the favourable political and strategic contexts, finally intersected."
2. Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds, 1948-1958. New York: Routledge, 2001. Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2002.
From publisher: "This book ... demonstrat[es] how British propaganda decisively ended the shooting war in December 1958. Essentially, the study breaks new ground by arguing for a concept of 'propaganda' that embraces not merely 'words' in the form of film, radio and leaflets but also 'deeds' such as the behavior of Government representatives and certain official policies. It argues that for propaganda to be effective, the message transmitted by the propagandist's words must be congruent with that suggested by his actual deeds."
Sarkesian, Sam C. Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
McCombie, Parameters, Autumn 1995, sees this as a "scholarly, well-researched work," providing "an excellent analysis of the topic to readers who have some background in Vietnam studies or unconventional warfare." Sarkesian's "conclusions are supported by modern events in Malaysia." Despite the "brevity" of his section on Vietnam, the author "allows the reader to see easily the contrasting styles, successes, and failures of the two wars." In his valuable last chapter, Sarkesian "provides a scholarly analysis of the nature of future wars and the ability of US forces to conduct them efficiently."
Sheenan, Margaret. Our Man in Malaya: John Davis, CBE, DSO, SOE Force 136 and Postwar Counter-insurgency. Charleston, SC: History Press, 2009.
From Publisher: When the Japanese invaded Malaya, "Davis switched from the Federated Malay States Police to the intelligence world, where he planned the infiltration of Chinese intelligence agents and British officers into the Malayan peninsula." He also "became an iconic figure in Malaya's colonial history when during the Communist Emergency he confronted Chin Peng, leader of the Communist Party."
Short, Anthony. The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960. London: Frederick Mueller, 1975. New York: Crane, Rusak, 1975.
Comber, I&NS 18.3, says that Short's work "still remains the standard account of the Malayan Emergency."
Sinclair, Georgina. "'The Sharp End of the Intelligence Machine': The Rise of the Malayan Police Special Branch 1948-1955." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 4 (Aug. 2011): 460-477.
What changed in Malaya "was the realization that Special Branch should be the principal police agency for the gathering and collation of security and political intelligence... [T]he implementation of a rigid structure allowed the flow of intelligence to be shared and coordinated at all levels."
Smith, Simon C. "General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and Minds, Intelligence, and Propaganda." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 60-78.
"Taking together improvements in intelligence and propaganda, his prioritizing of the civilian aspects of counter-insurgency, and the more vigorous prosecution of the war against the communists, it is difficult to see Templer's High Commissionership as anything other than central in turning the tide of the Emergency in Britain's favour."
Stewart, Brian "Winning in Malaya: An Intelligence Success Story." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 267-283.
The author served throughout the Emergency in the Chinese Affairs Department, as a Malayan Civil Service officer. He argues that the successful development of the Malayan government's intelligence community owed much to Gen. Sir Gerald Templer.
1. "Policing During the Malayan Emergency." In Policing and Decolonisation: Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917-1965, eds. David M. Anderson and David Killingray, 105-126. Manchester: Manchester University Press 1992.
2. ed. Malaya: Part II: The Communist Insurrection, 1948-53. London: HMSO, 1995.
Stubbs, Richard. Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Heather, I&NS 6.3, calls this an "admirable book" that focuses on "the social, economic and political aspects of the campaign against the Communist insurgency" in Malaya.
Thompson, Robert [Sir]. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. London: Chatto & Windus, 1966. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1966.
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