Anderson, David. Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005.
Bennett, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), sees this work as "the most complete narrative history yet published on the Mau Mau uprising and the government response." The author "pays substantial attention to the counterinsurgency campaign, including intelligence gathering and analysis operations."
Bennett, Huw. Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Stephenson, Military Review (Jan.-Feb. 2015), "uses newly released government documents to challenge the received view about the Kenya Emergency. Examining the British colonial experience, he finds that ... the British Army's 'thin red line' could rarely afford a 'hearts and mind' approach to counterinsurgency." This work is "hardly a smooth read. The author chooses a thematic chapter structure rather than a chronological account, and that, along with his close adherence to the documentary record, sometimes makes for a choppy narrative."
Bulloch, Gavin [Brigadier/British Army (Ret.)]. "Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective." Parameters 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 4-16.
"There is a clear relationship between force applied in war and force applied during a counterinsurgency campaign. The doctrine of maneuver warfare also applies equally to both types of warfare. In both situations force has to be applied selectively and in a controlled and measured fashion. Physical destruction is a means and not an end in a counterinsurgency campaign; the doctrine seeks to contribute to creating the conditions for political success with less force, more quickly, and with reduced costs. The theory of maneuver warfare shares a common ancestry with some of the most successful insurgent strategies. The military planner who is fully educated into this doctrine is more likely to cope with the real and inherent complexities of a counterinsurgency campaign than those who remain unaware of the doctrine."
Carruthers, Susan. Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960. London: Leicester University Press, 1995.
Clayton, Journal of Conflict Studies 16.1 (Spring 1996), says this "very full scholarly work" is "important and useful " It looks at how British governments presented "four major post-1945 colonial counter insurgency campaigns" to the British public: Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus.
Cassidy, Robert M. "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture." Military Review 85 (May-Jun. 2005): 53-59.
Cormac, Rory. Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Shaffer, Studies 58.3 (Se. 2014), finds that this work "provides important insight into the Joint Intelligence Committee's (JIC) activities of assessing intelligence, making recommendations, and reforming local intelligence operations to meet shifting Cold War and postcolonial demands." The author presents four cases studies: the Malayan Emergency (1948-1951), Cyprus (1955-1959), Aden 1962-1967), and the Dhofar rebellion in Oman (1968-1975).
Cross, John P.
1. "A Face Like a Chicken's Backside": An Unconventional Soldier In South East Asia, 1948-1971. London: Greenhill, 1996.
To Short, I&NS 13.2, the main part of this book is the hunt for Ah Soo Chye, the Chinese guerrilla leader living in the deep jungles of northern Malaya. Readers also get "a rare view of the underside" of the Malaysia-Indonesia "Confrontation" from Cross' experiences as commander of the Border Scouts in Sabah and Sarawak.
2. First In, Last Out: An Unconventional British Officer in Indo-China. London: Brassey's, 1992.
Tonnesson, I&NS 10.3, notes that Cross served with the Gurkhas who suppressed the revolution in southern Vietnam in 1945. In 1972-1976, he was the British defense attaché in Vientiene. The first part of the book "adds nothing to our understanding of what happened in Indochina in 1945-46." The second part provides an "at times fascinating ... account of the atmosphere within the ... international community of Vientiene.... Cross has some arresting episodes ... to recount, but they are drowned in the author's unrelenting attempts to satisfy his own vanity.... The normal reader is likely to be ... disgusted by the author's frenetic self-praise." It is likely that, when they become available, Cross' reports from Vientiene "will be valuable sources.... But if you do not have to read the book, don't."
Crozier, Brian. The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections. London: Chatto & Windus, 1960.
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 375-394.
"The British services had very good intelligence on the EOKA organization, methods, tactics, and operations.... Tactical intelligence on the whereabouts of the guerrilla leaders was, however, hard to come by.... [T]he guerrillas were able to maintain the military and political initiative."
1. "British Intelligence and Propaganda during the 'Confrontation,' 1963-66." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 83-102.
"The 1963-66 'Confrontation', or undeclared war between Britain, Malaysia and Indonesia, provides a good example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign. Indonesia's attempt to break up the Malaysian federation by sponsoring a guerrilla movement in Borneo was decisively defeated.....
"Ultimately Britiain's victory in the Confrontation was due to the ability of Commonwealth soldiers ... to contain and drive back the Indonesian guerrillas, and the political instability ... which brought down Sukarno. But good intelligence enabled Britain to deploy its limited military resources for the greatest effect. And when a political opening appeared in Indonesia in October 1965, Britain used propaganda against the supporters of Confrontation."
2. "British and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movements in Indonesia during the 'Confrontation,' 1963-66." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 195-208.
Aid to the dissidents, especially rebel groups in the outer islands, was "one of the very few tools that Britain could use against [Djakarta's] Confrontation campaign.... [Nevertheless,] Britain's aims in supporting the rebels were cautious and limited."
Heather, Randall W. "Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 5-83.
The author concludes that "[t]he neglect of Special Branch (and the regular police) before October 1952 contributed directly to the unnecessary delay in bringing about an end to the Mau Mau insurgency, a delay which was a high price to pay for the unpreparedness and complacency of the pre-Emergency period."
Jeffery, Keith. "Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British Experience." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 1 (Jan. 1987): 118-149.
The author identifies two main characteristics of British counterinsurgency operations: they "are for the most part conducted within a climate of legality, and they generally comprise a mixture of police and military action." The emphasis on legality means that "intelligence agencies ... work within a relatively restricted environment." In addition, the information needed by the police "is often of a different quality from that which military intelligence officers require for purely operational purposes. This may create strains within the security effort."
1. "The British Army and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Transition, 1944-1952." Small Wars and Insurgencies 7, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 265-308.
2. Postwar Counterinsurgency and SAS, 1945-1952: A Special Type of Warfare. London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001.
3. SAS: The First Secret Wars: The Unknown Years of Combat and Counter-Insurgency. London: Tauris, 2005.
4. SAS Zero Hour: The Secret Origins of the Special Air Service. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006.
From publisher: The author "draws extensively on primary sources and a close examination of recent regiment histories. While not dismissing Stirling's considerable contributions, Jones takes into account the influence of such notables as Dudley Clarke and Archibald Wavell on the formation of the regiment."
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