Cathcart, Brian. Test of Greatness: Britain's Struggle for the Atomic Bomb. London: John Murray, 1994.
According to Twigge, I&NS 11.1, the author focuses on the development and testing of Britain's first nuclear weapon, and "atomic intelligence is given only cursory attention." Nevertheless, the "background of the Fuchs case and its repercussions within Britain [and the nuclear weapons program] are explored in some detail."
Charters, David A. "British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1945-47." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 115- 140.
"[I]ntelligence failure was a direct cause of the British defeat" in the Palestine campaign. "The source of the failure lay principally in the complex of problems which beset the Political Branch of the Palestine Police CID... For reasons of size, tasking, professional and institutional orientation, the other intelligence organizations -- GSI [army intelligence] and the Defence Security Office -- were unable to fill the intelligence gap left by the police."
Cockerill, A.W. Sir Percy Sillitoe. London: W.H. Allen, 1975.
Constantinides comments that Sillitoe headed MI5 from 1946 to 1950 [1953?], but this biography includes "very little" on this part of Sillitoe's career. The one chapter on MI5 "is composed of generalities." The author "observes that while other writers have ... dismissed Sir Percy's work in MI5 as insignificant, he does not accept this judgment; but he does not succeed in producing evidence to refute it."
Cole, Benjamin. "British Technical Intelligence and the Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Threat, 1952-60." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 70-93.
"British technical intelligence of Soviet IRBM capabilities was ... inadequate for the purposes of strategic planning.... Consequently, strategic planning was based upon assumptions of Soviet capabilities rather than hard intelligence."
Cormac, Rory. "Organizing Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security." Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 6 (Dec. 2010): 800-822.
From "Abstract": "This article introduces, places in historical context and publishes selected extracts from chapter one of the Report on Colonial Security,... [w]ritten by General Sir Gerald Templer in 1955."
Cradock, Percy [Sir]. Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World. London: John Murray, 2002.
Addison, History Today, 52.7, finds that the author, a former JIC chairman, "has written a sober and persuasive analysis" of the JIC's "less than infallible performance during a number of post-war crises.... But the Cold War is the main theme and, as he demonstrates, the JIC's advice was consistently sane and a calming influence during periods of tension."
For Unsinger, NIPQ 19.1/2, this "[i]nteresting and enlightening" book is "thoroughly researched and well-written." Similarly, Cohen, FA 81.3 (May-Jun. 2002), declares Know Your Enemy "interesting and thoughtful.... The author's discussion of the relationship between intelligence estimates and policymaking is particularly well done." To Morrison, I&NS 17.4, Cradock had "one of the finest analytical minds ever applied in the UK to the problems of intelligence." The chapter in this book on "Intelligence and Policy" is "essential reading for any student or practitioner of intelligence, and especially for those who have unrealistic ideas of what intelligence can achieve."
West, IJI&C 16.1, notes that "Cradock's treatment of the JIC's declassified files is excellent and largely fair," but "he strays when reaching beyond the Cabinet Office to areas where his personal experience is limited.... The tone is mildly critical of politicians, perhaps even slightly anti-American, and emphatically self-congratulatory about the JIC structure."
Croft, Stuart. British Security Policy: The Thatcher Years and the End of the Cold War. London: Routledge, 1991.
From publisher: "An examination of British foreign and defence policy during the 1980s, exploring the Anglo-American security relationship and analyzing challenges to the nuclear orthodoxy. Central government policies towards Northern Ireland and the various perceptions of the threat of the Soviet Union are discussed. The costs of defence from a monetary and an intellectual point of view are assessed. The text concludes with a chapter which stocktakes the situation after the end of the Cold War."
David, James. "Bourbon Operations in China Following World War II." Cryptologia 31, no. 3 (Jul. 2007): 254-262.
"The small and short-lived [U.S. Navy] Tsingtao intercept site provides an important glimpse into the joint U.S.-British post-World War II Comint effort against the USSR codenamed BOURBON."
Davies, Philip H.J.
1. "The SIS Singapore Station and the Role of the Far East Controller: Secret Intelligence Structure and Process in Post-War Colonial Administration." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 105-129.
The author uses his analysis of the role of the FEC to support his argument that the relationship between the SIS and the British government is characterized by a "pull" (demand-driven) architecture for the SIS. This arises out of the "fundamental decentralisation of intelligence in the British state." (Emphasis in original)
2. "From Special Operations to Special Political Action: The 'Rump SOE' and SIS Post-War Covert Action Capability, 1945-1977." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 55-76.
"Beyond simply an influx of experienced staff, the legacy of SOE [in SIS after 1946] took two main forms: the establishment of the Directorate of War Planning on the one hand, and of the Directorate of Training and Development on the other."
Davies, Pete. "Estimating Soviet Power: The Creation of Britain's Defence Intelligence Staff 1960-65." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 6 (Dec. 2011): 818-841.
"[A]n integrated defence intelligence structure ... could not have been achieved in advance of the unified MoD with overarching strategic and financial authority over the three single-Service Departments (and which itself required the intervention of the prime minister)."
Deacon, Richard [Donald McCormick]. "C": A Biography of Sir Maurice Oldfield. London: MacDonald, 1985.
Clark comment: Sir Maurice Oldfield was Director, MI6/SIS, 1973-1978.
Denniston, Robin. "Three Kinds of Hero: Publishing the Memoirs of Secret Intelligence People." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 112-125.
The author traces the paths to publication of books by three former intelligence officers: Welchman's The Hut Six Story, Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret, and Philby's My Silent War.
1. "Covert Propaganda and the Cold War: Britain and Australia, 1948-1955." The Round Table 361 (2001): 607-621.
2. "Menzies, Macmillan and the 'Woomera Spy Case' of 1958." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 23-38.
"The Woomera episode ... highlighted the readiness of Australia and Britain to collude so that American nerves, if aroused, could be calmed."
Dover, Robert, and Michael S. Goodman, eds. Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011.
McGonagle, Intelligencer 19.1 (Winter-Spring 2012), finds that the editors "take a particular event in British post World War II history" and approach it by providing an actual document and having an author discuss the implications of that document. This is "an interesting read for individuals not familiar with British intelligence" in this period. For Peake, Studies 56.3 (Sep. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.3 (Winter-Spring 2013), "[t]his is a thoughtful, informative book that applies to the profession generally."
Dylan, Huw. "The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 1 (Feb. 2012): 27-45.
The JIB was folded into the Defence Intelligence Staff in 1964. Prior to that, its creation had been "an important step [in] the development of British intelligence, it was at the centre of a ... productive international network, and it produced analyses that directly influenced policy."
Easter, David. "GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 5 (Oct. 2008): 681-706.
"For GCHQ as an organization[,] the 1960s were a difficult decade. Decolonization, military withdrawal from East of Suez and financial crises all adversely affected its operations....Yet although GCHQ was weakened[,] it remained a powerful Sigint organization.... [It] continued to produce valuable intelligence for British policymakers in the 1960s."
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