1. "Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The UK Intelligence and Security Committee and the 'War on Terror.'" Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): 14-37.
"It is reasonable to conclude that the ISC has probably exceeded the expectations of some ... in terms of its access to information and success in establishing itself as a serious critic of the agencies. Yet it might also be criticized for timidity because it sees itself more as a part of the Whitehall machine for the management of the security intelligence commnunity than as its overseer." [italics in original]
2. "Reasserting Control: Recent Changes in the Oversight of the UK Intelligence Community." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 313-331.
Gill argues that recent steps in the UK, which have been presented as increased openness in the intelligence establishment, represent "not a movement along a single dimension from secrecy to openness but, rather,... a variation in 'information control'; specifically a shift from a defensive to an offensive strategy."
1. "Evidence-Based Policy or Policy-Based Evidence? Hutton and the Government's Use of Secret Intelligence." Parliamentary Affairs 58, no. 1 (Jan. 2005): 138-155.
2. and Philip H.J. Davies. "Intelligence, Iraq and the Limits of Legislative Accountability during Political Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 848-883.
The authors use the inquiries of the UK's Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) into the issue of Iraq's possession/nonpossession of weapons of mass destruction to frame their discussion of the impact of political loyalties on the legislative oversight function. They conclude that "[a]s a means to provide reliable, trustworthy and hence legitimate and effective oversight,... the legislature and its committees are limited tools.... Legislative oversight ... needs to be combined with various forms of oversight such as independent, judicial and administrative arrangements."
Goodman, Michael S.
1. "The Dog That Didn't Bark: The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Warning of Aggression." Cold War History. 7, no. 4 (Nov. 2007): 529-51.
From abstract: The subject here is the Nicoll Report -- "a previously classified document written to assess the performance of the British Joint Intelligence Committee in warning about foreign acts of aggression. The Nicoll Report ... provides detail on intelligence estimates for case studies which have not yet been released into the archive"; and "it provides an examination of the JIC's failures and in doing so it is far more candid than the 'open' investigations conducted by Lord Franks and Lord Butler."
2. "Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 40-56.
The JIC "has endured a troubled past. Yet, despite everything as it passes its 70th birthday, the JIC has never been so important."
Gustafson, Kristian. "Strategic Horizons: Futures Forecasting and the British Intelligence Community." Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 5 (Oct. 2010): 589-610.
From abstract: This article "deals with the role and benefit added by the use of horizon scanning in intelligence analysis in the UK.... [A] horizon scanning function in the JIO and the Cabinet Office should be made permanent."
Hannigan, Robert. "The Web Is a Terrorist's Command-and-Control Network of Choice." Financial Times, 3 Nov. 2014. [http://www.ft.com]
Hannigan is Director of GCHQ. ISIS "is the first terrorist group whose members have grown up on the internet. They are exploiting the power of the web to create a jihadi threat with near-global reach. The challenge to governments and their intelligence agencies is huge -- and it can only be met with greater co-operation from technology companies."
Heekin, John P. "Leashing the Internet Watchdog: Legislative Restraints on Electronic Surveillance in the U.S. and U.K." American Intelligence Journal 28, no. 1 (2010): 40-58.
Recent developments in both the United States and United Kingdom "indicate a shift toward greater government power to implement electronic surveillance and communications intercept operations, but the mechanisms of oversight persist as well."
Hennessy, Peter, ed. The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism. London: Continuum, 2007.
Scott, I&NS 24.5 (Oct. 2009), sees this work as an "impressive collection of essays from former and serving Whitehall mandarins with extensive experience of intelligence and its exploitation.... A striking feature of the collection is the focus on ethics." This work "will be essential reading for students of intelligence and anyone wishing to understand British government responses to the threat of jihadist terrorism."
1. "Intelligence and the Iraq Threat: British Joint Intelligence After Butler." RUSI Journal 149, no. 4 (Aug. 2004):1824.
2. "Intelligence and Policy: A Comment." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 229-239.
This article should be read in conjunction with the article to which it constitutes a response: Reginald Hibbert, "Intelligence and Policy," Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 110-128. Hibbert would like to see a more "open" assessment system in which both the influence of secret information and secret agencies would be reduced. In a well-done discussion, Herman points out that, in the areas of national defense and national security, covert intelligence has been and will remain the main source of information for the assessment system (whatever that may be). He concludes that the big question may not be "How should intelligence do its job?" but, rather, "What should intelligence do?"
Hibbert, Reginald. "Intelligence and Policy." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 110-128.
The author draws a dividing line between "foreign policy" (a subject of open discussion) and "intelligence" (not a subject of open discussion). He then argues that the "phenomenal growth of secret intelligence collection and assessment" since World War II has worked to undermine the influence of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the foreign policymaking process. He would like to see a more "open" assessment system in which both the influence of secret information and secret agencies would be reduced.
This article should be read in conjunction with a response by Michael Herman, "Intelligence and Policy: A Comment," Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 229-239.
Lamanna, Lawrence J. "Documenting the Differences Between American and British Intelligence Reports." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 602-628. Also, in Strategic Intelligence, 5 vols, ed. Loch K. Johnson. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.
A comparison of released British and American documents relating to the prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction "reveals significant differences between British and American approaches to intelligence concepts, structures, methods, purposes, and philosophies."
Mitchell, Marcia, and Thomas Mitchell. The Spy Who Tried to Stop a War: Katharine Gun and the Secret Plot to Sanction the Iraq Invasion. Sausalito, CA: Polipoint, 2008.
Nigel West, IJI&C 22.3 (Fall 2009), finds that this effort to portray as a whistle-blower the GCHQ linguist who leaked an NSA email to the London press "is not convincing." The authors "come across as almost absurdly biased in their attitude to British standards of secrecy." And "in terms of factual accuracy," the book "contains far too many lapses." For Peake, Studies 53.4 (Dec. 2009), this book "is an apologia for Katharine Gun that explicitly encourages others to decide on their own that they know best when it comes to security."
Morrison, John N.L. "British Intelligence Failures in Iraq." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 4 (Aug. 2011): 509-520.
British intelligence "on Iraqi WMD was a failure in four areas: a failure of intelligence requirment-setting and prioritization; a failure of intelligence collection, notably from human sources; a failure of intelligence assessment at the most senior level; and a failure of policymakers to use and disseminate intelligence responsibly."
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