Badey, Thomas J. "Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-Based Threat Assessment." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 39-54. Badey, Thomas J. "Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-Based Threat Assessment." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 39-54.
"[A]nti-proliferation initiatives have a limited impact on the illegal flow of nuclear materials and are not likely to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors.... [T]he primary threat of nuclear terrorism stems not from the availability of the materials but from the potential willingness of some groups to acquire [and use] them."
Bassiouni, M. Cherif.
1. International Terrorism: Multilateral Conventions (1937-2001). Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2001.
Advertisement: This volume "includes all relevant conventions adopted since the League of Nations Convention of 1937," including conventions of regional organizations and "relevant provisions from other international conventions."
2. International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972-2001). 2 vols. Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2001.
Advertisement: These volumes are "the only published source of all United Nations documentation since 1972 on the subject of 'terrorism.'"
Bell, Stewart. Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Abroad. Toronto: Wiley, 2004.
Gendron, IJI&C 18.2 (Summer 2005), finds that the author "draws on archival material, interviews, and insights based on his investigative work around the globe to illustrate how lack of will and political opportunism effectively signalled that Canada was soft on terrorism."
Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002.
Washington Post, 2 Oct. 2002, notes that this book, by two National Security Council staff members during Presidrent Clinton's second term, depicts "a dysfunctional war [with al Qaeda] in which the U.S. effort was crippled by FBI secrecy and thwarted by reluctant bureaucrats in the Justice, Treasury and Defense departments." FBI Director Louis J. Freeh "is depicted ... as a man blinded by animus toward Clinton and manipulated by dishonest reports" from Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan, "who sought to deepen Freeh's rift with the White House."
To Loeb, Washington Post, 16 Dec. 2002, this book "is far more insightful than the [House-Senate] committee's report ... on how government failures contributed to its inability to prevent" the 9/11 suicide attacks. The authors "seem quite balanced in their assessment of the CIA and the Pentagon, faulting each for a certain amount of risk aversion but acknowledging that each took the problem of al Qaeda seriously." They are, however, "unrestrained in their criticism" of the FBI.
Laipson, FA 82.1, terms The Age of Sacred Terror an "important new book" that "vividly ... describ[es] how al Qaeda emerged and how America responded." The authors "tell[] us a great deal" about "working on counterterrorism in the U.S. government.... Ultimately, however, theirs is a subjective account and will be matched by those of other players who will want to explain their side of the story."
For Neumann, I&NS 18.4, the authors "provide a solid (albeit hardly groundbreaking) account of the rise of Islamic jihadism, its ideological foundations and current manifestations. More importantly, though, they also offer a fascinating insight into the workings of the American intelligence community in the 1990s."
Peake, Studies 48.3 (2004), finds that "[b]y combining history with insights based on current real world experience, the authors have provided a valuable, well-documented perspective on a topic that demands attention."
Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right. New York: Times Books, 2005.
According to Bass, Washington Post, 6 Nov. 2005, the authors "argue that the United States has, in the years since 9/11, frittered away more time than it took to win World War II.... Written in clear and credible prose, The Next Attack is one of the most helpful, challenging goads to serious discussion of terrorism in recent years." However, the work "is stronger on diagnosis than prescription."
Falkenrath, FA 85.1 (Jan./Feb. 2006), comments that compared with their earlier and good book [The Age of Sacred Terror (2002)], "[t]his effort is a disappointment, less a work of scholarship than a polemic.... The book contains little new research about or analysis of what has happened or what should be done next." The authors respond in FA 85.2 (Mar./Apr. 2006), commenting that given Falkenrath's background, it is no surprise that he "would loathe a book" critical of the Bush administration's conduct of the war on terrorism. Falkenrath counter-responds in FA 85.2 (Mar./Apr. 2006), reiterating his view that the book's "scholarship is poor, its information and analysis derivative of more subtle and original works, its assessments unbalanced, and its prescriptions weak."
For Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), the authors do not "appear to realize that the steps they recommend are precisely those now being attempted. Their comment that the intelligence services have not changed their Cold War operational methods is not only unhelpful, it is inaccurate." This book "provides a good summary of the problem but contributes little to the solution."
Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. New York: Norton, 2003.
According to Singer, Parameters 34.2, most of the author's "argument takes place on the theoretical plane." He argues that the totalitarian ideologies of the past "have been planted in fertile ground in the Middle East.... [L]ike Fascism, the ideology of al Qaeda and radical Islam is driven by a fear and hate of liberal ideals of tolerance." Berman offers an interesting point of view, but he "attempts to cover too much ground with little grounding and offers too few tangible solutions."
Berntsen, Gary, and Ralph Pezzullo. Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander. New York: Crown, 2005.
Clark comment: Berntsen replaced Gary Schroen as head of the CIA's JAWBREAKER operation in Afghanistan in early November 2001, and headed the CIA effort through the fall of Kabul and in the hunt for Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora and beyond. He left in mid-December. The success of the CIA-led war against the Taliban certainly makes the decision not to give all covert operations to the military look pretty good. The speed at which the CIA was able to move and the flexibility shown in responding to the ever-changing situation is impressive. Berntsen's frustration, even anger, over the failure "to finish the job" -- that is, kill Osama bin Laden -- is clearly stated and heartfelt. Whether he is correct in his assessment of that "failure" is open for discussion. His book needs to be read in conjunction with Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2005). Taken together, the two books are a stunningly detailed view of a major paramilitary operation.
John Lehman, Washington Post, 12 Feb. 2006, says that this book "provides a valuable new account by a major participant that fills in many blanks" in the new kind of war waged in Afghanistan. At various times, CIA veteran Berntsen "had elements of the Delta Force, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs and tactical air units reporting to him." The "best aspect" of the book "is its day-by-day account of the execution of an aggressive strategy that originated at the most senior levels of the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA."
For the reviewer, a former Secretary of the Navy and 9/11 Commission member, the author "recounts very credibly how he and others pleaded with Gen. Tommy Franks and the Pentagon brass to put in blocking forces so that bin Laden and the remnants of al Qaeda's leadership could not flee into Pakistan. But for reasons that remain unclear to Berntsen..., the Bush administration or Franks decided to depend instead on local Afghan warlords rather than put U.S. forces on the ground to block bin Laden's escape." This "was a huge blunder."
To Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), "Berntsen offers highly detailed and, if they are to be accepted, disturbing perspectives of numerous events.... Published with many parts blacked out in the Agency’s classification review, it still tells an important story and should be read by all those who want to learn about CIA counterterrorism analysis at Headquarters and operations in the field."
See Richard Leiby, "Knocking on Osama's Cave Door: The CIA Operative Says He Was There at the Right Time. His Ex-Bosses Insist No One Was Home," Washington Post, 16 Feb. 2006, C1, for an interview with Berntsen.
See also Dana Priest, "Suing Over the CIA's Red Pen: Retired Operative Says Agency Unfairly Edited His Book," Washington Post, 9 Oct. 2006, A15, for a report on Bertsen's legal efforts to get redacted portions of his book restored.
Betts,
Richard K. "Intelligence Test: The Limits of Prevention." In How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War, eds James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.
Binnendijk, Hans, et al. "The Virtual Border: Countering Seaborne Container Terrorism." Defense Horizons [Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University] 16 (Aug. 2002): 1-9.
The "magnitude and diversity of th[e] global [trade and transportation] system coupled with the permeability of U.S. borders afford numerous avenues to attack American targets. Maritime commerce, and container shipping in particular, provides a highly attractive means not only of delivering weapons but also of smuggling terrorists themselves into the American homeland."
Bodansky, Yossef. Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America. Rosewood, CA: Forum, 1999. New York: Forum, 2001. [pb]
The author is Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare.
According to Powers, NYRB, 17 Jan. 2002, Bodansky "reports in great detail the outward facts of bin Laden's progress from a builder of hospitals and military barracks in Afghanistan to the world's most wanted terrorist." Nevertheless, we learn "little about bin Laden's character, the people who shaped his thinking, how he came to embrace terrorism and build links with extreme Islamicist groups throughout the world."
Chapman, IJI&C 15.4, finds this work "immensely thought-provoking" and "illuminating."
Bohn, Kevin, and Kelli Arena. "With 300,000 Names on List, Terrorist Center Always on Alert." CNN, 25 Sep. 2007. [http://www.cnn.com]
At the Terrorist Screening Center, "a highly secure" facility "in a classified location in northern Virginia," dozens of operations specialists use a "secret terror watch list" to respond to queries about possible terrorists. Officials said that "the consolidated watch list has 300,000 names.... The center's director, Leonard Boyle, said about 5 percent of the names on the list are U.S. citizens.... The majority of calls to the center come from border agents, Boyle said.... [T]he 4-year-old center ... is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week by FBI personnel, along with others on loan from various government agencies."
Bonini, Carlo, and Giuseppe D'Avanzo. Collusion: International Espionage and the War On Terror. Hoboken, NJ: Melville House, 2007.
Peake, Studies 51.3 (2007), says that this work "is well documented, well told and provides an explanation for some of the confused intelligence reporting leading to the war in Iraq."
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