Carruthers, Susan. Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960. London: Leicester University Press, 1995.
Clayton, Journal of Conflict Studies 16.1 (Spring 1996), says this "very full scholarly work" is "important and useful " It looks at how British governments presented "four major post-1945 colonial counter insurgency campaigns" to the British public: Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus.
Chin Peng [Ong Boon Hua], as told to Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor. Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History -- Recollections of the Guerrilla Leader Who Waged a 12-Year Anti-Colonial War against British and Commonwealth Forces in the Jungles of Malaya. Singapore: Media Masters Pte Ltd, 2003.
According to Comber, I&NS 19.1, this autobiography by the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Malaya tells "Chin Peng's side of the 12-year communist uprising (1948-60), which he led." See also, Peter Charles Unsinger, "Clandestinity in Malaya," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 751-756.
Cloake, John. Templer, Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer. London: Harrap, 1985.
Clutterbuck, Richard L.
1. The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1966.
What the British did right in Malaya and the Americans did wrong in Vietnam.
2. The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960. London: Cassell, 1967.
3. Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-1983. Rev. ed. Singapore: Graham Brash, 1984.
Hack, I&NS 14.2, p. 147/fn 2, calls Clutterbuck's "one of the best accounts of Emergency intelligence."
Coates, John. Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992.
Surveillant 3.2/3: Coates "reassesses the view of the British suppression of communist insurgency in Malaya contrasted with the performance of the U.S. in Vietnam many years later."
1. "The Malayan Security Service (1945-1948)." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 128-153.
"The Malayan Security Service (MSS) was the main intelligence agency of the British when they returned to Singapore in September 1945.... It was responsible for obtaining and collating information on subversive organisations and personalities in Singapore/Malaya. As there was some dissatisfaction over its alleged failure to forewarn the British colonial authorities of the impending uprising of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), it was disbanded in August 1948..., and its functions were taken over by the Singapore and Malayan Police Special Branches."
2. "The Malayan Special Branch on the Malayan-Thai Frontier during the Malayan Emergency (1948-60)." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 77-99.
From abstract: "This paper examines the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Malayan Special Branch in southern Thailand as part of the Emergency, and the establishment of a Special Branch Border Section in Penang and a joint regional Malayan-Thai Special Branch office in Songkhla, southern Thailand, to coordiante intelligence operations against the communist insurgents."
Cross, John P. "A Face Like a Chicken's Backside": An Unconventional Soldier In South East Asia, 1948-1971. London: Green hill, 1996.
According to Short, I&NS 13.2, the main part of this book is the hunt for Ah Soo Chye, the Chinese guerrilla leader living in the deep jungles of northern Malaya. Readers also get "a rare view of the underside" of the Malaysia-Indonesia "Confrontation" from Cross' experiences as commander of the Border Scouts in Sabah and Sarawak.
1. "British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation: The Example of Malaya." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 124-155.
The author argues that if the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) is used as the example, then, explanations of British success in counter-insurgency should place "more emphasis ... on government use of 'population control'" and "less on winning 'hearts and minds' or concentrating power on one leader."
2. "Corpses, Prisoners of War and Documents: British and Communist Narratives of the Malayan Emergency, and the Dynamics of Intelligence Transformation." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 211-241.
"British accounts of the Malayan Emergency argue intelligence underwent a major transformation in 1952-54, as part of a campaign-winning infusion of new leadership. This article uses the recent statements of Chin Peng, Secretary-General of the Malaysian Communist Party from 1947, to construct a contrasting Communist analysis ... which sees the insurgent campaign as flagging by 1951.... It then tries to reconcile these contradictory ... narratives."
3. Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britian, Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1968. London: Curzon, 2001.
4. "'Iron Claws on Malaya': The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30, no.1 (1999), 99-125.
5. "Screwing Down the People: The Malayan Emergency, Decolonisation and Ethnicity." In Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian Nationalism, eds. Hans Antlov and Stein Tonnesson, 83-109. London: Curzon, 1995.
Hatton, Tim. Tick Tock Birds: A Spider in the Web of International Terrorism. Sussex: Book Guild, 2004.
According to Comber, I&NS 19.4 (Winter 2004), the author served in many senior positions in the Malayan Special Branch of the former British colonial police service. His book is "a treasure trove of primary source material." Hatton "provides much valuable information and insights on how a successful intelligence operation was carried out" during the Malayan Emergency.
Hembry, Boris. Malayan Spymaster: Memoirs of a Rubber Planter, Bandit Fighter and Spy. Singapore: Monsoon Books, 2011.
According to Peake, Studies 56.3 (Sep. 2012), this is the memoir of a person who fought with a stay-behind unit after the Japanese invaded Malaya, joined the British V-Force in India, and then joined MI6 through the end of the war. He again served British and local governments during the Malayan insurgency. "The counterinsurgency methods Hembry describes are instructive.... Malayan Spymaster reveals a different kind of intelligence experience in a little-known part of the Pacific war." King, NIPQ 29.1 (Jan. 2013), sees this as "a real-life spy thriller, simply and elegantly told with a large helping of information and detail gleaned from his experiences."
Hoe, Alan, and Eric Morris. Re-Enter the SAS: The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency. London: Leo Cooper, 1994.
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