Cowley, Chris. Guns, Lies and Spies: How We Armed Iraq. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992.
Miller, I&NS 9.3: Cowley was "project manager for the 'Supergun.'" He displays a "tendency ... to leap readily to conclusions where the evidence is, to say the least, sparse."
Henderson, Paul. Unlikely Spy: An Autobiography. London: Bloomsbury, 1993.
Surveillant 3.4/5 says this is an "explosive document filled with revelations about the secret and often back-biting workings of British intelligence services and the UK government." The author is the former managing director of Matrix Churchill (machine tool manufacturer). For West, WIR 14.1, Henderson's story is "a grotesque catalogue of betrayal and a caution to those who are attracted to espionage.... Henderson is bitter, but he is likely to be vindicated when Lord Justice Scott releases his report in October 1995."
According to Miller, I&NS 9.3, this "is an accurate account" and "a remarkably restrained and dignified one." Rathmell, I&NS 9.3, notes that Henderson was "prosecuted in 1992 ... for breaking export regulations.... The trial collapsed after the defense was able to show that the trade had been authorized by the British government." Henderson is "an angry man" who "feels betrayed." He "provides useful insights into British industrial espionage practices, the relations between Western firms and Saddam's Iraq, and Iraq's efforts to develop a military-industrial base.... [The] writing style is often laborious."
Leigh, David. Betrayed: The Real Story of the Matrix Churchill Trial. London: Bloomsbury, 1993.
Miller, I&NS 9.3: "There are ... factual errors, albeit minor ones.... [Leigh] focuses on political duplicity.... What Leigh does do well is to give an account of a trial conducted for the benefit of public opinion post-Gulf War."
1. "Democracy, Dictators and the Regulation of Arms Exports: the UK and Iraq." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 3 (Jul. 1994), 536-543.
Miller reviews four books -- Chris Cowley, Paul Henderson, David Leigh, and John Sweeney -- on the subject of British arms dealings with Iraq.
2. "Intelligence and Proliferation: Lessons from the Matrix-Churchill Affair." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1994), 193-206.
A "study of the British experience in confronting Iraq's procurement activities suggests that there are real and abiding obstacles which will blunt both the usefulness of intelligence as well as the momentum of the non-proliferation effort itself.... [M]ore than anything, it is the political and economic context which will dictate the usefulness of intelligence."
Palmer, Alasdair. "Fear of Betrayal Leaves Spy Bosses out in the Cold." Telegraph (London), 19 Feb. l996. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
The Scott Report found that "[t]here was no substance to the charge" that MI6 had betrayed Paul Henderson "by not defending him when he was arrested for allegedly telling lies on his export licence application forms." However, "the myth of the secret service's calculated betrayal of innocent men reverberates"; and "MI6 is struggling to recruit agents ... because would-be spies fear they might end up in court."
Scott, Richard [Sir]. Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions. 5 vols. London: HMSO, 1996.
Stephanie Strom, "British Report on Iraq Arms Deal Declares Parliament Was Misled," New York Times, 16 Feb. 1996, A1, A4 (N), notes that Sir Richard Scott's report on his 3-year investigation into a scandal over Britain's sale of military equipment to Iraq in the late 1980s was made public on 15 February 1996. The investigation concluded that Government officials "deliberately misled Parliament in 1989 and 1990 about the Government's policy on the sale of machine tools to Iraq." However, the report "did not find find their actions duplicitous in the sense of a cover-up."
Sweeney, John. Trading with the Enemy: Britain's Arming of Iraq. London: Pan Books, 1993.
Miller, I&NS 9.3: "There are factual errors where there are no excuses for such mistakes.... Sweeney also misleads." The book is "tarted up with accounts of the suffering of the Iraqi people and gossip." The author "is patronizing of his readership."
Tomkins, Adam. "Intelligence and Government." Parliamentary Affairs 50, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 109-129.
ProQuest: The author "discusses what the UK's intelligence community knew ... about the true nature of Matrix Churchill's business with Iraq." The Intelligence and Security Committee should adopt basic standards to avoid the intelligence failures alluded to in the Scott report.
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