Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Hoffman, FA 87.3 (May-Jun. 2008), takes issue with the author's premise that the "true menace" to the United States and the West "is not a revived al Qaeda" but "loose-knit cells of Western-born Muslims or Muslim immigrants studying and working in the West." The reviewer believes that this is a "fundamental misreading of the al Qaeda threat." This work "founders precisely" on what its author "claims are its strengths: the empirical data on which his analysis is based and his technique of examining terrorism as a social movement."
For Sinai, Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), the author's "research is unique in the field of al Qaeda studies ... because of his 'evidence-based' approach." This is a "masterpiece," but it "is not perfect in all aspects. Some of [Sageman's] arguments are insufficiently explained or inadequately sourced." In addition, his "use of citations is sometimes clumsy." Nonetheless, "Sagemen's incisive observations based on carefully examined evidence, astute insights and scholarship make Leaderless Jihad the gold standard in al Qaeda studies."
Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
Pinkley, Studies 49.2 (2005), finds that this work has sufficient limitations that readers "are advised to proceed with caution." Nevertheless, the author manages "to make some useful observations working exclusively with unclassified information, despite its flaws."
For Hoffman, FA 87.3 (May-Jun. 2008), this is "an important work" that "provocatively challenged the conventional wisdom that victory in the war on terrorism would be achieved by killing and capturing" al Qaeda's leadership.
Scheuer, Michael F., writing as "Anonymous." Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004.
Washington Post, "CIA Insider: The Threat We Refuse to Get," 11 Jul. 2004, B1, publishes "selected portions from various sections" of Imperial Hubris. USA Today, 19 Jul. 2004, 13A, carries a full-page interview with "Anonymous."
According to Pincus, Washington Post, 26 Jun. 2004, this book "sharply attacks the Bush administration's approach to Islamic terrorists, sternly criticizes the decision to invade Iraq and chides officials for trying to create a Western-style democracy in Afghanistan.... The book's author is a 22-year veteran of the CIA who ... served as chief of the bin Laden station from 1996 to 1999, a time when, he complains, senior leaders 'downplayed intelligence' and 'ignored repeated warnings' about the dangers approaching from Islamic terrorists."
Clarke, Washington Post, 27 Jun. 2004, calls Imperial Hubris "a powerful, persuasive analysis of the terrorist threat and the Bush administration's failed efforts to fight it.... Anonymous has painted a detailed picture of th[e] enemy.... The enemy is 'an Islamic insurgency,' a multinational movement to replace governments in the Islamic world with fundamentalist theocracies."
For Brooks, NIPQ 20. 4 (Dec. 2004), this "is a well-written work by a man who is obviously well-read and thoughtful." Although the book is "rather repetitive, loosely organized, and duplicative of his previous work [Through Our Enemies' Eyes (2002)]," it is also "eloquent and persuasive."
Killebrew, Parameters 35.2 (Summer 2005), calls this an "insightful, bitter, worrisome book. It is also the most consequential critique of the war on terror yet published, deeply historical, broadly researched, and crisply articulated.... [While] the author’s strategic proposals seem to fall short,... his call for objectivity, accountability, and expertise in our response to the Islamic insurgency is much more on target."
To Chapman, IJI&C 18.4 (Winter 2005-2006), "Scheuer's book contains strong, provocative, heady stuff, but adds to public knowledge of the Islamic insurgencies that rock the world." Whether the author "is right or wrong, there's logic in what he has written." This work "should be read carefully by U.S. national leaders and not forgotten."
Joyner, Strategic Insights 3.9 (Sep. 2004) [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil], believes that the author "is an intelligent, dedicated man who has spent his adult lifetime studying terrorism, Islamist radicalism, and Osama bin Laden. As such, his insights deserve attention. His core argument -- that we are fighting against a large, Islamist jihad rather than a discrete terrorist organization -- is quite compelling. Many of the conclusions that follow from that premise, while exceedingly frightening and anathema to the current mores of American political culture, should be debated. My fear is that the powerful arguments he marshals ... will be largely dismissed because of the sneering tone and style. It will certainly be taken less seriously by the key decision makers whom he insults than it would have had he restrained his desire to vent his frustrations."
Scheuer, Michael F., writing as "Anonymous." Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002.
According to Peake, Studies 48.1, the author "seeks to explain bin Laden the man, provides context and reasons for his abhorrance of the West, describes the religious basis for its intensity.... The story of bin Laden is unpleasant and disturbing, but well told. For him and his followers, Islam is the superior religion and way of life.... And since the behavior of the United States appears to Muslims as inconsistent with that view, its physical elimination is warranted."
Schroen, Gary C. First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan. Novato, CA: Presidio, 2005.
Clark comment: Schroen and his JAWBREAKER team were truly "first in," leaving the U.S. for deployment to Afghanistan on 19 September 2001. He recounts the story well, in serviceable language that keeps the pace of the book moving along briskly. The success of the CIA-led war against the Taliban certainly makes the decision not to give all covert operations to the military look pretty good. The speed at which the CIA was able to move and the flexibility shown in responding to the ever-changing situation is impressive. Schroen's First In should be read in conjunction with Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander (New York: Crown, 2005). Berntsen replaced Schroen as commander of JAWBREAKER in early November 2001, and tells the story through his replacement in mid-December. Taken together, the two books are a stunningly detailed view of a major paramilitary operation.
Bass, Washington Post, 29 May 2005, comments that this "astonishing new book tells the story of how a handful of CIA agents ... led the initial post-Sept. 11 charge against al Qaeda and its Taliban patrons.... The staggering detail in these pages ... makes First In unlike any other CIA memoir." The book is "seriously weakened by several lengthy passages in which Schroen,... offers purportedly verbatim recreations of dialogue he never heard. But this is still a stunning book -- both an essential document about the strange and oft-forgotten war against the Taliban, a withering policy critique and a proud memoir from an aging man who risked life and limb to try to kill al Qaeda's masterminds."
For Moore, Studies 49.4 (2005), this work "speaks eloquently of the CIA's flexibility and ability to react in a crisis." The Northern Afghanistan Liaison team (NALT) "deployed nine days after the 9/11 attacks," while the first special forces teams did not arrive until almost a month later. Schroen tells the action part of his story well, but his "foray into the policy realm ... struck th[e] reviewer as a stretch."
DKR, AFIO WIN 21-05 (30 May 2005), finds that the author "leads the reader through events that range from the exhilarating to the terrifying to the frustrating.... Schroen is critical of the Bush administration's shift of interest to Iraq before the task in Afghanistan had been completed."
Latif, Parameters, Summer 2006, finds that "[t]he chapters are short and the book moves briskly, as the author writes in clear, crisp, matter-of-fact sentences that require no embellishment." Schroen describes his work to gain the Northern Alliance’s allegiance to the U.S. effort "through a combination of financial inducements and delicate diplomacy among the various warlords." This work "adds a riveting account to the already rich martial history of Afghanistan and is destined to become a classic tale of CIA exploits in the war on terror."
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