Chasdi, Richard. Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1994-1999. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002.
Singer, Parameters 34.2, comments that this work "provides a wealth of data and novel analysis, but packages it in a form that is almost inaccessible to general readers.... [T]his is a book solely for experts, but valuable nonetheless."
Cimbala, Stephen J. "Military Persuasion, Intelligence and the War on Terror." Defense & Security Analysis 22, no. 1 (Mar. 2006): 61-72.
Clarke, Richard A. "Targeting Terrorists." Wall Street Journal, 18 Jul. 2009. [http://online.wsj.com]
"Since well over 90% of the CIA's personnel are not engaged in covert action, but are doing the important work of intelligence collection and analysis, this [current] cycle of contentiousness suggests that perhaps covert action should be done by someone else. We need a professional intelligence gathering and analysis organization and it would be better if that agency were not tied to, prejudiced by, and often tainted with a connection to covert action.... [W]e should also take this opportunity to decide that covert operations should be done rarely, and then only by a special component of the military and perhaps by a small, separate, civilian agency under the joint supervision of a group of experienced administration and bi-partisan Congressional overseers."
Clutterbuck, Lindsay, and William Rosenau. "Subversion as a Facet of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Case for a Twenty-First Century Approach." Strategic Insights 8, no. 3 (August 2009). [http://www.nps.edu]
"[I]t is crucial to understand the differences between contemporary subversion, which is directed against Muslim communities, and subversion during the Cold War, which was directed primarily (but not exclusively) at state institutions. The infiltration of the armed forces, police, and government agencies is probably a small component of subversion today. The main thrust of countersubversion, both in Britain and the United States, should therefore be on the protection of Muslim communities from those who are undermining them from within, and on building and strengthening linkages between those communities and the larger society."
Conway, Maura. "Code Wars: Steganography, Signals Intelligence, and Terrorism." Knowledge, Technology and Policy (Special issue on "Technology and Terrorism") 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 45-62. Also in Technology and Terrorism, ed. David Clarke, 171-191. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2004.
From abstract: "The argument advanced here is that terrorists are unlikely to be employing digital steganography to facilitate secret intra-group communication as has been claimed. This is because terrorist use of digital steganography is both technically and operationally implausible. The position adopted in this paper is that terrorists are likely to employ low-tech steganography such as semagrams and null ciphers instead."
Cooper, H.H.A., and Lawrence J. Redlinger. Terrorism and Espionage in the Middle East: Deception, Displacement, and Denial. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2005.
According to Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), "the authors argue that Israel ... is the actual sponsor of terrorism [in the Middle East] and elsewhere in the world.... The[ir] most outrageous example is that Israel ... was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103." The "level of scholarship and application of fuzzy concepts [that] has been achieved" by the authors "might be reason enough to skip this book, but its $170 price tag makes the decision a no-brainer."
Corbin, Jane. The Base: Al-Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror. London: Pocket Books, 2003.
From publisher: "Tracing al-Qaeda's roots back to the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan," the author "picks up the complicated trail that led to the collapse of the Twin Towers and beyond." Corbin "examines the West's response to the threat of al-Qaeda and declares it a failure."
Cordesman, Anthony. "The Lessons of International Co-operation in Counter-Terrorism." RUSI Journal 151 (Feb. 2006): 48-53.
Corum, James S. Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy. St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2007.
Longino, Proceedings 133.7 (Jul. 2007), says that the author "presents a well-researched and thought-provoking analysis of what must be done to respond and why" to a type of warfare in Iraq "that arguably took many military professionals by surprise."
Crawford, Neta C. "Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War." Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (Mar. 2003): 5-25.
The author argues that "it is extremely difficult to fight a just counterterror war given the nature of terrorism and the realities of contemporary warfare." She shows, however, that "the [George W.] Bush administration has made an effort to engage in a just counterterror war by meeting the criterion of self-defense and seeking to avoid noncombatant harm. Even so, current U.S. policy and practice in the counterterror war are not just. But any government would have a problem fighting a just counterterror war in the current context; indeed, the utility of just war theory itself is challenged."
1. "Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 5 (Sep.-Oct. 2001): 329-337.
2. "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century." Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (Jun. 2000): 405-420.
Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M. Ludes, eds. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004.
From publisher: This work "brings together ... experts ... who have made the study" of terrorism "their life's work." They "provide a comprehensive picture of the challenges and opportunities of the campaign against international terrorism."
Cullen, Peter M. "The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign against Terror." Joint Force Quarterly 48 (1st Quarter 2008): 22-29.
The author concludes that "a carefully circumscribed policy of targeted killing can be a legal, moral, and effective tool in a counterterror campaign. Procedures to guide the proper implementation of a U.S. policy of targeted killing are proposed."
Dahl, Erik J. "Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence against Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (Feb. 2005): 31-55.
From abstract: This article seeks "to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack..., by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983." The author "concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism."
Dhar, Maloy. Fulcrum of Evil: The ISI-CIA-Al Qaeda Nexus. New Delhi: Manas, 2006.
Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006), says that the author's "somewhat warped analysis [concerning the CIA] suggests care should be taken in accepting his statements about other players. But the book has real value, despite its lack of documentation.... As a view from inside India and Islam, this is ... important if not easy reading."
Dickey, Christopher. Securing the City: Inside America's Best Counterterror Force -- the NYPD. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.
Brzezinski, Washington Post Book World, 1 Feb. 2009, notes that the author chronicles the creation of "an elite and controversial counter-intelligence unit within the NYPD" following the 9/11 attacks. He also "offers a scathing critique of the federal counter-terrorism system from a comparative, and in many ways competitive, perspective." New York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly hired David Cohen, "a senior CIA administrator," who built a "600-person unit." The book "contains a wealth of detail that would have been extremely difficult to obtain from typically less forthcoming federal agencies." However, he "might have dug a little deeper in addressing the persistent but vague allegations in Washington that the NYPD counterterrorism unit cuts legal corners and that some of its methods are unconstitutional."
For Garber, Studies 54.2 (Jun. 2010), this work "is engaging and edifying when describing details of how this unique expansion of a local law enforcement agency was envisioned and carried out. Unfortunately, Dickey doesn't do that often enough." The book's "major inadequacy" is that the author "virtually omits treatment of the deep-seated conflicts between the NYPD's Intelligence Division and its Counter Terrorism Bureau." Although the writing is clear, the language "at times veers toward the hackneyed"; and the book "has no apparent organizational scheme. In addition, the sparse endnotes are employed virtually randomly."
Return to Terrorism 2000s Table of Contents