Anderson, David. Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005. Anderson, David. Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005.
Bennett, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), sees this work as "the most complete narrative history yet published on the Mau Mau uprising and the government response." The author "pays substantial attention to the counterinsurgency campaign, including intelligence gathering and analysis operations."
Carruthers, Susan.
Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960. London: Leicester University Press, 1995.
Cross,
John P. "A Face Like a Chicken's Backside": An Unconventional Soldier In South East Asia, 1948-1971. London: Greenhill, 1996.
To Short, I&NS 13.2, the main part of this book is the hunt for Ah Soo Chye, the Chinese guerrilla leader living in the deep jungles of northern Malaya. Readers also get "a rare view of the underside" of the Malaysia-Indonesia "Confrontation" from Cross' experiences as commander of the Border Scouts in Sabah and Sarawak.
Cross, John P. First In, Last Out: An Unconventional British Officer in Indo-China. London: Brassey's, 1992.
Tonnesson, I&NS 10.3, notes that Cross served with the Gurkhas who suppressed the revolution in southern Vietnam in 1945. From 1972-1976, he was the British defense attaché in Vientiene. The first part of the book "adds nothing to our understanding of what happened in Indochina in 1945-46." The second part provides an "at times fascinating ... account of the atmosphere within the ... international community of Vientiene.... Cross has some arresting episodes ... to recount, but they are drowned in the author's unrelenting attempts to satisfy his own vanity.... The normal reader is likely to be ... disgusted by the author's frenetic self-praise." It is likely that, when they become available, Cross' reports from Vientiene "will be valuable sources.... But if you do not have to read the book, don't."
Crozier,
Brian. The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections. London: Chatto & Windus, 1960.
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 375-394.
"The British services had very good intelligence on the EOKA organization, methods, tactics, and operations.... Tactical intelligence on the whereabouts of the guerrilla leaders was, however, hard to come by.... [T]he guerrillas were able to maintain the military and political initiative."
Easter, David. "British Intelligence and Propaganda during the 'Confrontation,' 1963-66." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 83-102.
"The 1963-66 'Confrontation', or undeclared war between Britain, Malaysia and Indonesia, provides a good example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign. Indonesia's attempt to break up the Malaysian federation by sponsoring a guerrilla movement in Borneo was decisively defeated.....
"Ultimately Britiain's victory in the Confrontation was due to the ability of Commonwealth soldiers ... to contain and drive back the Indonesian guerrillas, and the political instability ... which brought down Sukarno. But good intelligence enabled Britain to deploy its limited military resources for the greatest effect. And when a political opening appeared in Indonesia in October 1965, Britain used propaganda against the supporters of Confrontation."
Easter, David. "British
and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movements in Indonesia during the
'Confrontation,' 1963-66." Intelligence and National Security
14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 195-208.
Aid to the dissidents, especially rebel groups in the outer islands, was "one of the very few tools that Britain could use against [Djakarta's] Confrontation campaign.... [Nevertheless,] Britain's aims in supporting the rebels were cautious and limited."
Heather,
Randall W. "Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56."
Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 5-83.
The author's findings support his conclusion that "[t]he neglect of Special Branch (and the regular police) before October 1952 contributed directly to the unnecessary delay in bringing about an end to the Mau Mau insurgency, a delay which was a high price to pay for the unpreparedness and complacency of the pre-Emergency period."
Jeffery, Keith. "Intelligence
and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British Experience."
Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 1 (Jan. 1987): 118-149.
The author identifies two main characteristics of British counterinsurgency operations: they "are for the most part conducted within a climate of legality,[] and they generally comprise a mixture of police and military action." The emphasis on legality means that "intelligence agencies ... work within a relatively restricted environment." In addition, the information needed by the police "is often of a different quality from that which military intelligence officers require for purely operational purposes. This may create strains within the security effort."
Jones, Tim.
1. "The British Army and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Transition, 1944-1952." Small Wars and Insurgencies 7, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 265-308.
2. Postwar Counterinsurgency and SAS, 1945-1952: A Special Type of Warfare. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
Return to UK Post-WWII Table of
Contents