Armstrong, John Alexander, ed. Soviet Partisans in World War II. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964.
Pforzheimer: "Chapter V ... describes Soviet intelligence as an instrument of control, as well as partisan intelligence operations." This study is "valuable for students in the field of guerrilla warfare."
Armstrong, Richard N. [LTCOL/USA] Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1988.
Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), calls this "[a] solid analysis of Soviet military deception operations in World War II. Oddly misses their last and most sophisticated case, their invasion of Manchuria."
Avery, Donald. "Allied Scientific Co-operation and Soviet Espionage in Canada, 1941-45." Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 3 (Jul. 1993): 100-128. Also, In Espionage: Past, Present, Future? ed. Wesley K. Wark, 100-128. London: Frank Cass, 1994.
Bacon, Donald J. [MAJ/USAF] Second World War Deception: Lessons Learned for Todays Joint Planner. Wright Flyer Paper No.5. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1998.
According to Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), the author focuses on six World War II deception cases -- 3 British and 3 Soviet.
Beachley, David R. "Soviet Radio Electronic Combat in World War II." Military Review 61 (Mar. 1981): 61-66.
Sexton: "A survey of the development and employment of Comint and radio countermeasures by the Red Army in World War II."
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. New York: Knopf, 2007. New York: Vintage, 2008. [pb]
Pringle, Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), sees this as "the best one volume history of the war on the Eastern Front." The author "does an outstanding job of discussing the role of NKVD regiments and divisions, as well as less known destroyer battalions.... Bellamy [also] does a good job of putting nuclear espionage into context." However, the book "is too heavily concentrated on the first 18 months of the war."
Birstein, Vadim J. SMERSH: Stalin's Secret Weapon, Soviet Military Counterintelligence in WWII. London: Biteback Publishing, 2012.
Goulden, Washington Times, 28 Feb. 2012, and Intelligencer 19.1 (Winter-Spring 2012), notes that "SMERSH ... existed as a military counterintelligence organization only from April 1943 to May 1946.... [T]his book can be tedious reading at times. Mr. Birstein has long riffs on the Soviet security services both before and after the brief life of SMERSH. While the unconventional sexual activities of such spy bosses as Lavrenti Beria and Genrich Yagoda make for salacious reading, they seem rather remote from the subject at hand. Nonetheless, it's a worthwhile read."
For King, NIPQ 28.2 (Jul. 2012), the 10 years the author spent researching this book shows. "While the detail is sometimes tedious, the story he unfolds is fascinating." Peake, Studies 56.2 (Jun. 2012) notes that "with a few exceptions," this book is "based on secondary sources."
Callahan, Raymond. "No Real Surprise Here." Military History 8 (Oct. 1991): 74-79.
According to Sexton, the author discusses "four strategic surprises achieved by Axis forces...: the conquest of Norway, the thrust through the Ardennes, the invasion of Russia and the attack at Pearl Harbor. Each event is assessed in [a] context of extant intelligence and preconceptions."
David, James E. "Soviet Secrets in the Ether -- Clandestine Radio Stations at the New York and San Francisco Consulates in World War II." Cryptologia 27, no. 2 (Apr. 2003): 135-147.
In July 1942, a Soviet request for permission to operate a radio station at the New York Consulate was denied by the State Department. However, by December 1942, FCC monitoring sites were picking up shortwave broadcasts identified in February 1943 as coming from the Consulate. In March 1943, a transmitter operating from the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco was identified. The operation of the two transmitters ended in October 1943 when newspapers in New York and Los Angeles published a story about illegal radios at the consulates.
Dixon, C. Aubrey, and Otto Heilbrunn. Communist Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Praeger, 1955.
Chambers: "Academic/military study."
Fischer, Ben. "'Mr. Guver': Anonymous Soviet Letter to the FBI." Center for the Study of Intelligence Newsletter 7 (Winter-Spring 1997): 10-11.
The author looks at one of the documents in the VENONA collection [Document No. 10 in Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, eds., Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957 (Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996)]. The item in question is an anonymous letter, dated 7 August 1943, to "Mr. Guver" (Hoover). It identifies Soviet "intelligence officers and operations that stretched from Canada to Mexico." It also includes accusations of war crimes against the KGB rezident in Washington, Vassili M. Zarubin (a.k.a. Zubilin), and his deputy, Markov (in the United States under the alias of Lt. Col. Vassili D. Mironov). The author sees the letter, a mix of fact and fantasy, as probably the result of a personal vendetta either by Markov or another enemy of Zarubin's within the rezidentura.
Fischer, Benjamin B. "Preparing to Blow Up the Bolshoi Ballet." Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin 10 (Winter 2000): 11-12.
This is a brief piece on an NKVD special operations unit, the Special-Purpose Motorized Brigade (OMSBON), renamed in 1943 as the Independent Detachment for Special Operations.
Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene. Editors. "Release of Katyn Documents." 11, no. 5 (1992): 3.
Fox, Frank. God's Eye: Aerial Photography and the Katyn Forest Massacre. West Chester, PA: West Chester University Press, 1999.
Fischer, IJI&C 15.3 and Studies 46.3 (2002), notes that this work "is part history and part biography. The historical part tells the story of Katyn and other killing fields, where more than 20,000 Polish" citizens were slaughtered during World War II. The biographical part focuses on the efforts of Waclaw Godziemba-Maliszewski, "a self-taught photo-interpreter of professional caliber," to "identify execution and burial sites, establish Soviet culpability, and pressure Warsaw and Moscow to complete a full official investigation."
Gebhardt, James F.
1. Soviet Naval Special Purpose Forces in World War II. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989.
2."Soviet Naval Special Purpose Forces: Origins and Operations in the Second World War." Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, no. 4 (1989): 536-578.
This article describes the combat actions of Soviet naval special purpose forces "against the Germans in the Far North from 1941-44, and against the Japanese in Northern Korea in August 1945."
Glantz, David M.
1. "The Red Mask: The Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 175-259.
2. The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990.
Surveillant 1.1 notes that this work is the "product of five years of research on Soviet deception and intelligence." According to Ugino, MI 20.2, the "Soviets started the war handicapped by the 'intuitions' of their leader Joseph Stalin.... By 1942, the Soviets established a group of interacting agencies and collection and analysis methods that are still in use today.... By war's end, the Soviets had refined their procedures in a series of regulations, directives, and instructions.... Although the Soviet empire is gone, the lessons enumerated in this book are still applicable."
3. Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. London: Frank Cass, 1989.
4. Soviet Military Intelligence in War. London: Frank Cass, 1990.
Surveillant 1.5 notes that this work was the winner of NISC's award for "Best Intelligence Book by U.S. Author" for 1990. Glantz is "Director of Research at the US Army Soviet Army Studies Office at Ft. Leavenworth." The author "explains how Soviet intelligence activities on the Eastern Front evolved during the Second World War." The study is "based on numerous formerly secret Soviet and German sources."
5. "Soviet Operational Intelligence in the Kursk Operation, July 1943." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 5-49.
In this lengthy article, Glantz explores the use of signals intelligence by the Soviet Red Army to locate the German Army's reserves, a critical feature of the Battle of Kursk. The article is liberally illustrated with maps.
Haslam, Jonathan. "Stalin's Fears of a Separate Peace, 1942." Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 4 (Oct. 1993): 97-99.
Little new or even interesting here.
Heilbrunn, Otto. The Soviet Secret Services. New York: Praeger, 1956. London: Allen & Unwin, 1956. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981.
Rocca and Dziak: "An account of Soviet Security Services activities during World War II, with emphasis on partisan operations support."
1. "The Soviets and Ultra." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 2 (Apr. 1988): 233-247.
The author believes that the capture of Enigma machines at Stalingrad and the work of Russian mathematicians allowed the Soviets to break the Enigma system. Sexton calls this a "provocative thesis that remains to be proved." For a challenge to Jukes' thesis, see P.S. Milner-Barry, "The Soviets and Ultra: A Comment on Jukes' Hypothesis," Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 2 (Apr. 1988): 248-250.
2. "More on the Soviets and Ultra." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 2 (Apr. 1989): 374-384.
The author addresses some issues raised by critics of his original article (see above). For Ralph Erskine's comment on this article, see "The Soviets and Naval Enigma: Some Comments," Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 3 (Jul. 1989): 503-511.
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