Dylan, Huw, and Martin S. Alexander, eds. "Special Issue on '100 Years of British Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 1 (Feb. 2012): entire issue.
1. Huw Dylan and Martin S. Alexander, "Introduction: Intelligence and National Security: A Century of British Intelligence," 1-4.
This is an edited collection "based on the contributions to the 'Century of British Intelligence' conference" in spring 2009.
2. John Ferris, "'Consistent with an Intention': The Far East Combined Bureau and the Outbreak of the Pacific War, 1940-41," 5-26.
With the outbreak of war in Europe, British military and naval intelligence agencies "were moved from Hong Kong to Singapore, and joined into an interservice organization, the FECB." Britain "rejected the FECB's assessments of Japanese capabilities, which were accurate enough to enable effective preparation, while accepting views on intentions, which were wrong, and shaped by enemy deception."
3. Huw Dylan, "The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World," 27-45.
The JIB was folded into the Defence Intelligence Staff in 1964. Prior to that, its creation had been "an important step [in] the development of British intelligence, it was at the centre of a ... productive international network, and it produced analyses that directly influenced policy."
4. Paul Maddrell, "British Intelligence through the Eyes of the Stasi: What the Stasi's Records Show about the Operations of British Intelligence in Cold War Germany," 46-74.
"SIS was a successful gatherer of intelligence in the GDR in the late 1940s and for most of the 1950s. Its success greatly declined in the late 1950s and was ended completely by Blake' treason."
5. Benjamin B. Fischer, "Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet War Scare: The Untold Story," 75-92.
From abstract: The Soviet war scare of the 1980s "had a profound influence on [U.S. President] Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and SovietAmerican relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation."
6. Ross Bellaby, "What's the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection," 93-117.
This article seeks to establish "an ethical framework" that outlines "under what circumstances the use of different intelligence collection activities would be permissible."
7. Wilhelm Agrell, "The Next 100 Years? Reflections on the Future of Intelligence," 118-132.
From abstract: The author identifies "six fundamental processes" of change: "the decreasing hegemony of national intelligence, the rise of new fields of knowledge..., the diminishing relative importance of exclusive sources and methods, the rise of new actors producing and providing intelligence, the loss of an intellectual monopoly in a competitive knowledge environment and finally an increasing demand for reliable assessments and verification in a fragmented world of information."
8. Michael Warner, "Reflections on Technology and Intelligence Systems," 133-153.
The literature on "the influence of technological change per se on intelligence systems" pays "surprisingly little attention to larger trends and their meaning." This "means we have an incomplete understanding of what happened in the past.... [And] it leaves us with few clues for understanding another wave of technological change washing over the intelligence profession at this time .... Looking at the second [digital] revolution in the light of the first [analog] can give us important clues to what to watch for in coming years."
9. David Omand [Sir], "Into the Future: A Comment on Agrell and Warner," 154-156.
"[F]or the democracies, the days of the Cold War 'secret state' have given way to those of 'the protecting state' and their intelligence communities will have to reflect that in their relationship with the public."
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