Literature from the 1990s

D - K

Derian, James Der. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992.

Deutch, John. "Terrorism." Foreign Policy 108 (Fall 1997): 10-22.

Ehrenfeld, Rachel. Narcoterrorism. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

From publisher: "Discusses how governments from around the world, including Bulgaria, Cuba, Nicaragua, Syria and others, have, over the last 25 years, initiated, developed and in some cases virtually dominated the drug business to finance terrorist activities." See also, Rachel Ehrenfeld, "Defeating Narco-Terrorism," Huffington Post, 17 Mar. 2009. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com]

Falkenrath, Richard A., Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer. America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.

From publisher: Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) "weapons suitable for covert attack are available to a growing range of states and groups hostile to the United States. At the same time, constraints on their use appear to be eroding. This volume analyses the nature and limits of the covert NBC threat and proposes a measured set of policy responses, focused on improving intelligence and consequence-management capabilities to reduce U.S. vulnerability."

Farson, Stuart.

1. "Criminal Intelligence vs. Security Intelligence: A Reevaluation of the Police Role in the Response to Terrorism." In Democratic Responses to International Terrorism, ed. David A Charters, 191-228. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Books, 1991.

2. "Security Intelligence Versus Criminal Intelligence: Lines of Demarcation, Areas of Obfuscation and the Need to Re-evaluate Organizational Roles in Responding to Terrorism." Policing and Society 2 (1991): 65-87.

Gellman, Barton. [Series of two articles]

1. "Broad Effort Launched After '98 Attacks." Washington Post, 19 Dec. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Beginning on Aug. 7, 1998, the day that al Qaeda destroyed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, [U.S. President Bill] Clinton directed a campaign of increasing scope and lethality against [Osama] bin Laden's network that carried through his final days in office.

"In addition to a secret 'finding' to authorize covert action,... Clinton signed three highly classified Memoranda of Notification expanding the available tools. In succession, the president authorized killing instead of capturing bin Laden, then added several of al Qaeda's senior lieutenants, and finally approved the shooting down of private civilian aircraft on which they flew.

"The Clinton administration ordered the Navy to maintain two Los Angeles-class attack submarines on permanent station in the nearest available waters, enabling the U.S. military to place Tomahawk cruise missiles on any target in Afghanistan within about six hours of receiving the order....

"The lines Clinton opted not to cross continued to define U.S. policy in his successor's first eight months. Clinton stopped short of using more decisive military instruments, including U.S. ground forces, and declined to expand the reach of the war to the Taliban regime that hosted bin Laden and his fighters after 1996."

2. "Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign." Washington Post, 20 Dec. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"By any measure available, Clinton left office having given greater priority to terrorism than any president before him. His government doubled counterterrorist spending across 40 departments and agencies.... Clinton devoted some of his highest-profile foreign policy speeches to terrorism, including two at the U.N. General Assembly. An interagency panel, the Counterterrorism Strategy Group, took on new weight in policy disputes.... And the foreign policy cabinet, by the time it left office, had been convening every two to three weeks to shape a covert and overt campaign against al Qaeda.

"But neither Clinton nor his administration treated terrorism as their top concern, because it was not. Without the overriding impetus provided by Sept. 11, the war on terror in the 1990s lost as many struggles inside government as it won. Steps to manage risk moved forward readily. Some of the harder initiatives, hurried through these past three months by President Bush, foundered then on money, bureaucratic turf, domestic politics and rival conceptions of national interest."

Gerth, Jeff, and Judith Miller. "Funds for Terrorists Traced to Persian Gulf Businessman." New York Times, 14 Aug. 1996, A1.

Goodman, Melvin. "The Role of Intelligence in the War Against Terrorism." IntellectualCapital.com, 27 Aug. 1998. [http://www.intellectualcapital.com]

"[I]ntelligence has been less useful in anticipating acts of terrorism but very useful in the investigative process following ... terrorist attacks.... Unfortunately, the CIA has its own credibility problem in the war against terrorism because of its misuse of intelligence information." Clark comment: Here follows a standard Goodman litany about the politicization of intelligence by William Casey and Robert Gates.

"The CIA is good at pinpointing terrorists and describing terrorism, but the intentions of terrorists are more elusive, and it will be difficult to predict their next moves.... But this is no time to reverse a series of executive orders that prohibit U.S. officials from 'engaging in, or conspiring to engage in, political assassination'.... It is also no time to be making a greater economic investment in intelligence against terrorism. Sufficient collection platforms are already in place to target terrorist groups, as well as a sufficient number of intelligence analysts throughout the intelligence community."

Graham, Bradley. "Pentagon Plans Domestic Anti-Terrorism Team." Washington Post, 1 Feb. 1999, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Defense Secretary William S. Cohen has decided to seek presidential approval for a permanent task force, headed by a general officer, to coordinate the military's response to a chemical or biological attack on the United States.... [R]ecent reports of the anti-terrorist group have alarmed civil libertarians and right-wing militia groups.... Officials stressed that the anti-terrorism task force would not amount to a full-scale regional command.... Most likely, they said, the task force would be subordinate to the U.S. Atlantic Command in Norfolk, which already has nominal responsibility for homeland defense issues."

Grunwald, Michael. "CIA Halted Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Uganda." Washington Post, 25 Sep. 1998, A27. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to government sources, CIA officers "helped foil a plot last week by Islamic extremists to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Uganda." Ugandan authorities alerted by the CIA "have detained 20 suspects in the case, including the two alleged ringleaders.... Those two men are believed to be associates of Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden."

Guelke, Adrian. The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System. London: Tauris, 1995.

Heymann, Philip B. Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.

According to Rose, FA 78.2 (Mar.-Apr. 1999), "Heymann offers a range of intelligent, if unsurprising, suggestions for handling traditional terrorist threats ... [and] makes a persuasive case for avoiding overreaction."

Hoffman, Bruce.

1. "The Confluence of International and Domestic Terrorism." Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 1-15.

2. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Rev. & expanded ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Rose, FA 78.2 (Mar.-Apr. 1999), calls this work "a concise yet authoritative survey of trends in terrorism past and present." According to a publisher's note, the revised edition includes "updated coverage" on 9/11 and its aftermath and the Madrid and London bombings.

3. "Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 207-223.

Recent terrorist incidents in France, Japan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia "shed light on the inherent difficulties in preventing and countering terrorism even when intelligence on likely potential operations exists." They also illuminate "two key trends in international terrorism today that are likely to make these challenges even more problematical in the future: the proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative; and - related to this - the overall diffusion of the terrorist threat by the increasing involvement of 'amateur' terrorists alongside their more easily identified 'professional' counterparts."

Hudson, Rex A. The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1999.

Israeli, Raphael. "Islamikaze and Their Significance." Terrorism and Political Violence, 9, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 96-121.

The author suggests that Islamic "suicide bombers" might better be understood if they were compared to the Japanese kamikaze pilots of World War II.

Ito, Tim. "Twenty Years of Anti-American Terror." Washington Post, 30 Apr. 1999. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Offers a chronology of terrorist actions since 1979.

Kornblum, Allan N. Prosecuting Terrorism Abroad: The Case of the Achille Lauro. Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence College, 1993.

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