Kelly, Saul. Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the United States and the Italian Colonies, 1945-52. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
Kemp, Anthony. The Secret Hunters. London: O'Mara, 1986.
Capet: "Post-war investigations about missing SOE and SAS wartime agents."
Lampe, David. The Last Ditch: Britain's Resistance Plans Against the Nazis. New York: Putnam, 1968. Rev. ed. Barnsley, UK: Greenhill, 2007. New York: Skyhorse, 2013. [pb]
From publisher: This work "investigates the German plans [for the occupation of Britain] and the countermeasures undertaken through the specially formed British Resistance Organization.... Although they never went into action, the Resistance was ready and waiting: the last ditch of Britain's defense."
Lawless, Jill. "UK Spy Files Reveal Details of 1950s Guyana Coup." Associated Press, 25 Aug. 2011. [http://www.ap.org]
"Secret documents declassified [on 25 August 2011] by Britain's MI5 security service reveal in dramatic and everyday detail how the U.K. under Prime Minister Winston Churchill overthrew the elected government of British Guiana -- now Guyana -- because he feared its left-wing leader and his American wife [Cheddi and Janet Jagan] were leading the British colony into the arms of the Soviet Union." In October 1953, Britain mounted "a military operation code-named Operation Windsor. Churchill dispatched a warship, HMS Superb, and brought hundreds of troops by air and sea to secure key sites."
Lee, J.M. "British Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War, 1945-61." Diplomacy and Statecraft 9, no. 1 (Mar. 1998): 112-134.
Leigh, Ian, and Laurence Lustgarten. "The Security Service Act 1989." Modern Law Review 52 (Nov. 1989): 801-836.
Lewis, Jeremy R.T. "Freedom of Information: Developments in the United Kingdom." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 465-473.
See Pforzheimer, IJI&C 4.2:263-267, for refutation of Lewis' comments re Coventry raid; and West, same, p. 267.
Lucas, Scott, and Alistair Morey. "The Hidden 'Alliance': The CIA and MI6 Before and After Suez." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 95-120.
From Abstract: "[T]he CIA maintained co-operation with [MI6] during and after Suez... [T]his 'special relationship' ... was based not on emotional or cultural ties but on the CIA's pragmatic if wayward assessment that MI6 was vital to the achievement of US objectives in the Middle East."
Lucas, W. Scott, and C.J. Morris. "A Very British Crusade: The IRD and the Beginning of the Cold War." In British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51, ed. R.J. Aldrich, 85-111. London: Routledge, 1992.
Macklin, Graham. "The British Far Right's South African Connection: A.K. Chesterton, Hendrik van den Bergh, and the South African Intelligence Services." Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 6 (Dec. 2011): 823-842.
Working from correspondence between Chesterton and the head of of South Africa's BOSS, the author "examines and evaluates ... the covert operations of the South African security services against 'subversives' in Britain during the 1950s and 1960s."
1. "British Intelligence through the Eyes of the Stasi: What the Stasi's Records Show about the Operations of British Intelligence in Cold War Germany." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 1 (Feb. 2012): 46-74.
"SIS was a successful gatherer of intelligence in the GDR in the late 1940s and for most of the 1950s. Its success greatly declined in the late 1950s and was ended completely by Blake's treason."
2. "Einfallstor in die Sowjetunion: Die Besatzung Deutschlands und die Ausspahung der UdSSR durch den britischen Nachrichtendienst" [The Occupation of Germany and the Penetration of the USSR by the British Intelligence Service]. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 51, no. 2 (2003): 183-228.
3. Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
According to Peake, Studies 51.3 (2007), this work "focuses on the scientific intelligence obtained" from interrogations of refugees, defectors, and former POWs, as well as from "traditional agents, special technical collection teams, mail interception units, and telecommunications monitoring," and "the beneficial results for Western military capabilities." The author leaves "the impression that the tremendous human intelligence effort he describes was less productive than he implied" earlier.
Fischer, IJI&C 21.3 (Fall 2008), comments that the author's "original contribution ... is to put intelligence at the center of the story" of the use of German scientists after World War II. In the process, Maddrell "depicts intelligence operations from the ground up.... Spying on Science is an important contribution to Cold War and intelligence history."
4. "The Western Secret Services, the East German Ministry of State Security and the Building of the Berlin Wall." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 829-847.
Although "the Communists' principal motive for closing the sectoral border in Berlin was to stop the flight of refugees..., the border closure was also motivated by security considerations.... [T]he Western secret services did not fail to see what might happen" and, in fact, "made extensive preparations to ensure that their operations could continue in the harder conditions which would ensue."
Marsden, Roy. "Operation 'Schooner/Nylon': BRIXMIS RAF Flying in the Berlin Control Zone." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 178-193.
This article tells the story of a British intelligence collection operation run by the British Commanders'-in-Chief Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany (BRIXMIS) from 1946 to 1990.
Mawby, Spencer. "The Clandestine Defence of Empire: British Special Operations in Yemen, 1951-64." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 105-130.
The author seeks "to illustrate the willingness" of the administrations of Eden, Macmillan, and Douglas-Home "to authorize special operations in order to protect Britain's remaining overseas interests. Small-scale clandestine operations were a useful weapon given the continuing problems of international disapproval and imperial overstretch." For example, the policy of secretly sponsoring frontier raids in Yemen "combined practicality and deniability."
1. The Enemy Within: MI5, Maxwell and the Scargill Affair. London & New York: Verso, 1994. The Enemy Within: The Secret War against the Miners. London: Pan Books, 1995. [pb]
Surveillant 4.3 notes Milne's suggestion "that the British intelligence services went to astonishing lengths conducting counter-subversion operations (mainly dirty tricks) to stop the National Union of Miners.... And at the head of these operations was Stella Rimington." For Thurlow, I&NS 10.4, this book is a "bitter account of problems faced by Arthur Scargill, since the end of the miners strike of 1984- 85.... [T]he accusations of MI5 manipulation and 'dirty tricks' during the miners' strike are part of a seedy tradition; the evidence produced however is not strong enough, at present, to convince that this episode should be added to that list."
2. "MI5's Secret War." New Statesman, 25 Nov. 1994, 18-21.
Mobley, Richard A. [CDR/USN (Ret.)]
1. "Deterring Iraq: The UK Experience." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 55-82.
"After deploying forces to Kuwait ... in July 1961, the United Kingdom faced the daunting challenge of deterring an Iraqi invasion ... for nearly a decade.... [A] review of the interplay among intelligence, contingency planning and force posture provides a useful case study of deterrence under conditions affording little or no warning."
2. "Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s." Studies in Intelligence 11 (Fall-Winter 2001): 19-31.
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) "assessments in the 1960s appear to have enjoyed high credibility within the British military establishment. The warning timelines they provided were central to UK military planning to defend Kuwait for over a decade."
Moran, Christopher R. "Intelligence and the Media: The Press, Government Secrecy and the 'Buster' Crabb Affair." Intelligence and National Security 265, no. 5 (Oct. 2011): 676-700.
The author argues that media "attitudes were changing by the mid-1950s. On the eve of Crabb's disappearance [in 1956], the media had already started to exhibit a growing curiosity about secret service matters, questioning whether the plea of secrecy was in fact a cloak to cover incompetence."
Mowbray, Stephen de. "Soviet Deception and the Onset of the Cold War: The British Documents for 1943 -- A Lesson in Manipulation." Encounter 62 (Jul.-Aug. 1984): 16-24.
Rocca and Dziak: "Discusses Soviet strategic political deception in the period 1943-1945 and the concomitant roles of Communists, near Communists and Soviet agents in influencing official British thinking and therefore policy towards the USSR."
Murphy, Philip. "Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from Central Africa, 1945-65." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 131-162.
The author discusses efforts "by the British intelligence community to improve the security arrangements" of Commonwealth members following World War II. The process was "a means of countering Communist subversion[,]... protecting Britain's key relationship with the United States,... [and] entrenching British influence, particularly in countries nearing independence.... The result of this process was a complex network of intelligence contacts reaching across the Commonwealth."
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