UNITED KINGDOM

Post-World War II

Generally

H - J

Hale, Don. The Final Dive: The Life and Death of "Buster" Crabb. Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton, 2007.

Peake, Studies 52.4 (Dec. 2008) and Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), notes that the author "does not provide any source notes," and "adds clumsy errors that detract from his analysis." Nevertheless, this is "a comprehensive picture of what is known and alleged. But it is not easy to tell the difference." For Goodman, I&NS 24.4 (Aug. 2009), the author's "uncritical use of oral history" introduces "several spurious claims.... The frequent errors not only undermine several of Hale's claims, but they also show a general lack of understanding of the Whitehall machinery at this time."

See also, Marshall Pugh, Frogman (1956); J. Bernard Hutton, Frogman Spy (1960); Michael G. and Jacqui Welham, Frogman Spy (1990); and Nicholas Elliott, With My Little Eye (1993), pp. 23-27 [cited in Peake, Studies 52.4 (Dec. 2008)].

Hardy, James. "MI6 Helped Spy to Flee Soviet Union." Telegraph (London), 8 Jun. 1997. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

An agent with the codename of "Gideon," "turned" by the Canadians in the 1950s and believed to have been executed by the KGB, was exfiltrated from the Soviet Union in the late-1980s on orders of Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. "British intelligence is understood to have played a largely supervisory role in the operation, which was run by a Canadian."

Harrison, Edward D.R. "J.C. Masterman and the Security Service, 1940-72." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 6 (Dec. 2009): 769-804.

"As the public image of the British secret services deteriorated during the 1960s, Masterman believed that MI5 did not grasp how his book could promote its interests, and so he insisted on forcing through publication anyway. The correspondence from serving and former MI5 officers in Masterman's papers vividly illustrate changing attitudes to official secrecy and the declining ability of the British Government to enforce it."

Hennessy, Peter.

1. The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War. London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2002.

According to Peake, Studies 48.1, the author reviews the mechanism and functions of the Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) "during various periods of the Cold War in considerable detail based on newly declassified cabinet documents." Addison, History Today 52.7, comments that "[n]o one writes with greater authority on Whitehall than Hennessy, and he tells the story with a sparkling combination of wit and infectious enthusiasm."

2. and Gail Brownfeld. "Britain's Cold War Security Purge: The Origins of Positive Vetting." Historical Journal 25 (1982): 965-974.

Hershberg, James G. "Their Man in Havana: Anglo-American Intelligence Exchanges and the Cuban Crises, 1961-62." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 121-176.

From Abstract: "When the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961, American officials turned to London, which maintained its embassy in Havana, to provide political, economic, and military intelligence on ... Cuba. Over the next two years,... the British government used this channel not only to provide information to its superpower ally, but also to try to 'moderate' Washington's anti-Castro policies ... and to deflect pressures to join its campaign of economic pressures against the island."

Hess, Sigurd. "The British Baltic Fishery Protection Service (BBFPS) and the Clandestine Operations of Hans Helmut Klose 1949-1956." Journal of Intelligence History 1, no. 2 (Winter 2001). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

BBFPS "was set up as a cover for operation 'Jungle.'" From 1949, MI 6 used a Kriegsmarine Fast Patrol Boat "under the command of the German naval officer Hans-Helmut Klose to transport agents" to landing sites in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland. "[A] permanent organisation ... was set up 1951 in Hamburg-Finkenwerder and later in Kiel." In 1952, a second Fast Patrol Boat was added and the mission "enlarged to include signal intelligence (SIGINT) equipment.... From 1951 onwards, MI 6 suspected that Soviet counter-intelligence might have infiltrated the spy networks in the forests of Courland. Actually,... [a]ll of the more than 42 agents which MI 6 had sent ... were caught, sentenced, or turned around as moles or counteragents. The Klose operations were successful as far as SIGINT and the naval aspects of his raids are concerned.... The MI 6 operations in the forests of Courland, however, were a complete failure.... In the end,... many human lives were sacrificed for a trickle of information, which after close analysis proved to be without much value."

Heuser, Beatrice. "Covert Action within British and American Concepts of Containment, 1948-51." In British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51, ed. Richard J. Aldrich, 65-84. London: Routledge, 1992.

Hirsch, Fred, and Richard Fletcher. The CIA and the Labour Movement. Nottingham, UK: Spokesman Books, 1977.

Hoffer, Peter. "MI6 'Plan for Austria Guerrilla Campaign.'" Telegraph (London), 15 Apr. 1996. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

During the Cuban missile crisis, MI6 was prepared to parachute specialists into Austria to lead resistance to a Soviet invasion of the country. "[A]n alleged former British MI6 agent, Simon Preston, in an interview with the Vienna daily newspaper, Die Presse," has supplied details of the British plan. Against the eventuality of a Soviet invasion, "the British had set up 33 concealed arms and food depots in their former occupation zone which they left in 1955."

Hopkins, Michael F. "Review Article: A British Cold War?" Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 4 (Oct. 1992): 479-482.

Hutton, J. Bernard [Pseud., Joseph Heisler]. Frogman Spy: The Incredible Case of Commander Crabbe. New York: McDowell Obolensky, 1960. London: Spearman, Neville, 1960.

A reviewer for Studies 5.3 (Summer 1961) suggests that this work "may be merely a pecuniary speculation by an exile fabrication mill, or [it] may be something more sophisticated, a product of Moscow's cold warriors; a case can be made for either view."

See also, Don Hale, The Final Dive (2007); Marshall Pugh, Frogman (1956); Michael G. and Jacqui Welham, Frogman Spy (1990); and Nicholas Elliott, With My Little Eye (1993), pp. 23-27 [cited in Peake, Studies 52.4 (Dec. 2008)].

Jackson, Peter. "The Politics of Secret Service in War, Cold War and Imperial Retreat." Contemporary British History 14, no. 4 (2003): 423-431.

Jones, Clive.

1. Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2004.

Mawby, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), finds that this work "contains much new and significant material about the Yemen Civil War." However, it also has "glaring deficiencies both in its major thesis and on points of detail." The reviewer notes, for example, that the Maria Theresa thaler/dollar "is rendered throughout as the Mother Theresa Dollar." This book must be read "with considerable care." Jones, I&NS 21.2 (Apr. 2006), 316-317, takes grave exception with the tone and conclusions of Mawby's review.

2. "'Where the State Feared to Tread': Britain, Britons, Covert Action and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-64." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 717-737.

Official British covert actions associated with the Yemen civil war were restricted to defensive activities along the border. Unofficially, a group of Conservation MPs worked with key Middle Eastern leaders in supporting a private mercenary organization.

Journal: Royal Air Force Historical Society. "The Proceedings of the RAFHS Seminar on Cold War Intelligence Gathering." 23 (2001): 7-102.

1. Nigel Baldwin [Air Vice-Marshal], "Welcome Address by the Society's Chairman," 7.

2.Michael Armitage [Air Chief Marshal Sir], "Introduction by Seminar Chairman," 8-9.

2. Richard Bates [Group Captain], "BRIXMIS -- History and Roles," 10-19.

3. Hans Neubroch [Group Captain], "RAF Element, BRIXMIS, 1956-59: Organisation and Operations," 20-27.

4. S. A. Wrigley [Group Captain], "BRIXMIS -- Operational Planning and Touring in the 1970s and 1980s," 28-38.

5. John N. L. Morrison, " BRIXMIS -- The View from Whitehall," 39-49.

6. "Morning Discussion Period," 50-58.

7. David Paton [Wing Commander], assisted by Derek Oliver [Master Aircrew], "Airborne Electronic Reconnaissance, 1948 to 1989," 59-68.

8. Philip Rodgers [Group Captain], "Photographic Reconnaissance Operations," 69-77.

9. Geoffrey Oxlee [Group Captain] and David Oxlee [Wing Commander], "Airborne Sensors and Technological Developments in Imagery Analysis," 78-92.

10. "Afternoon Discussion Period," 93-100.

11. Chairman's Closing Remarks," 101-102.

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