Materials presented chronologically.
Rubin, Claire. "Major Terrorist Events in the U.S. and Their Outcomes: Intitial Analysis and Observations." Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 1, no. 1 (2004). [http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol1/iss1/2]
From abstract: "[T]his article provides an initial policy analysis of recent federal efforts to deal with terrorism. The author poses some new questions and suggests that a new paradigm exists for emergency management in the U.S. since Sept. 11, 2001."
Vistica, Gregory L. "Military Split on How to Use Special Forces in Terror War." Washington Post, 5 Jan. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
There is a "fierce debate" among military and intelligence officials "over when and how elite military units should be deployed for maximum effectiveness." At Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's direction, "secret commando units known as hunter-killer teams have been ordered to 'kick down the doors' ... all over the world in search of al Qaeda members and their sympathizers." However, the U.S. military "may have missed chances to capture" Mohammad Omar and Ayman Zawahiri "during the past two years because of restrictions on Green Berets in favor of ... the Delta Force and SEAL Team Six," termed Special Mission Units.
Sanger, David E., and Eric Schmitt. "New U.S. Effort Steps Up Hunt for bin Laden." New York Times, 29 Feb. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to senior administration and military officials, "President Bush has approved a plan to intensify the effort to capture or kill Osama bin Laden,... The plan will apply both new forces and new tactics to the task.... The group at the center of the effort is Task Force 121, the covert commando team of Special Operations forces and Central Intelligence officers."
Hitz, Frederick P., and Brian J. Weiss. "Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots in the War on Terrorism." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 1-41.
"For cooperation to succeed,... both law enforcement and intelligence agencies must become more open and more flexible, and understand that, in an age of abundant information, their value is not the information they hold, but their analysis and use of that information.... [T]he U.S. needs to organize itself, not against a specific threat, but on a reasonable division of labor."
Kibbe, Jennifer D. "The Rise of the Shadow Warriors." Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2004): 102-115.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld "has made no secret of his plans to thrust special forces into the lead role in the war on terrorism, by using them for covert operations around the globe." Expanding the role of U.S. special forces "in the way Rumsfeld intends could be very dangerous for U.S. foreign policy."
Priest, Dana, and Kamran Khan. "Al Qaeda Leaders May Be Cornered: Pakistani Forces Wage Battle on Afghan Border." Washington Post, 19 Mar. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to senior Pakistani and U.S. officials on 18 March 2004, "Pakistani security forces backed by U.S. spy planes were engaged in a pitched battle with tribal fighters and Islamic militants who were believed to be protecting key members of al Qaeda.... Hundreds of Pakistani troops backed by artillery and helicopter gunships were on the attack around the villages of Azam Warsak, Kaloosha and Shin Warsak in remote southern Waziristan province, officials said....
"As part of the coordinated spring offensive, U.S. troops are working the other side of the border in Afghanistan. The forces include the clandestine Task Force 121, a recently reconstituted Special Operations and CIA unit, other Special Forces teams and 11,000 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, said several U.S. defense officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Small CIA paramilitary teams are also active in the region, several counterterrorism officials said.
"Supporting the U.S. and Pakistani troops is a newly refined technology that allows for the quick processing and analysis of images and communications intercepts from U.S. Air Force spy planes, CIA drones and National Security Agency satellites. New techniques allow for speedy transfer of the information to commanders in the field, said counterterrorism officials."
Gellman, Barton. "Memoir Criticizes Bush 9/11 Response: President Pushed Iraq Link, Aide Says." Washington Post, 22 Mar. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke provides a "detailed portrait of the Bush administration's wartime performance" after 9/11. Clarke "served more than two years in the Bush White House after holding senior posts under Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton." He resigned just over a year ago. Clarke expresses "points of disagreement with all four presidents," but "reserves by far his strongest language for George W. Bush. The president, he said, 'failed to act prior to September 11 on the threat from al Qaeda despite repeated warnings and then harvested a political windfall for taking obvious yet insufficient steps after the attacks.' The rapid shift of focus [from al Qaeda] to Saddam Hussein, Clarke writes, 'launched an unnecessary and costly war in Iraq that strengthened the fundamentalist, radical Islamic terrorist movement worldwide.'"
Rice, Condoleezza. "9/11: For The Record." Washington Post, 22 Mar. 2004, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Clearly responding to reports about the content of former counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke's new book, President Bush's National Security Adviser argues that "[i]n the immediate aftermath of the attacks,... [i]t would have been irresponsible not to ask a question about all possible links, including to Iraq -- a nation that had supported terrorism and had tried to kill a former president. Once advised that there was no evidence that Iraq was responsible for Sept. 11, the president told his National Security Council on Sept. 17 that Iraq was not on the agenda and that the initial U.S. response to Sept. 11 would be to target al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan."
Bamford, James. A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies. New York: Doubleday, 2004.
Farah, Washington Post, 6 Jun. 2004, comments that this "[h]ighly readable and well-researched ... account offers new insights into how the Sept. 11 hijackings occurred." The author "does a superb job of laying out and tying together threads of the Sept. 11 intelligence failures and their ongoing aftermath." In the last third of the book, he sets out "to show that key figures in the Bush administration ... locked in a plan to wage war in Iraq well before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. He charges that ... four leading hawks manipulated" the CIA, DIA, and NSA "in a desperate attempt to justify a regime change in Iraq that they had been strategizing to bring about for years."
According to Duffy, Time, 14 Jun. 2004, "Bamford alleges that the CIA not only failed to detect and deter the secret army of Muslim extremists gathering over the horizon in the late 1990s but also failed to take action when a group of Administration hard-liners, backed by the Pentagon chief and Vice President Dick Cheney, began to advance the case for war with Iraq in secret using data the CIA widely believed weren't supportable or were just plain false. Instead of fighting back, Bamford argues, the CIA for the most part rolled over and went along."
Kruh, Cryptologia 29.1 (Jan. 2005), calls A Pretext for War "a riveting chronicle of what happened on September 11.... This is an eye-opening book that you will find difficult to put down."
Pincus, Walter. "Agencies Shared Intelligence That Led to New Alert; Daily 5 p.m. Sessions Boost Cooperation." Washington Post, 2 Aug. 2004, A7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Pincus discusses the 5 p.m. daily counterterrorism meeting participated in by senior CIA, FBI, and military officials. Such a meeting on 29 July 2004 "set in motion plans for antiterrorism operations in the United States and overseas, ultimately leading to" the announcement on 1 August 2004 "of an elevated terrorism threat more specific than any the government had ever issued."
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