Materials in chronological order
Pincus,
Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "CIA Blocked Two Attacks Last Year."
Washington Post, 11 Aug. 1998, A16. "The CIA's Track Record
on Terrorism: At Least Two Plots Were Foiled Last Year, But the Two Embassies
Hit Were 'Low-Risk.'" Washington Post National Weekly Edition,
17 Aug. 1998, 20.
"CIA operatives foiled two attacks on U.S. embassies last year [1997] in advanced stages of planning and disrupted three other incipient plots after infiltrating terrorist cells and by monitoring and intercepting electronic communications."
Goodman,
Melvin. "The Role of Intelligence in the War Against Terrorism."
IntellectualCapital.com, 27 Aug. 1998. [http://www.intellectualcapital.com]
"[I]ntelligence has been less useful in anticipating acts of terrorism but very useful in the investigative process following ... terrorist attacks.... Unfortunately, the CIA has its own credibility problem in the war against terrorism because of its misuse of intelligence information." Clark comment: Here follows a standard Goodman litany about the politicization of intelligence by William Casey and Robert Gates.
"The CIA is good at pinpointing terrorists and describing terrorism, but the intentions of terrorists are more elusive, and it will be difficult to predict their next moves.... But this is no time to reverse a series of executive orders that prohibit U.S. officials from 'engaging in, or conspiring to engage in, political assassination'.... It is also no time to be making a greater economic investment in intelligence against terrorism. Sufficient collection platforms are already in place to target terrorist groups, as well as a sufficient number of intelligence analysts throughout the intelligence community."
Zuckerman, Mortimer
B. "[Editorial:] It's Time to Fight Back." U.S. News and World
Report, 7 Sep. 1998, 92.
The United States "will need to become even more energetic in intelligence gathering so that we can mount pre-emptive action when the threshold of evidence is compelling.... Given the transnational character of terrorist groups," ensuring the confidentiality of intelligence sources "may well require scrapping the legal barrier that now exists between foreign and domestic operations."
Schmitt,
Eric. "$1.8 Billion Asked to Help Bolster Embassy Security." New
York Times, 22 Sep. 1998. [http://nytimes.com]
"The Clinton administration will ask Congress this week for $1.8 billion for emergency security improvements at most of the nation's 260 embassies and consulates worldwide.... That money, about twice the amount Congress has appropriated for diplomatic security since 1985, reflects the administration's conclusion that no country can be considered safe for U.S. diplomats following the fatal bombings in East Africa last month. But the request is far below the full amount the State Department has said is needed to modify or build embassies meeting the security standards established in the 1980s. In 1985, the department put the cost of converting or replacing all embassies at $3.5 billion."
Grunwald,
Michael. "CIA Halted Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Uganda." Washington
Post, 25 Sep. 1998, A27. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to government sources, U.S. intelligence officers "helped foil a plot last week by Islamic extremists to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Uganda.... Ugandan authorities alerted by the Central Intelligence Agency have detained 20 suspects in the case, including the two alleged ringleaders.... Those two men are believed to be associates of Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden, who is suspected of orchestrating last month's bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania."
Gellman,
Barton. [Series of two articles]
1. "Broad Effort Launched After '98 Attacks." Washington Post, 19 Dec. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
First of two articles.
"Beginning on Aug. 7, 1998, the day that al Qaeda destroyed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, [U.S. President Bill] Clinton directed a campaign of increasing scope and lethality against [Osama] bin Laden's network that carried through his final days in office.
"In addition to a secret 'finding' to authorize covert action,... Clinton signed three highly classified Memoranda of Notification expanding the available tools. In succession, the president authorized killing instead of capturing bin Laden, then added several of al Qaeda's senior lieutenants, and finally approved the shooting down of private civilian aircraft on which they flew.
"The Clinton administration ordered the Navy to maintain two Los Angeles-class attack submarines on permanent station in the nearest available waters, enabling the U.S. military to place Tomahawk cruise missiles on any target in Afghanistan within about six hours of receiving the order....
"The lines Clinton opted not to cross continued to define U.S. policy in his successor's first eight months. Clinton stopped short of using more decisive military instruments, including U.S. ground forces, and declined to expand the reach of the war to the Taliban regime that hosted bin Laden and his fighters after 1996."
2. "Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign." Washington Post, 20 Dec. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Second of two articles.
"By any measure available, Clinton left office having given greater priority to terrorism than any president before him. His government doubled counterterrorist spending across 40 departments and agencies.... Clinton devoted some of his highest-profile foreign policy speeches to terrorism, including two at the U.N. General Assembly. An interagency panel, the Counterterrorism Strategy Group, took on new weight in policy disputes.... And the foreign policy cabinet, by the time it left office, had been convening every two to three weeks to shape a covert and overt campaign against al Qaeda.
"But neither Clinton nor his administration treated terrorism as their top concern, because it was not. Without the overriding impetus provided by Sept. 11, the war on terror in the 1990s lost as many struggles inside government as it won. Steps to manage risk moved forward readily. Some of the harder initiatives, hurried through these past three months by President Bush, foundered then on money, bureaucratic turf, domestic politics and rival conceptions of national interest."
Woodward,
Bob. "CIA Paid Afghans To Track Bin Laden: Team of 15 Recruits Operated
Since 1998." Washington Post, 23 Dec. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"For four years prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the CIA paid a team of about 15 recruited Afghan agents to regularly track Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, according to well-placed sources. The team had mixed results, ranging from excellent to total failure. Once every month or so, the team pinpointed bin Laden's presence in a specific building, compound or training camp, and that location was then confirmed by the CIA through communications intelligence or satellite overhead photography.... The creation of the tracking team was part of a covert CIA operation to capture or kill bin Laden launched first by the Clinton administration and continued under President Bush."
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