Allen, Matthew. "The
Foreign Intelligence Community and the Origins of the Naval Intelligence
Department." Mariner's Mirror 81, no. 1 (Feb. 1995): 65-78. Allen, Matthew. "The
Foreign Intelligence Community and the Origins of the Naval Intelligence
Department." Mariner's Mirror 81, no. 1 (Feb. 1995): 65-78.
Archer, John Michael.
Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English
Renaissance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993. [Surveillant
3.2/3]
Aubrey, Philip. Mr.
Secretary Thurloe. London: Athlone, 1990.
See also, D.L. Hobman, Cromwell's Master Spy: A Study of John Thurloe (London: Chapman & Hall, 1961).
Backscheider, Paula
R. "Daniel Defoe and Early Modern Intelligence." Intelligence
and National Security 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 1-21.
Defoe "extended the possibilities of counter-insurgency, invented practices that survive to the present day, and earned the reputation of master spy." He was successful as both an intelligence collector and an agent of influence, but "it was as a propagandist that Defoe was most useful and his contributions to the art of intelligence most original."
Baden-Powell, Robert. "Adventures as a Spy." Everybody's 32 (Feb. 1915): 184-192. [Calder]
Baden-Powell, Robert.
My Adventures as a Spy. London: 1915.
Bayly, C.A. Empire
and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India,
1780-1870. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
MacMillan, AHR 103.4, finds that Bayly's work goes well beyond a discussion of British intelligence and surveillance of their Indian subjects. Rather, this is "a wide-ranging and subtle exploration of systems of knowledge and how these affect, and are affected by, the relations between rulers and ruled."
For Durrans, English Historical Review, Nov. 1998, this is an "absorbing and persuasive study" that "offers valuable insights."
Black, Jeremy. "British
Intelligence and the Mid-Eighteenth Century Crisis." Intelligence
and National Security 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1987): 209-229.
The author's goal is "to place British intelligence activities in the context of British foreign policy in the period and to indicate important areas of activity that require more attention." He looks at postal interception operations, overseas espionage, and the use of information from friendly diplomats, and concludes that "it is clear that Britain used the full range of available methods for the obtaining of information."
Budiansky, Stephen. Her Majesty's Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth of Modern Espionage. New York: Viking, 2005.
Jardine, Washington Post, 14 Aug. 2005, rips this work: "All doublet and hose and swashbuckling machismo, written in a breathless, archaic style reminiscent of historians of 50 years ago, Budiansky's book panders unashamedly to our fondness for nostalgia." The reviewer, an "academic who specializes in the Tudor period," finds it "hard to take Her Majesty's Spymaster seriously as history, but it is written in a racy, popular style that may capture the imagination of the general reader." Clark comment: Guess I will have to read this one.
For Bath, NIPQ 22.1 (Jan. 2006), this "is sound intelligence history, well and interestingly told." Similarly, Kruh, Cryptologia 30.2 (Apr. 2006), comments that "[w]ith the taut narrative of a spy novel,... Budiansky brings thrillingly to life ... Walsingham's intricate spy network."
Peake, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), calls Her Majesty’s Spymaster a "splendid little book." As the author describes the events of the times, "it becomes clear that Walsingham developed many of the techniques of intelligence still in use, despite having no prior training in the craft. His skill was based on knowledge of the threat, common sense, and the ability to deal with people discreetly.... Budiansky makes his fascinating life good reading."
To Arpin, NWCR 59.3 (Summer 2006), the author has captured "how Walsingham’s skill in gathering and analyzing information complemented (if not always easily) Elizabeth’s talent for political and diplomatic intrigue.... If this book has a fault, it is the lack of discussion on Walsingham’s impact on later incarnations of the British secret service."
Schwab, IJI&C19.3 (Fall 2006), sees this as "an ambitious and complex work that ... is well-conceived." Nevertheless, "[a]n index would have been beneficial" to this "fine historical study."
Bywater, Hector C., and H.C. Ferraby. Strange Intelligence: Memoirs of Naval Secret Service. London: Constable, 1931. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931.
Constantinides sees this book as a "paean of praise to British naval intelligence" that is lacking in authoritative sources. "The successes the authors claim for naval intelligence of the prewar period seem exaggerated in the light of later evidence."
Cobban, Alfred. Ambassadors
and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the
Hague. London: Jonathan Cape, 1954.
To Pforzheimer, this book is an "excellent ... account of British and French intrigue during a revolution in Holland in the 1780's."
Constantinides refers to Ambassadors and Secret Agents as a "most impressive work on secret service.... [Cobban] gives a fascinating picture of the secret intelligence, propaganda, and political war waged in the Dutch Republic."
Cole, J.A. Prince of Spies: Henri Le Caron. London: Faber & Faber, 1984.
Chambers: "A mixture of farce and good legwork. Entertaining."
See Henri Le Caron [pseud., Thomas Miller Beach], Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service: The Recollections of a Spy (London: Heinemann, 1892; 10th ed. London: EP Publishing, 1974).
Canadian Security Intelligence Service. "History of CSIS." [http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/about_us/history_artifacts/history/brf_pics_003.asp]
"Henri Le Caron, born Thomas Miller Beach, was a Civil War veteran recruited by the British in 1867 to spy on the Fenian movement in the United States. Le Caron was arguably one of the most successful covert agents to work for the Canadian government."
Cook, Andrew. M: MI5's First Spymaster. Stroud, UK, and Charleston, SC: Tempus, 2005.
DKR, AFIO WIN 13-05 (28 Mar. 2005), says that the author "has written a well-researched and colorful account of William Melville." In 1909, when MI5 was formally established, Melville became its first head. Melville died in 1917.
Cooper, H. H. "English Missions." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 2 (Spring 1961): A43-A50.
Deals with the 18 years of clandestine work in England by John Gerard, S.J., beginning with a covert landing on the beach in 1588.
Curts, Bob. "A
Warning That Worked: The British Foil Napoleon's Grab for Three Fleets."
Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1993):
9-12.
Davies, Huw. "The Influence of Intelligence on Wellington's Art of Command." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): 619-643.
"Over the course of his career, Wellington's understanding of intelligence moved froma perception that it was necessary only to justify his pre-existing beliefs, to a central focus of his decision-making process."
Davies, Huw. "Integration of Strategic and Operational Intelligence during the Peninsular War." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 2 (Apr. 2006): 202-223.
This article speculates about the methods Wellington used to integrate available strategic and operational intelligence during the Peninsular War. The author suggests that analysis of intelligence took place at multiple levels of command, contrary to the view that Wellington did it all himself.
Davies, Huw. "Wellington's Use of Deception Tactics in the Peninsular War." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 ( 2006): 723-750.
From abstract: "Wellington's use of intelligence developed throughout his military career." As the Peninsular War "progressed, he developed sophisticated methods for the integration of strategic intelligence -- largely gathered by civilian agents -- with operational intelligence -- collected by military personnel.... [I]t was his considered use of intelligence, combined with intricate deception operations in the latter stages of the conflict, which deprived the French of reliable intelligence on his own movements, and demonstrated his understanding of the importance of intelligence."
Dedijer, Stevan. "British
Intelligence: The Rainbow Enigma." International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 1, no. 2 (1986): 73-90.
This article concerns the so-called Rainbow portrait of Queen Elizabeth I.
Dragonette,
Charles N. "The Birth of COMINT." Naval Intelligence Professionals
Quarterly 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 16.
During the Russo-Japanese War, The Times of London correspondent established a wireless relay station on shore and chartered a merchant ship to take him closer to the action. In addition to transmitting news ashore, The Times personnel began to base news stories on analysis of intercepted transmissions -- not the content, because messages were ciphered, but on the basis of rudimentary "traffic analysis" techniques. The activity took place from 14 March to 18 April 1904, when the ship left because of complaints from both belligerents. This article has no footnotes or other sourcing.
Duffy, Michael. "British Intelligence and the Breakout of the French Atlantic Fleet from Brest in 1799." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): 601-618.
"The French had masked their intentions with some skill and the British agents had never been able to penetrate the secret. On the contrary British ministers had been led away on the false trail that the French had laid before them."
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