Economist. Editors. Economist. Editors.
1. " Spooked Out." 24 Jul. 1993: 61.
"The government has so far continued to fend off demands for proper accountability" of its intelligence organizations. "Canada's Security Intelligence Review Committee, comprising non-MPs chosen by the prime minister after consulting the opposition, is the likeliest model for Mr. Major to follow."
2. "I Spy an Accountant." 8 Nov. 1997, 61-62.
ProQuest: "The UK government has announced that it intends to do the first complete review of spending by the country's intelligence services."
Fitzgerald,
Patrick. "An Incalculable Loss for MI5." New Statesman &
Society 7 (10 Jun. 1994): 12-13.
The reference in the article's title is to a helicopter crash that claimed the lives of 10 RUC Special Branch officers (including the branch's head), 9 Army officers (colonel to major), and 6 MI5 personnel (including the Director and Co-Ordinator of Intelligence [DCI] for Northern Ireland). The article includes a fairly detailed "order of battle" for British intelligence and security activities in Northern Ireland.
Gedye, Robin, and Christopher Lockwood. "Magazine Names Diplomat as MI6 Spy Who Paid for Russian Secrets." Electronic Telegraph, 30 Jan. 1996. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
"Rosemary Sharpe,... until recently the first secretary at the British embassy in Berlin," was named by the German magazine Der Spiegel on 29 January 1996 "as the MI6 operative who bought information from German intelligence officials now under investigation on corruption-related charges.... It is understood that Miss Sharpe became involved in the 'left-overs' of a deal under which German intelligence set up a unit in 1991 to purchase sensitive Soviet military equipment from the departing army. Three of the members of the unit are alleged to have established a rogue operation in which they sold on material to American and British secret services. Everything from tanks to documents were spirited out of the barracks of the departing Soviet army in return for cash. It is stressed that none of the material related to nuclear weapons."
Gill, Peter. "Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The UK Intelligence and Security Committee and the 'War on Terror.'" Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): 14-37.
"It is reasonable to conclude that the ISC has probably exceeded the expectations of some ... in terms of its access to information and success in establishing itself as a serious critic of the agencies. Yet it might also be criticized for timidity because it sees itself more as a part of the Whitehall machine for the management of the security intelligence commnunity than as its overseer." [italics in original]
Gill,
Peter. "Reasserting Control: Recent Changes in the Oversight of the
UK Intelligence Community." Intelligence and National Security
11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 313-331.
Gill argues that recent steps in the UK, which have been presented as increased openness in the intelligence establishment, represent "not a movement along a single dimension from secrecy to openness but, rather,... a variation in 'information control'; specifically a shift from a defensive to an offensive strategy."
Glees, Anthony. "Evidence-Based Policy or Policy-Based Evidence? Hutton and the Government's Use of Secret Intelligence." Parliamentary Affairs 58, no. 1 (Jan. 2005): 138-155.
Glees, Anthony, and Philip H.J. Davies. "Intelligence, Iraq and the Limits of Legislative Accountability during Political Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 848-883.
The authors use the inquiries of the UK's Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) into the issue of Iraq's possession/nonpossession of weapons of mass destruction to frame their discussion of the impact of political loyalties on the legislative oversight function. They conclude that "[a]s a means to provide reliable, trustworthy and hence legitimate and effective oversight,... the legislature and its committees are limited tools.... Legislative oversight ... needs to be combined with various forms of oversight such as independent, judicial and administrative arrangements."
Goodman, Michael S. "Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 40-56.
The JIC "has endured a troubled past. Yet, despite everything as it passes its 70th birthday, the JIC has never been so important."
Harvey,
Donald [RADM/USN (Ret.)]. "MI5 Jobs Up but Bodies Down." Periscope
22, no. 1 (1997): 8.
Additional duties acquired by MI5 include beginning "intelligence operations against international criminals operating in Britain." At the same time, manpower reductions are underway. About "50 senior officers" have been asked to accept early retirement, and "hundreds of administrative, clerical, and secretarial grades" have suffered layoffs. MI5 staffing "has fallen from 2200 in 1994 to under 1900 this year.... Cuts have also been imposed on GCHQ and MI6."
Herman, Michael. "Intelligence and the Iraq Threat: British Joint Intelligence After Butler." RUSI Journal 149, no. 4 (Aug. 2004):18–24.
Herman,
Michael. "Intelligence and Policy: A Comment." Intelligence
and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 229-239.
This article should be read in conjunction with the article to which it constitutes a response: Reginald Hibbert, "Intelligence and Policy," Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 110-128. Hibbert would like to see a more "open" assessment system in which both the influence of secret information and secret agencies would be reduced.
In a well-done discussion, Herman points out that, in the areas of national defense and national security, covert intelligence has been and will remain the main source of information for the assessment system (whatever that may be). He concludes that the big question may not be "How should intelligence do its job?" but, rather, "What should intelligence do?"
Hibbert,
Reginald. "Intelligence and Policy." Intelligence and National
Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 110-128.
The author draws a dividing line between "foreign policy" (a subject of open discussion) and "intelligence" (not a subject of open discussion). He then argues that the "phenomenal growth of secret intelligence collection and assessment" since World War II has worked to undermine the influence of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the foreign policymaking process. He would like to see a more "open" assessment system in which both the influence of secret information and secret agencies would be reduced.
This article should be read in conjunction with a response by Michael Herman, "Intelligence and Policy: A Comment," Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 229-239.
Johnston, Philip. "MPs Fear 'Untold Damage' Caused by CIA Traitor Ames." Electronic Telegraph, 29 Mar. 1996. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
According to a report from the British Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee, "Aldrich Ames ... may have caused untold damage to British security interests." The Committee's report was "highly critical" of "the way the intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic handled the Ames scandal." The Committee "said it was not satisfied that the matter was being treated seriously enough," and "accused the CIA of failing to furnish its British counterpart with enough information."
Lamanna, Lawrence J. "Documenting the Differences Between American and British Intelligence Reports." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 602-628. Also, in Strategic Intelligence, 5 vols, ed. Loch K. Johnson. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.
A comparison of released British and American documents relating to the prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction "reveals significant differences between British and American approaches to intelligence concepts, structures, methods, purposes, and philosophies."
Major, John [Prime Minister], and Tom King [CH MP, Chairman, Intelligence and Security Committee]. Intelligence and Security Committee: Annual Report 1995, Intelligence Services Act of 1994, Chapter 13. London: HMSO, 1996.
Surveillant 4.2: These annual reports tend to "say little since they operate within ... the Official Secrets Act of 1989." This report, however, does criticize the United States "for being lax in sharing information from ongoing debriefings of Soviet spy Aldrich Ames."
Marshall, Roger D., BEM. "Operation Grapple: British Armed Forces in United Nations Protection Force." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 25-26, 57-58.
The British force first deployed to Croatia and Bosnia in October 1992 with the task of escorting United Nations High Commissiom for Refugees (UNHCR) humanitarian convoys. Other tasks would follow.
Return to UK Post-Cold War Table
of Contents